Haynes v. Quarterman
Decision Date | 10 March 2009 |
Docket Number | No. 07-70004.,07-70004. |
Citation | 561 F.3d 535 |
Parties | Anthony Cardell HAYNES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Nathaniel QUARTERMAN, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent-Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Allen Richard Ellis (argued), Law Offices of A. Richard Ellis, Mill Valley, CA, for Haynes.
Jeremy Craig Greenwell (argued), Austin, TX, for Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
Before JOLLY, DENNIS and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Anthony Cardell Haynes ("Haynes"), a Texas prisoner, appeals the district court's decision to deny Haynes a petition for a writ of habeas corpus that alleges the state prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges was in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution as prescribed by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986).
The State of Texas charged Haynes with the capital murder of a peace officer who was "acting in the lawful discharge of an official duty[.]" TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.03(a)(1). A jury convicted Haynes of capital murder and answered Texas's special issues in a manner requiring the imposition of a death sentence. After exhausting his state remedies without relief, Haynes filed a federal habeas petition on October 5, 2005, with the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The District Court denied habeas relief in an opinion filed on January 25, 2007. Haynes filed for a certificate of appealability (COA) in this court on May 30, 2007. This panel granted a COA on two issues: "(1) whether the prosecution violated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments through the racially discriminatory use of its peremptory challenge as to potential juror Owens; and (2) whether the prosecution violated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments through the racially discriminatory use of its peremptory challenge as to potential juror McQueen." Haynes v. Quarterman, 526 F.3d 189, 202-203 (5th Cir.2008).
In respect to the use of peremptory challenges against prospective jurors McQueen and Owens in the Batson context, the relevant facts are as follows: Two different state trial judges took turns presiding over the jury selection process in this case at the state court level. Judge Wallace presided at the beginning of the jury selection process when the jurors were addressed and questioned as a group; Judge Harper presided during the next stage in which the attorneys questioned the prospective jurors individually; and Judge Wallace presided again during the final stage in which peremptory challenges were exercised and when Batson challenges were made, considered, and ruled upon. During the Batson hearing, the defendant established a prima facie case of a Batson violation, and the prosecutor justified his use of peremptory challenges against potential jurors McQueen and Owens solely1 on his impression of their demeanor when responding to individual voir dire questioning (at which time Judge Wallace was not presiding).
In his direct appeal, Haynes appealed the Batson determinations to the state appellate court. On appeal, Haynes noted that "Judge Wallace, having not observed the voir dire of individual veniremembers, having not observed their demeanor, body language, responses, attitudes, and characteristics, could not assess or scrutinize the veracity of the prosecutor's explanations and observations regarding the reasons for striking these prospective veniremembers." Haynes also contended that "[a] trial court's determination of a Batson challenge must necessarily be based upon the facial validity of the prosecutor's explanation in light of the trial court's direct evaluation of the venire, their respective statements, responses and demeanor." (emphasis in original). In this context, Haynes argued that "the trial court erred in concluding that the State exercised its peremptory challenges against minority veniremembers Goodman, Kirkling, McQuuen [sic], and Owens, respectively in a racially neutral manner where these findings are unsupported by the record." He repeats these arguments in his federal habeas petition. His arguments with respect to McQueen and Owens are now properly before this court.
The State first contends that Haynes' claim of a Batson violation because Judge Wallace did not preside over individual voir dire is procedurally defaulted. We disagree. Goodrum v. Quarterman, 547 F.3d 249, 256 (5th Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The state appellate court recognized that Haynes made two related arguments with respect to the fact that Judge Wallace, and not Judge Harper, made the Batson determinations; it found only one of them to be procedurally defaulted.
The state appellate court first examined Haynes's argument that the trial judge erred and denied him due process by presiding over the Batson hearing even though he had not presided over the voir dire examination. With respect to this due process challenge, the state court, on direct appeal, concluded that Haynes procedurally defaulted the argument by failing to raise it before the trial court. The appellate court then proceeded to discuss a related but different argument regarding the effect of Judge Wallace's failure to sit on individual voir dire on the state appellate court's review of the trial court's Batson determinations. It did not find this argument to be procedurally defaulted and, in fact, considered this argument extensively on the merits. The state appellate court eventually concluded that Haynes was "partly correct" and decided to give the trial court "no deference" as to its Batson determinations. Haynes v. State, No. 73,685, slip op. at 17 (Tex.App. Ct. Oct. 10, 2001) (unpublished). Haynes also preserves this later issue in his federal habeas petition. The federal district court addressed this issue on the merits. See Haynes v. Quarterman, 2007 WL 268374, at *16 n. 10 (S.D.Tex. Jan. 25, 2007) (unpublished). We can now squarely address this issue.
A Batson challenge involves three steps:
The Supreme Court has outlined a three-step process for determining whether peremptory strikes have been applied in a discriminatory manner. First, the claimant must make a prima facie showing that the peremptory challenges have been exercised on the basis of race. Second, if this requisite showing has been made, the burden shifts to the party accused of discrimination to articulate race-neutral explanations for the peremptory challenges. Finally, the trial court must determine whether the claimant has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination.
United States v. Bentley-Smith, 2 F.3d 1368, 1373 (5th Cir.1993). "The Constitution forbids striking even a single prospective juror for a discriminatory purpose." Snyder v. Louisiana, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1203, 1208, 170 L.Ed.2d 175 (2008) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted); Reed v. Quarterman, 555 F.3d 364, 381 n. 12 (5th Cir.2009).
We first consider Haynes's Batson claims as to prospective juror Owens. With respect to prospective juror Owens, the State concedes that the defendant made a prima facie showing that the peremptory challenge had been exercised on the basis of race.
For the second step, the prosecutors articulated a race-neutral explanation as to Owens based entirely on demeanor. The Supreme Court demands that the trial court especially scrutinize explanations based purely on demeanor. See Snyder, 128 S.Ct. at 1208; see also Davis v. Fisk Elec. Co., 268 S.W.3d 508, 518 (Tex.2008); Goodwin v. State, 898 S.W.2d 380, 382 (Tex. Ct.App.-San Antonio 1995); Daniels v. State, 768 S.W.2d 314, 317-18 (Tex. Ct. App.-Tyler 1988). This demand is logically derived from the underlying rationale for delegating the Batson determination to a trial court and according it substantial deference—namely, that the trial court is better able to make determinations of demeanor. See Snyder, 128 S.Ct. at 1208 () (internal quotations and citations omitted); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 339, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003); see also Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 111, 116 S.Ct. 457, 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995). Therefore, we accord the trial court the primary role in adjudicating demeanor-based Batson challenges because the trial court is in a better position to evaluate those challenges and is not relying, as the appellate court does, solely on the paper record. See Moody v. Quarterman, 476 F.3d 260, 272 (5th Cir.2007) (...
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