Haynes v. State

• Decision Date: 30 October 2003
• Docket Number: No. CR 02-1087.,CR 02-1087.
• Citation: 354 Ark. 514,127 S.W.3d 456
• Parties: James Kelly HAYNES v. STATE of Arkansas.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

127 S.W.3d 456

James Kelly HAYNES v. STATE of Arkansas.

No. CR 02-1087.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

October 30, 2003.

Henry & Cullen, LLP, by: Tim Cullen, Little Rock, for appellant.

Mike Beebe, Att'y Gen., by: Kent G. Holt, Ass't Att'y Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.

TOM GLAZE, Justice.

Appellant James K. Haynes was convicted of raping and burglarizing a ninety-four-year-old woman in Fort Smith; he was sentenced to life imprisonment on the rape conviction, and forty years on the burglary. On appeal, he argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions, and that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress DNA evidence.

For his first point on appeal, Haynes argues that there was no direct evidence that he committed the crimes for which he was convicted. He insists that the evidence arrayed against him was purely circumstantial, and that this circumstantial evidence does not force the mind to rise beyond speculation or conjecture. This court has held numerous times that circumstantial evidence may constitute substantial evidence. Gregory v. State, 341 Ark. 243, 15 S.W.3d 690 (2000); Dixon v. State, 311 Ark. 613, 846 S.W.2d 170 (1993). Guilt can be established without eyewitness testimony, and evidence of guilt is not less because it is circumstantial. Gamble v. State, 351 Ark. 541, 95 S.W.3d 755 (2003); Gregory, supra; Trimble v. State, 316 Ark. 161, 871 S.W.2d 562 (1994). Whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial, however, it must still meet the requirement of substantiality; that is, it must force the fact-finder to reach a conclusion one way or the other without resorting to speculation or conjecture. Edmond v. State, 351 Ark. 495, 95 S.W.3d 789 (2003); Gregory, supra; Chism v. State, 312 Ark. 559, 853 S.W.2d 255 (1993).

The longstanding rule in the use of circumstantial evidence is that the evidence must exclude every other reasonable hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused in order to be substantial. Smith v. State, 337 Ark. 239, 988 S.W.2d 492 (1999); Smith v. State, 282 Ark. 535, 669 S.W.2d 201 (1984); Upton v. State, 257 Ark. 424, 516 S.W.2d 904 (1974). In Gregory v. State, supra, this court quoted from Bowie v. State, 185 Ark. 834, 49 S.W.2d 1049 (1932), as follows:

This demands that in a case depending upon circumstantial evidence the circumstances relied upon must be so connected and cogent as to show guilt to a moral certainty, and must exclude every other reasonable hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused. Circumstances, however strong they may be, ought never to coerce the mind of the jury to a conclusion of guilt if they can be reconciled with the theory that one other than the defendant has committed the crime, or that no crime has been committed at all.

Gregory, 341 Ark. at 248, 15 S.W.3d 690; see also Carter v. State, 324 Ark. 395, 921 S.W.2d 924 (1996); Studdard v. State, 243 Ark. 73, 419 S.W.2d 134 (1967). Once a trial court determines the evidence is sufficient to go to the jury, the question of whether the circumstantial evidence excludes every hypothesis consistent with innocence is for the jury to decide. Smith v. State, 337 Ark. 239, 988 S.W.2d 492 (1999). Upon review, this court determines whether the jury resorted to speculation and conjecture in reaching its verdict. Boone v. State, 282 Ark. 274, 668 S.W.2d 17 (1984). Two equally reasonable conclusions as to what occurred merely gives rise to a suspicion of guilt. Carter v. State, 324 Ark. 395, 921 S.W.2d 924 (1996). We will set aside a judgment based upon evidence that did not meet the required standards, and thus left the fact finder only to speculation and conjecture. Smith v. State, 264 Ark. 874, 575 S.W.2d 677 (1979); see also Jones v. State, 246 Ark. 1057, 441 S.W.2d 458 (1969).

We turn now to the merits of Haynes's sufficiency argument. The evidence introduced at trial showed the following events took place on May 3, 2000. At about 2:30 a.m. on that morning, the ninety-four-year-old victim in this case had been sleeping on her sofa when she was awakened by someone's hands around her throat. Her attacker, who was wearing a mask and gloves, threw her to the floor and raped her. The victim could see the intruder's wrists between his gloves and the cuffs of his shirt, allowing her later to tell the police that her attacker was African-American. Demanding money, the man called her by her nickname, "Momma." As he got up to go through her purse, the victim noticed that her phone was off the hook; she told the intruder "they got you ... the police are on their way." The attacker then fled through the back door of the victim's house.

When the police arrived, they found a cinder block outside under the victim's kitchen window; a white blanket was also spread out on the ground. In investigating the scene, Sergeant Jamie Hammond also discovered a ski mask and a pair of gloves on the ground next to a dumpster located 129 feet from the rear of the victim's house. Although the ground was wet, due to a recent rain, these items were dry. Sergeant Hammond showed the victim the mask and gloves and asked her to identify them. She averred that they looked familiar, and that they resembled the items worn by her attacker. At trial, upon being shown the mask recovered from the crime scene, the victim testified, "As far as I can remember, that looks like it." The police sent the gloves and mask to the State Crime Lab for DNA testing.

On October 21, 2000, Sergeant Hammond received a phone call from Kermit Channell, the supervisor of the Forensic Biology Section of the State Crime Lab. Channell informed Hammond that he had gotten a "hit" on the DNA that was obtained from the ski mask recovered at the crime scene. Channell advised Sergeant Hammond that the DNA corresponded to a sample that had previously been taken from Haynes. As a result of his conversation with Channell, Sergeant Hammond contacted Haynes on October 21. Hammond told Haynes that the police were investigating a break-in at a residence on North 33rd Street; Haynes denied knowing where the house was or that he had been involved in the crime. Sergeant Hammond then informed Haynes that his DNA had been found on evidence taken from the crime scene. Haynes denied owning the mask and gloves, and said that he had never had a mask like that on his head. However, Haynes later said that he worked at a chicken plant and had worn gloves like those recovered by the police. Haynes also knew exactly where the dumpster was, and stated that he had worked on the house across the corner from the victim's house; nonetheless, he still denied knowing where her house was. Sergeant Hammond interviewed Haynes again the next day, and this time, Hammond told Haynes that his DNA was found on the mask. Haynes offered no response or explanation as to how it might have gotten there.

At trial, Channel testified that, based on a comparison of saliva found on the ski mask at the crime scene and Haynes's blood sample, the DNA from the saliva matched the DNA from the blood sample. On cross-examination, Channell stated that the chances of the DNA found on the ski mask belonging to someone other than Haynes were less than one in a trillion.

On appeal, Haynes asserts that the evidence does not place him at the crime scene, and he argues that the "circumstances of the saliva sample near the eye hole of a discarded ski mask near a dumpster that happens to be in the neighborhood of the attack is tenuous evidence at best." Haynes claims there are numerous reasonable alternate explanations for the presence of the DNA, and asserts that the presence of the DNA alone does not link him to this crime. Additionally, Haynes contends, the State's own DNA expert testified that there was no way to date the stain found on the mask, and that it could possibly last on the mask for years.

In arguing that his conviction was based on purely circumstantial evidence that could not have been substantial enough to force or compel reasonable minds to reach a conclusion one way or the other, Haynes relies primarily on the case of Standridge v. State, 310 Ark. 408, 837 S.W.2d 447 (1992). In Standridge, this court reversed appellant Standridge's conviction for manufacturing marijuana, where the only evidence linking Standridge to the growing marijuana crop was his fingerprint on a plastic cup, found next to a tent in which some of the plants were growing. The State's fingerprint expert testified that he had no way of knowing where Standridge might have touched the cup; he also stated that the print could have been made as much as a year earlier, and could have been "anywhere in the world" when it was touched by Standridge. In reversing, this court held that there was no evidence to suggest when or where Standridge touched the cup, whether he had ever purchased it, or how it came to rest near the marijuana. The court further wrote that "[t]he evidence was insufficient to compel reasonable minds to conclude that [Standridge] was at the crime scene, and even less sufficient to compel the conclusion that he was engaged in the `manufacture' of marijuana." Standridge, 310 Ark. at 410, 837 S.W.2d 447.

Haynes also cites Ravellette v. State, 264 Ark. 344, 571 S.W.2d 433 (1978), in which this court also reversed a drug conviction due to insufficient evidence. In Ravellette, the evidence showed only that there were drugs in Ravellette's house, which he shared with another man, although there were no drugs found in his room. Ravellette's roommate and co-defendant testified that another friend had left the marijuana in the house the night before Ravellette's arrest, and the roommate completely exonerated Ravellette of any knowledge of the presence of control of the contraband. Ravellette v. State, 264 Ark. at 346, 571 S.W.2d 433.

Here, unlike the situation in Standridge, the State presented proof that Haynes's undegraded DNA was on a ski mask, found with a pair of gloves 129 feet from...