Haynes v. Anderson, 45637
| Citation | 232 N.W.2d 196,304 Minn. 185 |
| Decision Date | 23 May 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 45637,45637 |
| Parties | Lorraine HAYNES, Petitioner, v. Donald A. ANDERSON, Respondent. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Minnesota (US) |
Syllabus by the Court.
In an action for personal injuries giving rise to a claim of permanent disability, a physician conducting an adverse examination of the plaintiff may be authorized to administer the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Test if, but only if, the trial court, in exercise of the authority granted by Rule 35.01, Rules of Civil Procedure, is persuaded:
(1) That the answers to the questions will not be used to embarrass or intimidate the examinee;
(2) That the need for the examination and the anticipated probative value of the evaluation of the answers given outweigh any unnecessary intrusion on the examinee's privacy;
(3) That the evaluation of the results of the test will be privileged except to the extent that disclosure is made necessary by the progress of the litigation;
(4) That answers to each of the questions submitted to the person examined are necessary to make the test useful to the examining physician; otherwise, answers to nonessential questions should not be required.
Ogurak & Striker and Melvin Ogurak, and Leland W. Kampinen, Minneapolis, for petitioner.
Clarance E. Hagglund, Robert M. Pearson, Minneapolis, for respondent.
Heard at Special Term by KELLY, TODD, and SCOTT, JJ., and considered and decided by the court en banc.
Petition for writ of prohibition to restrain the district court from enforcing its order that plaintiff submit to the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory as part of the independent adverse medical examination in this personal injury action. We issued an alternative writ. Writ discharged and case remanded for further proceedings consistent with opinion.
The underlying action arises out of an April 1971 automobile collision. Plaintiff commenced this action in December 1971, alleging that as a direct result of the accident she 'was caused to suffer great pain and sustain, among other injuries, severe and permanent injuries to her head, neck, lower back and spine, legs, and other areas.' While denying causal negligence on his part, defendant answered that he was without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the alleged injuries sustained by the plaintiff.
Based on the scant record before us, these facts are pertinent:
According to plaintiff's complaint, defendant's vehicle struck the rear of plaintiff's vehicle, inflicting about $160 of property damage. Plaintiff claims to have incurred severe injuries. The day after the accident, plaintiff complained to a doctor of headaches and pain in her back, neck, and shoulder. She was diagnosed as suffering from a myofascial injury of the neck and a protruding lumbar disc and received treatment.
In June 1971, plaintiff was hospitalized for 17 days and received physical therapy for her neck and back condition. The diagnosis at that time was 'myofascial injury of neck' and 'lumbar discognetic syndrome.' Plaintiff continued to receive therapy on an outpatient basis. Plaintiff's doctor discharged her from treatment in October 1971, noting that she had made a good recovery, but that her injuries were permanent and that she suffered from a permanent partial disability of her back. Plaintiff apparently last saw her doctor about her condition in December 1971.
Plaintiff's April 1973 discovery deposition revealed that she suffered from daily headaches, accompanied by neck pain, for which she takes a nonprescription pain reliever, daily pain in her right thigh, pain in her right arm occurring several times a week, almost constant throbbing in her shoulder, and a periodic 'catch' in her back. Discovery also revealed that plaintiff claims special damages of approximately $4,500 for medical expenses and wage loss.
In early May of 1974, plaintiff, pursuant to an agreement of counsel, submitted to an adverse medical examination performed by Andrew J. Leemhuis, M.D. He concluded that the physical examination was 'normal for any abnormality as a result of this accident' and characterized plaintiff's residual symptoms as 'on a tension or functional basis,' predicting that they would disappear when the litigation was settled.
Dr. Leemhuis attempted to administer the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (hereinafter MMPI) to plaintiff during the examination. Acting upon the advice of counsel, plaintiff refused to submit to it. Defendant moved the trial court, under Rule 35.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, for an order compelling plaintiff to undergo the MMPI. Plaintiff contends that the trial court abused its discretion in issuing the order.
At issue is the meaning of Rule 35.01 as applied. The rule provides:
(Italics supplied.)
Plaintiff argues that neither the 'in controversy' nor the 'good cause' requirements of the rule have been met 1. The trial court is vested with much discretion in ordering a physical or mental examination. Hill v. Hietala, 268 Minn. 296, 128 N.W.2d 745 (1964). We also recognize that mere conclusory allegations of the pleadings are insufficient to satisfy the 'in controversy' and 'good cause' requirements of Rule 35.01. The moving party must affirmatively show that the condition as to which examination is sought is really and genuinely in controversy and that good cause exists for the particular examination in question. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 85 S.Ct. 234, 13 L.Ed.2d 152 (1964).
Plaintiff argues that by asserting physical injuries in her complaint she placed only her physical and not her mental condition in controversy. To place such a restrictive interpretation upon Rule 35.01 would, in our view, substantially undermine its usefulness. The rule does not require that the party to be examined place his or her condition in controversy, but only that the condition be in controversy. 1
We are convinced by materials placed before the trial court at the hearing on the discovery...
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Kresko v. Rulli, C5-88-206
...discretion in determining whether a psychological examination should be ordered pursuant to Minn.R.Civ.P. 35.01. Haynes v. Anderson, 304 Minn. 185, 232 N.W.2d 196 (1975); Hill v. Hietala, 268 Minn. 296, 128 N.W.2d 745 (1964); Wills v. Red Lake Municipal Liquor Store, 350 N.W.2d 452 (Minn.Ct......
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...cause' under the rule differs from case to case, turning largely upon the nature of the examination sought." Haynes v. Anderson, 304 Minn. 185, 189, 232 N.W.2d 196, 199 (1975). "The burden to show that the trial court abused its discretion in granting or denying an order for an adverse exam......
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...is "really and genuinely in controversy and that good cause exists for the particular examination in question." Haynes v. Anderson, 304 Minn. 185, 188, 232 N.W.2d 196, 199 (1975). The burden to show that the trial court abused its discretion in granting or denying an order for an adverse ex......
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Tyler v. District Court In and For Adams County
...for ordering each particular examination.' Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 85 S.Ct. 234, 13 L.Ed.2d 152. See Haynes v. Anderson, 304 Minn. 185, 232 N.W.2d 196 (1975). Petitioner's mental condition is not in controversy under Rule 35(a). While Schlagenhauf v. Holder, supra, states that......