Haynes v. Aldrich

• Decision Date: 24 May 1892
• Citation: 31 N.E. 94,133 N.Y. 287
• Parties: HAYNES v. ALDRICH.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

133 N.Y. 287

31 N.E. 94

HAYNES

v.ALDRICH.

Court of Appeals of New York.

May 24, 1892.

Appeal from superior court, New York city, general term.

Action by Elizabeth J. Haynes against Elizabeth W. Aldrich. From a judgment of the general term, affirming a judgment for plaintiff, entered on a verdict directed by the trial judge, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Spencer Aldrich,(Henry Galbraith Ward, of counsel,) for appellant.

Olin, Rives & Montgomery, (Stephen H. Olin, of counsel,) for respondent.

FINCH, J.

Judgment was ordered against the defendant upon the trial of this action for rent accrued after the expiration of her original lease, upon the ground that by holding over after such expiration she became a tenant for another year upon the terms of the prior written lease. The facts disclosed were that such lease ended by its terms on May 1, 1889; that it contained a provision that the premises should be occupied as a private dwelling, and a covenant not to sublet without the written consent of the lessor. Both stipulations were violated. The tenant, without permission, rented the premises to Mrs. Coventry, who occupied them as a boarding house, and received as one of her boarders a lady, who was a chronic invalid, and continuously ill. On the 4th of February, 1889, the lessor inquired of the lessee whether she desired to renew her lease for another year, and was informed that she did not. The 1st day of May was a holiday, and doubtless the tenant had until noon of the next day for a surrender of possession. But the possession was retained by the tenant until the afternoon of May 4th, when the keys were tendered, but refused. The excuse given is that on the 2d day of May there was difficulty in engaging trucks, that the removal began on the 3d, but the sick boarder could not then be moved with safety, and was not moved until the 4th. This court held in Commissioners v. Clark, 33 N. Y. 251, that the rule is too well settled to be disputed that, where a tenant holds over after the expiration of his term, the law will imply an agreement to hold for a year upon the terms of the prior lease; that the option to so regard it is with the landlord, and not with the tenant; and that the latter holds over his term at his peril. In Conway v. Starkweather, 1 Denio, 114, the tenant had notified the landlord of his intentionnot to remain for another year, as was the fact in the present case, but nevertheless did hold over for a fortnight, and the fact of the notice was held to be immaterial, the court saying: ‘The act of the plaintiff in holding over has given the defendants a legal right to treat him as tenant, and it is not in his power to throw off that character, however onerous it may be.’ The appellant does not deny the rule, but seeks to qualify it so as to mean that it is only where the tenant holds over voluntarily, and for his own convenience, that the landlord's right arises, and that it does not so arise when the tenant holds over involuntarily, not for his own convenience, but because he cannot help it. I am averse to any such qualification. It would introduce an uncertainty into a rule whose chief value lies in its certainty. The consequent confusion would be very great. Excuses would always be forthcoming, and their sufficiency be subject to the doubtful conclusions of a jury; and no lessor would ever know when he could safely promise possession to a new tenant. The cases cited by the appellant do not bear out his contention. In Smith v. Allt, 7 Daly, 492, the holding over was in part the act and assent of the landlord, and occasioned by pending negotiations, and could not have been said to be the sole act of the tenant. In Shanahan v. Shanahan, 55 N. Y. Super. Ct. 344, it...