Haynes v. Masonic Benefit Association

Decision Date27 March 1911
PartiesHAYNES v. MASONIC BENEFIT ASSOCIATION
CourtArkansas Supreme Court

Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court, Second Division; F. Guy Fulk Judge; affirmed.

STATEMENT BY THE COURT.

This is an action by appellant against appellee on a life insurance policy in the sum of $ 200 issued by appellee to W. A. Haynes November 1, 1906. By the terms of the policy or benefit certificate sued on and introduced by appellant in evidence the appellee agrees to pay to the beneficiary the sum named within thirty days after proof of death, provided the assured "shall have fully and faithfully complied with the constitution" of the association; "otherwise the certificate is void and without force."

The assured died November 3, 1907. The proof of the death of the assured was made. Deceased in his life time paid all assessments except for the quarter ending October 30, 1907. The sections of the constitution applicable here are as follows:

"2. Every master mason in good standing in his lodge is hereby made a member of the Masonic Benefit Association, so long as he shall remain in good standing in his lodge.

"6. The secretary shall, on the first day of October, A. D. 1891 and every three months thereafter, make out and forward to the masters of every lodge in the State an assessment of $ 1 against each master mason in good standing at the time of such notice, the same to be paid to the master of his lodge by each master mason within thirty days from the date of said notice, and upon his failure to pay the same within the time specified he stall stand suspended from his lodge and from all masonic privileges and masonic intercourse until he shall have paid all dues and assessments against him. Any lodge in this State failing to forward to the secretary within the time required by law the full amount of each assessment against the lodge, less the express or postal charges, shall stand suspended from all masonic privileges and intercourse until said assessment is forwarded."

The secretary whose duty it was to levy the assessments under the above section never levied any assessment. He never issued any notice that an assessment had been made. On October 29 1907, two days before the time for paying dues expired, the assured left the money to pay his assessment, due October 1, 1907, with a member of the order, but the member did not tender payment until November 5, 1907. The assured having died before the payment was tendered, same was not accepted. Demand for payment of the amount of the policy was made and refused, and this suit followed. The defense was that the assured had not complied with the constitution of the appellee association by paying the dues. The court found that the dues were not paid, and that appellant offered no evidence of payment. The court, sitting as a jury, found substantially the above facts.

Judgment was rendered in favor of appellee, and this appeal was taken.

Judgment affirmed.

Jones & Price, for appellant.

1. Deceased was in good standing at the time of his death as no assessment had been made for October, and no notice given to appellee. Notice is requisite. Bacon on Ben. Soc. § 379; 116 Ia. 311; 108 Mich. 665; 77 Miss. 830; 126 N.C. 477; 56 Minn. 414; 24 F. 450.

2. A certificate issued to a member of a benefit society is evidence that the member is in good standing, and this is presumed to continue until proof to the contrary, and the burden is upon the society to show this when relied upon as a defense. 87 Ark. 115.

3. Insured is entitled to notice, although the assessments fall due at regular intervals, where the laws of the order provide for it. 114 Ill. 467; 78 Ind. 110; 45 Minn. 262; 93 Ia. 402; 71 Tex. 149; 50 L. R. A. 114; 49 N.Y.S. 151; 17 Abb. N. C. 53.

F. T. Vaughan, for appellee.

1. The assessments fell due quarterly at regular intervals. The constitution told all members when they were due. No notice was required by the rules of the society nor the statutes of this State. 132 S.W. 998; 1 Bacon on Ben. Soc. §§ 81, 161; 102 Ind. 262; 66 Ind. 134-136.

2. Members are presumed to know the rules and laws of their societies, and cannot excuse their omissions or failure to comply therewith on the ground of omissions or acts of other members or officers. 2 Bacon, Ben. Soc. p. 1114; 40 Mo.App. 605, 606; 57 A. 922.

WOOD, J. KIRBY, J., dissents.

OPINION

WOOD, J., (after stating the facts).

1. The provision in the policy that the assured "shall have fully and faithfully complied with the constitution of this association" is a condition precedent to liability on the policy. Section 6 of the constitution requires the secretary of the grand lodge after the 1st of October, 1891, to give notice quarterly to the masters of every lodge in the State of an assessment of $ 1 against each master mason in good standing at the time of such notice. It further requires each master mason to pay within thirty days from the date of said notice the amount of the assessment or dues. Failure to pay within the time specified ipso facto results in suspension until the dues and assessments are paid.

The "assessment of $ 1 against each master mason in good standing" is a fixed and continuing charge levied by the constitution itself at regular periods. Each master mason must pay this assessment at the time prescribed in order to preserve his good standing in the association. The time when the secretary shall give the notice is fixed at a certain date, and within thirty days from this date the master masons in good standing must pay their dues or stand suspended. It will be observed that the secretary is not required to "make out and forward an assessment" to each master mason, but to the "masters of every lodge." The constitution does not contemplate that any notice of assessment shall be given to each master mason. On the contrary, each master mason must take notice of the assessment, and that it is due "at the time of such notice, i. e., at the time when the constitution requires the notice to be given. He must pay it within thirty days of that date, whether the secretary has given notice of the assessment or not. Each member is conclusively presumed to know the requirements of the constitution of the society to which he belongs. He receives notice, when he gets his certificate and becomes a member, of what the laws of the association require of its officers; and he cannot excuse himself for failing to comply with the laws prescribing his own duties because the officers may have neglected some duty exacted...

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