Haynes v. Haynes, 14693
| Decision Date | 04 April 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 14693,14693 |
| Citation | 264 S.E.2d 474,164 W.Va. 426 |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | Marilyn Sue HAYNES v. Roger Lee HAYNES. |
Syllabus by the Court
W.Va.Code, 48-2-4(a)(10) (1977) which provides for a consensual divorce based upon irreconcilable differences allows the court to make a "just and equitable" award with regard to alimony, and since divorce on this ground is consensual, it is not necessary to find fault or inequitable conduct on the part of the spouse to be charged with an alimony award, although consideration may be given by the trial court to fault or inequitable conduct as one of many factors to be considered in determining what is "just and equitable."
Jane Moran, Williamson, for appellant.
Elliott E. Maynard, Williamson, for appellee.
The Court granted this appeal to determine whether a wife may be entitled to alimony in a divorce based upon irreconcilable differences, W.Va.Code, 48-2-4(a)(10) (1977), 1 notwithstanding that she cannot demonstrate fault or inequitable conduct on the part of the husband. We find that she may be so entitled and reverse and remand.
Appellant Marilyn Haynes originally filed an action for divorce from her husband Roger on 19 October 1978, alleging adultery, mental cruelty, and irreconcilable differences. After a hearing, the court granted appellant a divorce for irreconcilable differences. The record indicates that the trial court found that neither party was more at fault than the other, and that plaintiff and defendant were equally entitled to the divorce because of irreconcilable differences and denied any alimony award. The wife argues here that W.Va.Code, 48-2-4(a)(10) (1977) does not require her to prove fault on the part of her husband in order to be awarded alimony under the "just and equitable" standard. We are called upon to determine whether the standard eliminates the traditional requirement that a finding of fault, at least in the sense of inequitable conduct, be made before alimony can be awarded.
We recently spoke to this subject in the context of a divorce based upon voluntary separation in Dyer v. Tsapis, W.Va., 249 S.E.2d 509 (1978) where we recognized that the law of divorce has evolved into something closely akin to our contract law. In prior times, when divorce was less pervasive and less acceptable than it is today, principles akin to tort law governed alimony awards, which frequently served not only a compensatory function, but a punitive function as well. 2
Dyer dealt with alimony when divorce is predicated on voluntary separation under W.Va.Code, 48-2-4(a)(7) (1977). That statute specifically conditions an alimony award upon a finding of "fault," and we held in that case that fault was to be construed as substantial inequitable conduct on the part of the party against whom the alimony was to be charged. "Fault" in that context did not require a finding which would entitle one of the parties to a divorce on a fault ground under W.Va.Code, 48-2-4(1-6, 9) (1977). The rationale of Dyer was that alimony is a way of avoiding unjust enrichment of either of the parties. 3 Thus, certain factors were set forth to be considered by a trial judge in determining whether alimony should be awarded, and if so, in what amount.
If the wife is young but has no occupational skills, the court might provide alimony for a predetermined, limited time to support her while she undergoes vocational training. In the same vein, if the wife is no longer young but able to work at a job which can only help contribute to her support in her customary manner, then alimony can serve to supplement her income. Furthermore, a trial judge should look to the separate estates of the parties along with the ages of the parties, which are important because age reflects upon their ability to work; similarly, the duration of the marriage is important because duration is an index to the opportunity which the wife has foregone by being a housewife. W.Va., 249 S.E.2d at 513.
The case at bar can be distinguished from Dyer in that a divorce under W.Va.Code, 48-2-4(a)(10) (1977) is strictly consensual. One party files a complaint, but the divorce is not awarded on the ground of irreconcilable differences unless the second party files an answer admitting those differences. Only then does the issue of alimony arise. The statute provides that the court may make an award of alimony, or it may approve or reject an agreement previously reached by the parties. As a practical matter, if the parties agree that they no longer wish to be married to each other, in a majority of cases, they will have already decided upon a division of property. In the few cases where such an agreement has not been reached, the court serves almost the function of an arbitrator who must take into consideration the factors set out in Dyer, which have been taken from W.Va.Code, 48-2-16 (1969) which says:
All judges and courts of this State, called upon to fix, ascertain and determine an amount as alimony, support or maintenance to be paid by a spouse or to modify any order pertaining thereto, shall take into consideration, among other things, the financial needs of the parties, the earnings and earning ability of the husband and wife, the estate, real and personal, and the extent thereof as well as the income derived therefrom of both the husband and wife and shall allow, or deny, alimony or maintenance or modify any former order with relation thereto, in accordance with the principles of justice. 4
Under the irreconcilable differences ground for divorce, we find that the Legislature intended to eliminate fault as an absolute condition precedent to an alimony award. The object of the award pursuant to the legislative mandate is to put the parties in a "just and equitable" position, and where economic and other circumstances dictate that alimony is necessary for a "just and equitable" settlement, alimony can be awarded against a blameless party.
The difference between the voluntary separation statute and the irreconcilable differences statute is that the...
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