Haynes v. Robbins

• Decision Date: 22 January 1962
• Citation: 177 A.2d 352,158 Me. 17
• Parties: George HAYNES, Petitioner for Writ of Habeas Corpus v. Allan L. ROBBINS, Warden Maine State Prison.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 352

177 A.2d 352

158 Me. 17

George HAYNES, Petitioner for Writ of Habeas Corpus v. Allan L. ROBBINS, Warden Maine State Prison.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Jan. 22, 1962.

Christopher S. Roberts, Rockland, for plaintiff.

Richard A. Foley, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant.

Before WILLIAMSON, C. J., and WEBBER, TAPLEY, SULLIVAN, DUBORD and SIDDALL, JJ.

TAPLEY, Justice.

On report on agreed statement of facts. This is a procedure in habeas corpus. The petitioner is serving a sentence in the Maine State Prison of not less than 2 1/2 years nor more than 5 years. This sentence was imposed upon him as a result of having been convicted on an indictment charging the crime of threatening by oral communication to injure the persons and property of others. The statute upon which the prosecution was based is Sec. 27, Chap. 130, R.S.1954, and reads as follows:

'Threatening communication.--Whoever makes, publishes or sends to another any communication, written or oral, containing a threat to injure the person or property of any person shall be punished by a fine of not more than $500 or by imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or by both such fine and imprisonment; and if the communication is written and is anonymous or signed by any other than the true name of the writer, the punishment shall be a fine of not more than $1,500 or imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or by both such fine and imprisonment; and if any such threat is against the person or property or member of the family of any public official, the punishment shall be imprisonment for not more than 15 years.'

The case was tried at the September Term, 1959 of the Superior Court, within and for the County of Penobscot. At the time of the trial the petitioner was represented by court appointed counsel. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, whereupon the respondent was sentenced. It is not until now that the petitioner attacks the sufficiency of the indictment upon which he was convicted.

The pertinent portion of the agreed statement of facts is as follows:

'The petitioner contends that the indictment states no crime as defined by any law or statute of the State of Maine; that the indictment is a nullity and the conviction and sentence thereunder is illegal and void and his imprisonment thereunder unlawful.

'The respondent contends the indictment states a crime as defined in R.S.Chap. 130, Sec. 27, that he was duly tried by a jury and found guilty and that the conviction, sentence and imprisonment is legal and lawful.

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'The case is reported on the petition for the writ, the indictment and docket entries of the original case marked Exhibit A hereto annexed, and the mittimus aforesaid marked Exhibit B, the facts taken out at hearing and docket entries and entire record of the case at bar.

'If the contentions of the petitioner are sustained a writ of habeas corpus is to be issued and the petitioner released from imprisonment; if the contention of the respondent is sustained the petition is to be dismissed.'

Counsel for the petitioner contends, (1) that the indictment states no crime, as defined by statute; (2) that the indictment is a nullity and the conviction and sentence thereunder is illegal and void.

Counsel for the petitioner argues that the Legislature never intended that the provisions of Sec. 27 of Chap. 130 should be applied to the circumstances of this case as a basis of prosecution; that Secs. 2 and 4 of Chap. 144 are applicable to the facts and not Sec. 27 of Chap. 130. He cites in support of this contention Sec. 28 of Chap. 130 and Secs. 1, 2 and 4 of Chap. 144.

Chap. 130:

'Sec. 28. Threats to accuse or injure, with intent to extort or compel.--Whoever, verbally or by written or printed communication, maliciously threatens to accuse another of a crime or offense, or to injure his person or property, with intent thereby to extort money or to procure any advantage from him, or to compel him to do any act against his will, when such offense is of a high and aggravated nature, shall be deemed guilty of a felony and on conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not more than $500 or by imprisonment for not more than 2 years; but when such offense is not of a high and aggravated nature, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not more than $100 or by imprisonment for not more than 11 months.'

Chap. 144:

'Sec. 1. Power of courts to keep the peace; security required.--The justices of the superior court and judges of municipal courts, in term time or in vacation, and trial justices in their counties have power to cause all laws for the preservation of the public peace to be kept; and in the execution thereof may require persons to give security to keep the peace and be of good behavior, as hereinafter provided.'

'Sec. 2. Complaint that offense threatened.--Any magistrate described in section 1, on complaint that any person threatens to commit an offense against the person or property of another, shall examine, on oath, the complainant and any other witnesses produced, reduce the complaint to writing and cause the complainant to sign it; and, if on examination of the facts he thinks that there is just cause to fear the commission of such offense, he shall issue a warrant reciting the substance of the complaint, and commanding the officer, to whom it is directed, forthwith to arrest the accused and bring him before such magistrate or court, subject to the provisions of section 9 of chapter 146.'

'Sec. 4. Sureties to keep peace; costs; bound over.--When the accused is brought before the magistrate and his defense is heard, he may be ordered to recognize, with sufficient sureties, in the sum required by the magistrate, to keep the peace toward all persons and especially toward the person requiring the security, for a term of less than 1 year, and to pay the costs of prosecution; but he shall not be bound over to any court, unless he is also charged with some other specific offense requiring it.'

Sec. 28 pertains to extortion. Extortion is the gist of the crime and the verbal, written or printed communication is the manner in which the extortion is committed. State v. Blackington, 111 Me. 229, 88 A. 726; State v. Vallee, 136 Me. 432, 12 A.2d 421. Sec. 28 describes an entirely different crime than that of Sec. 27 upon which the prosecution in the instant case is based. Secs. 1, 2 and 4 have nothing whatever to do with a chargeable crime. They are procedures designed by statute for the prevention of crime and to keep the public peace. There is no ambiguity in Sec. 27. The language is plain and understandable. The intent of the Legislature is equally clear that it intended to make it a crime for one to make, publish or send to another any communication, written or oral, containing a threat to injure the person or...