Haynes v. State of Washington, No. 147

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtGOLDBERG
Citation10 L.Ed.2d 513,83 S.Ct. 1336,373 U.S. 503
PartiesRaymond L. HAYNES, Petitioner, v. STATE OF WASHINGTON
Docket NumberNo. 147
Decision Date27 May 1963

373 U.S. 503
83 S.Ct. 1336
10 L.Ed.2d 513
Raymond L. HAYNES, Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF WASHINGTON.

No. 147.
Argued Feb. 26 and 27, 1963.
Decided May 27, 1963.

Lawrence Speiser, Washington, D.C., for petitioner.

George A. Kain, Spokane, Wash., for respondent.

Page 504

Mr. Justice GOLDBERG delivered the opinion of the Court.

The petitioner, Raymond L. Haynes, was tried in a Superior Court of the State of Washington on a charge of robbery, found guilty by a jury, and sentenced to imprisonment 'for a term of not more than 20 years.' The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, with four of nine judges dissenting. 58 Wash.2d 716, 364 P.2d 935. Certiorari was granted, 370 U.S. 902, 82 S.Ct. 1252, 8 L.Ed.2d 399, to consider whether the admission of the petitioner's written and signed confession into evidence against him at trial constituted a denial of due process of law.

Haynes contends that the confession was involuntary, and thus constitutionally inadmissible, because induced by police threats and promises. He testified at trial that during the approximately 16-hour period between the time of his arrest and the making and signing of the written confession, he several times asked police to allow him to call an attorney and to call his wife. He said that such requests were uniformly refused and that he was repeatedly told that he would not be allowed to call unless and until he 'cooperated' with police and gave them a written and signed confession admitting participation in the robbery. He was not permitted to phone his wife, or for that matter anyone, either on the night of his arrest or the next day. The police persisted in their refusals to allow him contact with the outside world, he said, even after he signed one written confession and after a preliminary hearing before a magistrate, late on the day following his arrest. According to the petitioner, he was, in fact, held incommunicado by the police until some five or seven days after his arrest.1

Page 505

The State asserts that the petitioner's version of events is contradicted, that the confession was freely given, and that, in any event, the question of voluntariness was conclusively resolved against the petitioner by the verdict of the jury at trial. We consider each of these contentions in turn.

I.

The petitioner was charged with robbing a gasoline service station in the City of Spokane, Washington, at about 9 p.m. on Thursday, December 19, 1957. He was arrested by Spokane police in the vicinity of the station within approximately one-half hour after the crime.2 Though he orally admitted the robbery to officers while en route to the police station, he was, on arrival there, not charged with the crime, but instead booked for 'investigation,' or, as it is locally called, placed on the 'small book.' Concededly, prisoners held on the 'small book' are permitted by police neither to make phone calls nor to have any visitors.3

Shortly after arriving at the station at about 10 p.m., the petitioner was questioned for about one-half hour by Lieutenant Wakeley of the Spokane police, during which period he again orally admitted the crime. He was then placed in a line-up and identified by witnesses as one of the robbers. Apparently, nothing else was done that night.

On the following morning, beginning at approximately 9:30 a.m., the petitioner was again questioned for about an hour and a half, this time by Detectives Peck and

Page 506

Cockburn. He once more orally admitted the robbery, and a written confession was transcribed. Shortly thereafter, he was taken to the office of the deputy prosecutor, where still another statement was taken and transcribed. Though Haynes refused to sign this second confession, he then did sign the earlier statement given to Detectives Peck and Cockburn.4 Later that same afternoon he was taken before a magistrate for a preliminary hearing; this was at about 4 p.m. on December 20, the day after his arrest.

At the conclusion of the hearing, Haynes was transferred to the county jail and on either the following Tuesday or Thursday was returned to the deputy prosecutor's office. He was again asked to sign the second statement which he had given there some four to six days earlier, but again refused to do so.

The written confession taken from Haynes by Detectives Peck and Cockburn on the morning after his arrest and signed by Haynes on the same day in the deputy prosecutor's office was introduced into evidence against the petitioner over proper and timely objection by his counsel that such use would violate due process of law. Under the Washington procedure then in effect,5 voluntariness of the confession was treated as a question of fact

Page 507

for ultimate determination by the jury. In overruling the petitioner's objection to use of the confession, the trial judge, however, made an apparently preliminary determination that it was voluntary and 'conditionally' admissible. See 58 Wash.2d, at 719 720, 364 P.2d, at 937. The evidence going to voluntariness was heard before the jury was the issue submitted to it. The jury returned a general verdict of guilty and was not required to, and did not, indicate its view with respect to the voluntariness of the confession.

II.

The State first contends that the petitioner's version of the circumstances surrounding the making and signing of his written confession is evidentially contradicted and thus should be rejected by this Court. We have carefully reviewed the entire record, however, and find that Haynes' account is uncontradicted in its essential elements.

Haynes testified that on the evening of his arrest he made several specific requests of the police that he be permitted to call an attorney and to call his wife. Each such request, he said, was refused. He stated, however, that he was told he might make a call if he confessed:

'They kept wanting me to own up to robbing a Richfield Service Station and I asked Mr. (Detective) Pike several times if I could call a lawyer and he said if I cooperated and gave him a statement * * * that I would be allowed to call, to make a phone call. * * *'

On cross-examination, Lieutenant Wakeley, the officer who interrogated the petitioner on the night of his arrest, first said that Haynes did not ask him for permission to call his wife, but merely inquired whether his wife would be notified of his arrest. Lieutenant Wakeley said that

Page 508

he told the petitioner that his wife would be notified.6 Defense counsel, however, pursued the point and, only a moment later, Wakeley testified that Haynes 'may have' asked permission to call his wife himself; Wakeley said he didn't 'remember exactly whether he asked or whether we wouldn't notify his wife.' Wakeley then testified that he simply didn't 'remember' whether Haynes asked to call his wife so that she might secure a lawyer for him; in addition, the lieutenant admitted that the petitioner might have asked to call his wife after the interrogation was completed. Detective Pike, also testifying at trial, said simply that he had not talked to Haynes on the evening of the arrest.

If this were the only evidence of police coercion and inducement in the record, we would face the problem of determining whether, in view of the testimony of Lieutenant Wakeley and Detective Pike, the petitioner's own testimony would be sufficient, on review by this Court, to establish the existence of impermissible police conduct barring use of the written confession ultimately obtained. We need not pursue such an inquiry, however, since the record contains other probative, convincing, and uncontradicted evidence.

The written confession introduced at trial was dictated and transcribed while Haynes was being questioned by Detectives Peck and Cockburn on the morning of December 20, the day after the robbery. Haynes testified:

'Q. * * * (S)tate whether or not the officers at that time asked you to give them a statement. A. Yes.

Page 509

'Q. And what was your answer to that? A. I wanted to call my wife.

'Q. And were you allowed to call your wife? A. No.

'Q. * * * This was on Friday? A. Friday.

'Q. December 20th? A. Yes.

'Q. And was anything else said with respect to making a telephone call? A. Mr. Pike (sic) and the other officer both told me that when I had made a statement and cooperated with them that they would see to it that as soon as I got booked I could call my wife.

'Q. Well, that was the night before you were told that, wasn't it? A. I was told that the next day too, several times.

'Q. Who were the officers that were with you' A. Oh, not Mr. Pike. Mr. Cockburn and Mr. Peck, I believe.

'Q. In any event, Mr. Haynes, did you soon after that give them a statement? A. Well, not readily.

'Q. Did you give them a statement? A. Yes.'

The transcribed statement itself discloses that early in the interrogation Haynes asked whether he might at least talk to the prosecutor before proceeding further. He was told: 'We just want to get this down for our records, and then we will go to the prosecutor's office and he will ask the same questions that I am.'

Whatever contradition of Haynes' account of his interrogation on the night of his arrest might be found in the testimony of Lieutenant Wakeley and Detective Pike, his explicit description of the circumstances surrounding his questioning and the taking by Detectives Peck and Cockburn of the challenged confession on the following day remains testimonially undisputed. Though he took the stand at trial, Detective Cockburn did not deny that he or Detective Peck had told the petitioner that he might

Page 510

call his wife only if he 'cooperated' and gave the police a statement. Cockburn said merely that he could not 'remember' whether Haynes had asked to call his wife. He conceded that the petitioner 'could have' made such a request. No legal alchemy can transmute such wholly equivocal testimony into a denial or...

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1188 practice notes
  • Miller v. Fenton, No. 83-5530
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)
    • September 28, 1984
    ...would be frustrated on direct appeal if the question were one of fact. Hence the Court's explanation in both Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515-16, 83 S.Ct. 1336, 1344-45, 10 L.Ed.2d 513 (1963), and Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 181, 73 S.Ct. 1077, 1091, 97 L.Ed. 1522 (1953)--both c......
  • Davis v. Burke, No. 16728.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)
    • April 2, 1969
    ...legality by various writers.11 In some specific cases, it has been found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.12 In Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 83 S.Ct. 1336, 10 L.Ed.2d 513 (1963), a combination of the "small book system" and the "if you cooperate" approach was held to constitute ......
  • Soffar v. Cockrell, No. 98-20385.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)
    • July 29, 2002
    ...would have "little, if any, trouble" obtaining a written "concession of voluntariness" and waiver of any rights. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513, 83 S.Ct. 1336, 10 L.Ed.2d 513 10. Thus, the en banc majority's observation that Soffar was "read his Miranda rights at least four times,"......
  • Corley v. United States, No. 07–10441.
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • April 6, 2009
    ...language used by this Court in describing the traditional rule regarding the admission of confessions. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513, 83 S.Ct. 1336, 10 L.Ed.2d 513 (1963) (“ ‘In short, the true test of admissibility is that the confession is made freely, voluntarily and......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1188 cases
  • Miller v. Fenton, No. 83-5530
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)
    • September 28, 1984
    ...would be frustrated on direct appeal if the question were one of fact. Hence the Court's explanation in both Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515-16, 83 S.Ct. 1336, 1344-45, 10 L.Ed.2d 513 (1963), and Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 181, 73 S.Ct. 1077, 1091, 97 L.Ed. 1522 (1953)--both c......
  • Davis v. Burke, No. 16728.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)
    • April 2, 1969
    ...legality by various writers.11 In some specific cases, it has been found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.12 In Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 83 S.Ct. 1336, 10 L.Ed.2d 513 (1963), a combination of the "small book system" and the "if you cooperate" approach was held to constitute ......
  • Soffar v. Cockrell, No. 98-20385.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)
    • July 29, 2002
    ...would have "little, if any, trouble" obtaining a written "concession of voluntariness" and waiver of any rights. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513, 83 S.Ct. 1336, 10 L.Ed.2d 513 10. Thus, the en banc majority's observation that Soffar was "read his Miranda rights at least four times,"......
  • Corley v. United States, No. 07–10441.
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • April 6, 2009
    ...language used by this Court in describing the traditional rule regarding the admission of confessions. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513, 83 S.Ct. 1336, 10 L.Ed.2d 513 (1963) (“ ‘In short, the true test of admissibility is that the confession is made freely, voluntarily and......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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