Haynes v. Daimlerchrysler Corp.

• Decision Date: 17 June 2011
• Docket Number: No. 101151.,101151.
• Citation: 228 W.Va. 441,720 S.E.2d 564
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: Shelia F. HAYNES, as Administratrix of the Estate of Elgene Phillips, Jr., Deceased, Plaintiff Below, Petitioner v. DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION, a Foreign Corporation; Autoliv Asp, Inc., a Foreign Corporation; and Joe Holland Chevrolet, Inc., a West Virginia Corporation, Defendants Below, Respondents.

228 W.Va. 441

720 S.E.2d 564

Shelia F. HAYNES, as Administratrix of the Estate of Elgene Phillips, Jr., Deceased, Plaintiff Below, Petitioner

v.DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION, a Foreign Corporation; Autoliv Asp, Inc., a Foreign Corporation; and Joe Holland Chevrolet, Inc., a West Virginia Corporation, Defendants Below, Respondents.

No. 101151.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted May 25, 2011.Decided June 17, 2011.Concurring Opinion of Justice Benjamin

July 22, 2011.

Syllabus by the Court

1. “This Court reviews the circuit court's final order and ultimate disposition under an abuse of discretion standard. We review challenges to findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard; conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.” Syllabus Point 4, Burgess v. Porterfield, 196 W.Va. 178, 469 S.E.2d 114 (1996).

2. “Where the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, they must be applied and not construed.” Syllabus Point 2, Bethlehem Mines Corp. v. Haden, 153 W.Va. 721, 172 S.E.2d 126 (1969).

3. “ ‘ “It is not the right or province of a court to alter, pervert or destroy the clear meaning and intent of the parties as expressed in unambiguous language in their written contract or to make a new or different contract for them.” Syllabus Point 3, Cotiga Development Co. v. United Fuel Gas Co., 147 W.Va. 484, 128 S.E.2d 626 (1963).’ Syllabus point 1, Hatfield v. Health Management Associates of West Virginia, 223 W.Va. 259, 672 S.E.2d 395 (2008).” Syllabus Point 5, Dan's Carworld, LLC v. Serian, 223 W.Va. 478, 677 S.E.2d 914 (2009).

4. “ ‘To show an accord and satisfaction, the person asserting the defense must prove three elements: (1) Consideration to support an accord and satisfaction; (2) an offer of partial payment in full satisfaction of a disputed claim; and (3) acceptance of the partial payment by the creditor with knowledge that the debtor offered it only upon the condition that the creditor accept the payment in full satisfaction of the disputed claim or not at all.’ Syllabus Point 1, Charleston Urban Renewal Authority v. Stanley, 176 W.Va. 591, 346 S.E.2d 740 (1985).” Syllabus Point 5, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994).

5. “Whether the parties altered their original contract or entered a transaction or compromise depends on whether there was mutual consent. It is necessary to examine the evidence and determine whether the parties arrived at a new agreement or acted under the existing one.” Syllabus Point 7, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994).

Charles M. Love, IV, Esq., Christopher L. Brinkley, Esq., The Masters Law Firm LC, Charleston, WV, for Petitioner.

Philip J. Combs, Esq., Debra C. Price, Esq., Allen Guthrie & Thomas, PLLC, Charleston, WV, for Respondent Autoliv, Asp, Inc.

PER CURIAM:

This case is before the Court upon an appeal of the May 4, 2010, order of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County by the petitioner, Shelia Haynes, as Administratrix of the Estate of Elgene Phillips, Jr. In this appeal, the petitioner argues that the circuit court erred in denying her motion to sever claims against a defendant below, DaimlerChrysler Corporation (hereinafter, “Chrysler”), and further erred in denying her motion to compel defendant below and respondent herein, Autoliv Asp, Inc. (hereinafter, “Autoliv”), to pay the remainder of an agreed upon settlement of the underlying wrongful death action. The petitioner seeks a reversal of the circuit court's order. Based upon the parties' briefs and arguments in this proceeding, as well as the relevant statutory and case law, this Court is of the opinion that the circuit court committed reversible error and accordingly, reverses the decision below.

I.FACTS

On January 22, 2006, Elgene Phillips was driving his 1998 Dodge Ram 1500 truck northbound on Sissonville Drive near Sissonville, West Virginia, when his vehicle hydroplaned, ran off the left side of the road through a guardrail, and rolled over. Mr. Phillips died as a result of the accident. The petitioner, as administratrix of Mr. Phillips' estate, then filed a wrongful death action in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County alleging that the driver's restraint system in the decedent's truck (the seatbelt) was defective. Chrysler, the manufacturer of the decedent's truck, and Autoliv, the manufacturer of the seatbelt, were named as defendants.¹

According to Gloria Phillips, who was a passenger in the truck, Mr. Phillips' seatbelt was latched prior to the accident but became unlatched during, and as a result of, the accident.² The petitioner's expert, William Muzzy, III, also opined that Mr. Phillips would not have sustained fatal injuries if his seatbelt had remained latched during the accident. Ms. Phillips, whose seatbelt did remain latched during the accident, suffered only minor injuries.

On February 19, 2009, the petitioner participated in a mediation with Autoliv and Chrysler. As a result of mediation, the parties reached a settlement of all claims and executed a handwritten settlement agreement (hereinafter, the “Agreement”). The full text of the Agreement provides:

Settlement Agreement

On February 19, 2009, the parties met in mediation and agreed to settle as follows:

(1) The Defendants agree to pay to the Plaintiff $150,000

(2) In return for said payment, the Plaintiff agrees as follows:

(a) to keep the terms and conditions of the settlement confidential;

(b) to execute a full and complete release of any claims asserted or which may have been asserted, to be prepared by counsel for the Defendants; and,

(c) to retain all documents produced during discovery, as required by the terms of the protective order (3) The parties agree that, by entering into this settlement agreement, the Defendants do not admit to any liability, which is denied.

(4) The parties agree that this handwritten document is a binding and enforceable contract, to be replaced by typewritten documents, including a full and complete release, to be prepared by counsel for the Defendants.

(5) The Plaintiff further agrees to indemnify the Defendants for any and all claims stemming from this accident.

The Agreement was signed by Phillip J. Combs, counsel for Autoliv, James Popson, counsel for Chrysler and Joe Holland Chevrolet, Inc., Christopher L. Brinkley, counsel for Ms. Haynes, and by Ms. Haynes, as administratrix.

On April 28, 2009, an order was entered by the circuit court permitting the petitioner to accept the settlement amount of $150,000 in full and final settlement of all claims against Chrysler and Autoliv. Also on April 28, 2009, in exchange for the total sum of $150,000, the petitioner signed a full and final release of all claims against Chrysler and Autoliv. Neither the Agreement nor the release contained an apportionment between Autoliv and Chrysler regarding who was responsible for that amount. Following the circuit court's approval of the settlement by all parties and the execution of the signed release, the petitioner received two checks. On April 29, 2009, the petitioner received a $65,000 check from Autoliv.³ The petitioner also received a check for $85,000 from Chrysler.⁴ On April 30, 2009, the petitioner's counsel deposited both checks; however, because Chrysler had filed for bankruptcy, that check was returned for insufficient funds. The petitioner thereafter contacted Chrysler, but Chrysler refused to honor the check.

The petitioner then filed a July 9, 2009, motion to sever claims against Chrysler and a July 21, 2009, motion to compel Autoliv to pay the entire amount of the settlement. The petitioner asserted that Chrysler and Autoliv collectively agreed to pay $150,000 for the settlement of the wrongful death claim, which is reflected in the February 19, 2009, Agreement, in the April 28, 2009, signed release of claims against Autoliv and Chrysler, and in the April 28, 2009, final order approving the settlement. Said another way, the petitioner maintained that the parties did not agree to a separation of the settlement amount and argued that the $150,000 was to be paid by both Chrysler and Autoliv or either of them. Autoliv refused to pay more than the $65,000 check it provided to the petitioner on April 29, 2009, and further argued that the petitioner was barred by the doctrine of accord and satisfaction from pursuing a claim against it.

On May 4, 2010, the circuit court entered an order denying the petitioner's July 9, 2009, and July 21, 2009, motions. The circuit court noted that while the petitioner was not aware of the precise division of the settlement between the defendants, the petitioner was aware that each defendant would be contributing a specific amount of money and that the two payments combined would constitute the overall settlement amount of $150,000. The circuit court further held that when the petitioner cashed Autoliv's check and entered into a stipulated order of dismissal with prejudice, that the petitioner was bound by the doctrine of accord and satisfaction and was barred from pursuing a claim against Autoliv for the additional $85,000 that was supposed to be paid by Chrysler pursuant to the Agreement. As a result of the circuit court's order, the petitioner received only $65,000 in settlement proceeds. This appeal followed.

II.STANDARD OF REVIEW

As noted above, the petitioner assigns as error the circuit court's denial of her motion to sever claims against Chrysler and her motion to compel Autoliv to pay the remainder of an agreed upon settlement of the wrongful death action. “This Court reviews the circuit court's final order and ultimate disposition under an abuse of discretion standard. We review challenges to findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard; conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.” Syllabus Point 4, Burgess v. Porterfield, 196 W.Va. 178, 469 S.E.2d 114 (1996). “Where the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard...