Haynes v. Molina

Decision Date14 September 2021
Docket Number01-19-00917-CV
PartiesMARK HAYNES, DANIELLE MEGAN HAYNES, AND CHARLES EDWARD HAYNES, Appellants v. MARIO MOLINA AND CHARLENE MOLINA, INDIVIDUALLY AND DBA MASTER MECHANICAL A/C AND HEATING, JORGE MOLINA, Appellees
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

On Appeal from the 270th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2016-43961

Panel consists of Justices Kelly, Guerra, and Farris.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Peter Kelly Justice

Mark Haynes-together with his wife, Danielle Megan Haynes, and his father, Charles Edward Haynes-filed suit after his house was damaged, allegedly by the appellees' faulty sizing and installation of an air conditioning system. Mario Molina and Charlene Molina, individually and d/b/a Master Mechanical A/C and Heating, and Jorge Molina (collectively "Master Mechanical" or the "appellees") filed a plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment. They alleged that Mark and Danielle lacked standing because they did not own the house, Charles's claims were barred by limitations, and there was no evidence of one or more elements of each of Charles's causes of action. The trial court granted the motion without specifying a basis.

On appeal, Charles purports to challenge the trial court's ruling on limitations, but he decided to "forego [sic] argument and briefing for efficiency's sake." Mark and Danielle argue that they have standing because, although Mark's father held record legal title to the house, Mark provided the down payment and paid the mortgage, taxes, and maintenance costs.

We affirm the dismissal of claims made by Charles because his brief was inadequate as to one of the grounds for summary judgment, and we must affirm if any ground for summary judgment is not challenged on appeal. We affirm the dismissal of claims made by Danielle because the evidence does not support an inference that she had an ownership interest in the house. We reverse the dismissal of claims made by Mark because the record demonstrates that he has standing to pursue his claims. We reverse the trial court's judgment in part, and we remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

Background

In 1993, Charles E. Haynes and his wife, Martha Haynes, obtained a mortgage for the purchase of a house in the City of Deer Park, Texas. Their son, Mark Haynes, provided the down payment, and thereafter he made monthly payments to his father to pay for the principal and interest on the loan. According to Mark, his father agreed to take a loan in his name because Mark's credit was inadequate at the time. Mark maintains that his father promised to transfer the deed to him once he made the final payment on the house. Neither Charles nor Martha ever took possession of the house. Mark lived in the house with Danielle, and he paid all taxes insurance, maintenance, and repairs. Mark made the final payment to his father in 2017, and in March 2018, Charles and Martha transferred the deed to Mark.

The appellants have alleged that in June 2014, Jorge Molina, who worked for Master Mechanical, provided an estimate of the cost to replace the air conditioning system on the house install a filter, and replace ductwork. Based on this estimate and Jorge's representations, the appellants hired Master Mechanical to complete the work. Several weeks later, the system malfunctioned, and Master Mechanical- Jorge and other employees-returned to provide additional service under the warranty. In May 2015, Mark and Danielle raised concerns about water dripping from an air return inside the house. Although Master Mechanical returned to the house to make additional changes to the system, in July 2015, the ceiling in the master bedroom collapsed allegedly due to condensation from the air conditioning system. In the following days, Mark learned that Master Mechanical had failed to replace copper tubing that it previously represented had been replaced, and it failed to obtain a city permit for the air conditioning system installation.

Mark and Danielle filed a complaint with the Texas Department of Licensing and Regulation, which found that Mario Molina failed to obtain a permit before installing the air conditioning system, Mario failed to provide proper installation, service, or mechanical integrity, and Master Mechanical A/C and Heating failed to comply with the 2012 International Residential Code, which had been adopted by the City of Deer Park.

In June 2016, Mark and Danielle sued Mario Molina, Charlene Molina Master Mechanical A/C and Heating, and Jorge Molina.[1] They alleged causes of action for:

(1) violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act by
(a) engaging in an unconscionable action or course of action and taking advantage of their lack of knowledge, ability, or experience to an unfair and unconscionable degree;
(b) making misrepresentations in violation of section 17.46(b) of the Texas Business and Commerce Code;
(c) breaching the implied warranties of fitness for a particular purpose, good and workmanlike performance, and merchantability.
(2) common law fraud;
(3) breach of contract; and
(4) negligence.

Master Mechanical filed a plea to the jurisdiction and a motion for summary judgment, asserting that (1) Mark and Danielle lacked standing to recover damages because they did not own the home when the air conditioning system was installed, and (2) there was no evidence that the damages to the house were caused by problems with the air conditioning system it installed. Mark and Danielle responded with evidence, which Master Mechanical challenged. The trial court did not rule on the plea, the motion for summary judgment, or Master Mechanical's objections to Mark and Danielle's summary judgment evidence. In June 2019, Charles Haynes joined the lawsuit as a plaintiff.

Master Mechanical amended its answer and filed a second plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment. Master Mechanical again argued that Mark and Danielle lacked standing to sue because they did not own the house when the air conditioning system was installed. It also argued that Charles's claims were barred by limitations and that there was no evidence of one or more elements of each of his causes of action. In response, Mark and Danielle asserted that they have standing as consumers under the DTPA. They also asserted that they have standing because they have a legal interest in the house as beneficial owners of the property because Mark provided the down payment and the money for all payments thereafter.

The trial court granted Master Mechanical's plea to the jurisdiction as to the claims made by Mark and Danielle, and it granted summary judgment as to the claims made by Charles. The trial court dismissed all claims and rendered a final appealable judgment.

Analysis I. Charles has waived his challenge to the summary judgment.

We review a trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Eagle Oil &Gas Co. v. TRO-X, L.P., 619 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Tex. 2021). The party moving for traditional summary judgment must show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Eagle Oil &Gas, 619 S.W.3d at 705. A defendant may obtain summary judgment by conclusively establishing an affirmative defense. Eagle Oil &Gas, 619 S.W.3d at 705. "We review the summary judgment record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts against the motion." Id.

When a movant argues multiple grounds for summary judgment and the order does not specify the ground on which the judgment is rendered, the appellant must negate all grounds on appeal. McCoy v. Rogers, 240 S.W.3d 267, 271 (Tex. App.- Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied); Ellis v. Precision Engine Rebuilders, Inc., 68 S.W.3d 894, 898 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.). "If summary judgment may have been rendered, properly or improperly, on a ground not challenged, the judgment must be affirmed." Ellis, 68 S.W.3d at 898.

A party appealing a motion for summary judgment must assert either a general issue challenging the summary judgment as a whole or separate issues challenging each independent ground for summary judgment alleged in the motion. Zapata v. ACF Indus., Inc., 43 S.W.3d 584, 586 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.); see Malooly Bros., Inc. v. Napier, 461 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex. 1970). "The challenging party must also, however, present . . . arguments and supporting authority in order to merit reversal." McCoy, 240 S.W.3d at 272; see TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (providing requisites of appellate briefs).

The third issue in the appellants' brief states:

Is summary judgment on the statute of limitations (as to Charles Haynes) proper when he is added in response to Defendants' belated concern that a necessary party is omitted? (Appellants forego argument and briefing for efficiency's sake but do not waive this point, fully briefed in Haynes' Response to Summary Judgment.)

Charles did not provide any substantive argument on this issue. In the court of appeals, unbriefed issues are waived. Compare TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) ("The brief must contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record."), with TEX. R. APP. P. 53.2(i) (providing that petition for review in Supreme Court of Texas need "not address every issue or point included in the statement of issues or points. Any issue or point not addressed may be addressed in the brief on the merits if one is requested by the Court.").

Charles's issue is waived, and therefore the summary judgment ground of limitations has not been negated on appeal. See McCoy, 240 S.W.3d at 272; TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). We overrule...

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