Haynes v. DOH Oil Company
| Decision Date | 12 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | 11-20-00158-CV |
| Citation | 647 S.W.3d 793 |
| Parties | Mary HAYNES, Appellant v. DOH OIL COMPANY; Craig A. Johnson; CAJ Oil, LLC ; OneMap Mineral No. 4 LLC; OM4 Saleco, LLC; Saxet I Minerals, LLC; Royalty Interests Partnership, LP; Lario Permian, LLC; and Christy Milton, Appellees |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Stephen J. Ahl, John W. Petry, Clint A. Bonn, Langley & Banack, Inc., San Antonio, for Appellant.
Graham K. Simms, Matthew S. Wolcott, Jason R. Mills, Tyler "Gus" A. Clardy, Fort Worth, for Appellees Johnson, Craig A., CAJ Oil, LLC, DOH Oil Company.
Andrew W. Zeve, William A. Moss, Houston, for Appellee Royalty Interests Partnership, LP.
Jessica Crawford, Houston, for Appellees OneMap Mineral No. 4, LLC, OM4 Saleco, LLC.
Michael L. Hamric, Spring, Andrew W. Zeve, William A. Moss, Houston, for Appellee Saxet I Minerals, LLC.
Brian W. Farabough, Amarillo, for Appellee.
Michael Christensen, Stephanie L. Perry, Midland, for Appellee Lario Permian, LLC.
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., Trotter, J., and Williams, J.
This appeal arises out of a dispute over property in Martin County, Texas. Following a foreclosure to satisfy delinquent property taxes, the disputed property was sold by sheriff's deeds in 2008 and 2009. Over a decade later, Mary Haynes (Appellant) sued to try title, alleging that the sheriff's deeds are void for an inadequate property description. In the alternative, she also sued to quiet title, alleging that, in relevant part, the sheriff's deeds only conveyed royalty interests and not her entire mineral estate. DOH Oil Company, Craig A. Johnson, and CAJ Oil, LLC (together, DOH) and Christy Milton (Milton) filed motions for traditional summary judgment, asserting that Appellant's claims were procedurally barred under the Texas Tax Code's statute of limitations. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 33.54 (West 2015). DOH and Milton also asserted that the sheriff's deeds, in relevant part, conveyed more than just royalty interests. Milton additionally asserted that Appellant's claims were barred by the Tax Code's requirement that Appellant deposit funds into the trial court's registry, or file an affidavit of inability to do so, before bringing a claim challenging a tax sale. See id. § 34.08(a). The trial court granted DOH's and Milton's motions for summary judgment and later signed a final judgment incorporating its previous rulings and rendering judgment that Appellant take nothing on her claims. We affirm.
In 1966, J.B. and Jennie Abbot conveyed the following real property to Appellant by warranty deed:
Some thirty-eight years later, on May 31, 2005, the judge presiding in the 118th District Court in Martin County, Texas, signed a judgment ordering the sale of some disputed amount of Appellant's property to satisfy delinquent property taxes owed to Stanton Independent School District, Martin County Hospital District, and Martin County. Specifically, the judgment foreclosed upon and ordered the sale of "the property hereinafter described and in the amounts indicated, to wit:"
By sheriff's deeds, pursuant to the district court's judgment and order of sale, Randy Cozart, the Sheriff of Martin County, sold tracts one, two, and four to DOH (the DOH deed) and sold tract three to Milton and her then husband (the Milton deed).
The Milton deed was recorded on January 23, 2009. About a year later, pursuant to a division of property in their divorce decree, Milton's husband conveyed all of his interest in tract three to Milton. The DOH deed was thereafter corrected and recorded on March 13, 2009. Five days later, DOH conveyed "an undivided ONE-HALF (1/2) of all of the estate, right, title, interest[,] and benefit which [DOH] acquired in and under and by virtue of th[e] ... [DOH] DEED" to Craig A. Johnson (Johnson). About nine years after that, in 2018, Johnson and DOH purported to lease the property they acquired by virtue of the DOH deed to CAJ Oil, LLC. The leases described the property covered by the lease as:
All the North Half (N/2) of the Northwest Quarter (NW/4) of Section 47, Block 35, Township 1 North, T&P Ry. Company Survey, Abstract 64, Martin County, Texas, containing 80.0 acres, more or less limited to those depths below 9,000 feet below the surface.
On October 15, 2019, more than a decade after the two sheriff's deeds were recorded, Appellant brought suit against DOH1 and Milton in trespass to try title and suit to quiet title. In her trespass to try title claim, Appellant argued that the sheriff's deeds were void under the statute of frauds because they contained an inadequate property description. As to her suit to quiet title, Appellant argued that DOH and Milton created a cloud on her title "by executing ... [l]eases (a right associated with a mineral interest, not a royalty interest) when the ... [DOH and Milton deeds] recite only royalty interests."
DOH and Milton each filed separate motions for traditional summary judgment.2
Both asserted that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the Tax Code's statute of limitations barred Appellant's claims. See TAX § 33.54. Both also argued, in part, that their respective sheriff's deeds conveyed more than just royalty interests. However, Milton alone also argued that she was entitled to summary judgment because Appellant failed to deposit any delinquent funds into the registry of the trial court or file an affidavit of her inability to do so before bringing suit. See id. § 34.08(a). Appellant responded that the statute of limitations never began to run because, insofar as the deeds’ property descriptions are inadequate, the property never actually vested in DOH or Milton in the first place. Notably, Appellant did not address Milton's Section 34.08(a) defense. Milton additionally argued, in her reply to Appellant's response to her motion for summary judgment, that she was entitled to summary judgment because Appellant failed to respond to her Section 34.08(a) defense. The trial court granted both motions for summary judgment without specifying its grounds for doing so. This appeal followed.
Appellant raises two issues on appeal. First, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in granting Appellees’ motions for summary judgment because the DOH and Milton deeds are void for inadequately describing the property they purport to convey and, therefore, the Tax Code's statute of limitations period never commenced. Second, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in granting Appellees’ motions for summary judgment with respect to her suit to quiet title, because the sheriff's deeds, in relevant part, only conveyed her royalty interests , not her entire mineral estate. On appeal, Appellant has not addressed Milton's Section 34.08(a) defense.
We review an order granting summary judgment de novo, generally taking as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant and indulging every reasonable inference in the nonmovant's favor. Concho Res., Inc. v. Ellison , 627 S.W.3d 226, 233 (Tex. 2021) ; ConocoPhillips Co. v. Koopmann , 547 S.W.3d 858, 865 (Tex. 2018). A party moving for traditional summary judgment has the burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c) ; Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding , 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). "[A] defendant who conclusively negates at least one essential element of a cause of action or conclusively establishes all the elements of an affirmative defense is entitled to summary judgment." KCM Fin. LLC v. Bradshaw , 457 S.W.3d 70, 79 (Tex. 2015).
When, as here, the trial court does not specify the grounds upon which it grants summary judgment, "we must affirm the summary judgment if any of the theories presented to the trial court and preserved for appellate review are meritorious." Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott , 128 S.W.3d 211, 216 (Tex. 2003). "[I]t is the appellant's burden on appeal to show that each of the independent grounds asserted in support of summary judgment is insufficient to support the judgment." Humane Soc'y of Dallas v. Dallas Morning News, L.P. , 180 S.W.3d 921, 923 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.) ; see also 6 Roy W. McDonald & Elaine A. Carlson, Texas Civil Practice: Appellate Practice § 38:4 (2d ed.) (updated Dec. 2021). "If summary judgment may have been rendered, properly or improperly, on a ground not challenged, the judgment must be affirmed." Britton v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice , 95 S.W.3d 676, 682 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) ; see also 6 McDonald & Carlson, § 38:4.
In her motion for summary judgment, Milton asserted two grounds which she claimed entitled her to judgment as a matter of law. First, Milton argued that Appellant's claims were barred by the Tax Code's statute of limitations. See TAX § 33.54. Second, Milton argued that she was entitled to summary judgment because Appellant failed to satisfy the Tax Code's prerequisite to challenging the validity of a tax sale...
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