Haynes v. Allbaugh
| Decision Date | 27 September 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No. CIV 15-374-RAW-KEW |
| Parties | KENJI DUVILLE HAYNES, Petitioner, v. JOE M. ALLBAUGH, DOC Director, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Oklahoma |
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner is a pro se state prisoner in the custody of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections who is attacking his conviction and sentence in Wagoner County District Court Case No. CF-2012-418 for Endeavoring to Manufacture a Controlled Substance, After Conviction of Drug-Related Felonies (Count 1); Obstructing an Officer (Count 4); and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia (Count 5). He received a 40-year sentence for Endeavoring to Manufacture a Controlled Substance and one-year sentences on the two misdemeanors, which the trial court ordered to run concurrently. He sets forth the following grounds for relief:
Respondent concedes that Petitioner has exhausted his state court remedies for the purpose of federal habeas corpus review. The following records have been submitted to the court for consideration in this matter:
Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), federal habeas corpus relief is proper only when the state court adjudication of a claim:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
Petitioner alleges in Ground I that Officer Webster's stop of Petitioner was improper. He, therefore, asserts the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash/suppress which relied heavily on the OCCA's unpublished decision in Gille v. State, No. M-2004-802 (Okla. Crim. App. Oct. 21, 2015) (O.R. 75-85). The record shows the State filed a response to Petitioner's motion (Dkt. 8-12 at 12-20; O.R. 89-97), and on June 7, 2013, the trial court held a hearing and issued this decision from the bench:
[I]n this case, giving consideration to all the evidence that waspresented at the Preliminary Hearing, I believe that the police officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle, and then it follows that everything after that was a valid stop. I think once he stopped it and observed what he observed and smelled what he smelled, then he had probable cause to continue the detention. The Defendant's Motion to Quash and Suppress is overruled.
(Mot. Tr. 12; Dkt. 9-3 at 14).
On direct appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) rejected this claim, holding that under the facts of the case, Petitioner's motion to suppress was properly overruled:
The undisputed testimony showed that Appellant's vehicle was parked behind a vacant retail building that had recently been the site of a variety of crimes. The vehicle was parked very close to the rear of the building, in an alcove by the loading dock, as if to avoid detection. The vehicle's lights were off, but as soon as the officer's vehicle approached, Appellant turned his lights on and left at a high rate of speed.
Haynes v. State, No. F-2013-737, slip op. at 2 n.1 (Okla. Crim. App. July 14, 2014) (Dkt. 8-3). The OCCA's factual findings are entitled to a presumption of correctness, unless Petitioner produces clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
[T]he totality of facts known and observed by the arresting officer support a conclusion that Appellant's conduct, preceding the traffic stop, was not equally consistent with innocent activity as with criminal activity. The trial court did not err in finding the investigative detention was reasonable under the circumstances. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 73 (1968); Knighton v. State, 912 P.2d 878, 887 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996).
Haynes, No. F-2013-737, slip op. at 2.
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule claims are not cognizable in federal habeascorpus proceedings if the petitioner had an opportunity for full and fair litigation of the claim in state court. Stone v. Powell, 418 U.S. 465, 494 (1976). Here, petitioner had the opportunity and exercised it fully. The issue was initially raised in the trial court through a motion to suppress. After hearing testimony about the search in the motion hearing, the trial court overruled the motion. Petitioner then raised the claim on direct appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals, but the argument also was rejected by that court. Because Petitioner's Fourth Amendment was fully and fairly litigated in state court, this Court finds Ground I of the petition is meritless.
Petitioner received three concurrent sentences, with the two misdemeanor counts to run concurrently, for a total of 40 years. He alleges in Ground II of the petition that the trial court erroneously deprived him of his statutory right to have the court assess punishment. He claims in Ground III that the trial court improperly bifurcated the proceedings when it submitted the misdemeanor offenses to the jury in the second stage of trial. In Ground IV, Petitioner complains his 40-year sentence for Endeavoring to Manufacture a Controlled Substance and his one-year sentences for the misdemeanors are "shockingly" excessive. Respondent alleges these claims concerning the sentencing procedures used at Petitioner's trial raise issues of state law which are not cognizable on federal habeas review.
On direct appeal, Petitioner raised the claim in Ground II as a question of state-law statutory interpretation, although he also included a due process claim, citing Hicks v.Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 346 (1980), and Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).1 He, however, conceded in his direct appeal brief that this claim raised an issue regarding sentencing only (Dkt. 8-1 at 16). In essence, this claim on direct appeal alleged that it was error for the trial court to deny his request to waive the jury's assessment of sentencing, after the jury found him guilty in the first-stage proceedings. The OCCA rejected Petitioner's statutory interpretation:
[A] defendant has no "right" to have a jury decide his guilt and then have a judge decide his sentence. Rendell v. State, 543 P.2d 574, 581-82 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975); Love v. State, 217 P.3d 116, 117 (Okla. Crim. App. 2009). The trial court did not err in denying Appellant's unilateral request for same. [This proposition] is denied.
Haynes, No. F-2013-737, slip op. at 2.
The OCCA also denied relief on the claim in Petitioner's Ground III of this petition:
[T]he State concedes, and we agree, that the trial court erred in the way it bifurcated the trial, so that the jury did not recommend sentences on the misdemeanor counts until after it had received evidence of Appellant's felony criminal history, which was not relevant to the misdemeanor sentences. However, because the trial court ordered the misdemeanor terms to be served concurrently with the felony term, Appellant suffered no prejudice from the error. Carter v. State, 147 P.3d 243, 244 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006). [This proposition] is denied.
Haynes, No. F-2013-737, slip op. at 2-3.
Regarding Petitioner's claim in Ground IV of the petition, the OCCA reasoned:
[C]onsidering Appellant's history of drug crimes, the circumstances of this particular case, and the trial court's decision to run all terms concurrently, we cannot say the sentences imposed are shocking to the conscience. Rea v. State, 34 P.3d 148, 149 (Okla. Crim. App. 2001). [This proposition] is denied.
Haynes, No. F-2013-737, slip op. at 3.
Issues concerning sentencing are matters of state law. See Shafer v. Stratton, 906 F.2d 506, 510 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 961 (1990). Challenges to state sentencing decisions "are not generally constitutionally cognizable, unless it is shown the sentence imposed is outside the statutory limits or unauthorized by law."2 Dennis v. Poppel, 222...
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