Haynes v. Arman

• Decision Date: 13 May 2016
• Docket Number: No. 5D15–2865.,5D15–2865.
• Citation: 192 So.3d 546
• Parties: Mark Alan HAYNES, Appellant, v. Michael ARMAN, Ela M. Lugo, et al., Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

192 So.3d 546

Mark Alan HAYNES, Appellant,

v.Michael ARMAN, Ela M. Lugo, et al., Appellees.

No. 5D15–2865.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

May 13, 2016.

Mark Alan Haynes, Port Orange, pro se.

Ela M. Lugo, of Lugo Law, Inc. Edgewater, pro se and for Appellee, Michael Arman.

No Appearance for Appellees, Ronald Lester and Maxine Lester.

PER CURIAM.

Mark Alan Haynes (“Appellant”) appeals the final summary judgment awarding Michael Arman and Ela M. Lugo (“Appellees”) damages of just over $2 million, including a punitive damages award of $1,483,456. Because we find that disputed issues of material fact exist and that the awards for punitive damages and certain intangible damages are peculiarly within the province of the jury, we reverse the final judgment on all issues, save one.

In 2004, Appellees contracted with Appellant to purchase real property located in Oak Hill, Florida. Because this property was completely surrounded by other property owned by Appellant, the contract between the parties for the purchase of the property and the later warranty deed provided Appellees with certain easements, including egress and ingress, across Appellant's properties.

For reasons not germane to the resolution of the present appeal, the relationship between the parties soon deteriorated, resulting in Appellees filing suit against Appellant in 2010. Appellees were later granted leave to amend their complaint to assert a claim for punitive damages and, in early 2015, filed the operative third amended complaint alleging the following six causes of action: (1) fraud in the inducement; (2) breach of contract and “trespass on the case”;¹ (3) slander/disparagement of title; (4) trespass; (5) unjust enrichment; and (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress. Appellees demanded a jury trial on all counts.

Appellant, who was, by that time, and still is representing himself,² filed a detailed, but rambling response to the third amended complaint. Appellees thereafter filed their motion for summary judgment and attached to their motion, among other things, their affidavits, a partial transcript from an administrative hearing involving the parties, and a “schedule of damages,” which included claims for damages in the amount of $10,000 for trespass, $97,500 for “mental anguish and suffering” related to the intentional infliction of emotional distress action, and a “treble damage calculation” of $1,565,821.02.³

Appellant filed a motion to dismiss and strike the motion for summary judgment, attaching numerous documents to his motion, including his own “Affidavit of Substantive Impeachable Truth and Facts,” to which he also attached various exhibits. After the hearing, the trial court entered final judgment awarding Appellees $494,485.34, which is the total of the compensatory damages requested, and punitive damages of $1,483,456.00, which is exactly three times the compensatory damages, together with $27,455.00 in attorney's fees and $1,493.75 in court costs, for a total of $2,006,890.09. This appeal ensued.

The standard of review of a trial court's entry of a final summary judgment is de novo. Volusia Cty. v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So.2d 126, 130 (Fla.2000)

. In conducting this review, an appellate court must examine the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, which, in this case, is Appellant. See

Colon v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA, 162 So.3d 195, 197 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015). “A summary judgment should not be granted unless the facts are so crystalized that nothing remains but questions of law.... If the evidence will permit different reasonable inferences, it should be submitted to a jury as a question of fact.” Lashley v. Bowman, 561 So.2d 406, 408 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (citing Moore v. Morris, 475 So.2d 666 (Fla.1985) ). Moreover, unless the moving party conclusively establishes, as a matter of law and fact, its entitlement to the summary judgment, the opposing party is not required to file a counter-affidavit to defeat the motion. Lindsey v. Cadence Bank, N.A., 135 So.3d 1164, 1167 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)

.

We find that the facts in this record are not so crystalized that nothing remains but questions of law, and we specifically address some, but not all, of the issues that require resolution by the jury. First, the trial court erred in its summary award of punitive damages. The law is clear that:

When claims for punitive damages are made, the respective provinces of the court and jury are well defined. The court is to decide at the close of evidence whether there is a legal basis for recovery of punitive damages shown by any interpretation of the evidence favorable to the plaintiff.... Once the court permits the issue of punitive damages to go to the jury, the jury has the discretion whether or not to award punitive damages and the amount which should be awarded.

(Wackenhut Corp. v. Canty, 359 So.2d 430, 435–36 (Fla.1978)

(citation omitted)). Here, because Appellees demanded a jury trial in the operative complaint, Appellant was entitled to trial by jury and to have the jury determine the amount of punitive damages, if any. See

Shasho v. Euro Motor Sport, Inc., 979 So.2d 343, 345 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (“Regardless of who makes the demand [for jury trial], once made it cannot be withdrawn without the consent of all parties” (quoting Barge v. Simeton, 460 So.2d 939, 940 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) )); see also Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.430(d) (“A demand for trial by jury may not be withdrawn without the consent of the parties.”). There is no...