Haynes v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 04 February 1931
• Docket Number: No. 1387-5566.,1387-5566.
• Parties: HAYNES v. TAYLOR.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

35 S.W.2d 104

HAYNES v. TAYLOR.

No. 1387-5566.

Commission of Appeals of Texas, Section A.

February 4, 1931.

Error to Court of Civil Appeals of Fourth Supreme Judicial District.

Action by J. M. Taylor against J. P. Haynes. To review judgment of Court of Civil Appeals [19 S.W.(2d) 850], reversing judgment for defendant, both defendant and plaintiff bring error.

Judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals reversed, and judgment of the District Court affirmed.

Terrell, Davis, McMillan & Hall and E. W. Clemens, all of San Antonio, for plaintiff in error.

Hull & Oliver, of San Antonio, for defendant in error.

CRITZ, J.

After recovering compensation from an insurance company under the terms of the Workmen's Compensation Law of Texas for personal injuries sustained by him while an employee of the Gunter Hotel Company of San Antonio, J. M. Taylor brought this suit in the district court of Bexar county, Tex., for a second recovery under the common law against J. P. Haynes. The case was submitted to a jury in the district court on special issues, and, based on the answers of the jury to these issues, the trial court entered judgment for Haynes. Taylor appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals at San Antonio, which court reversed the judgment of the trial court, and originally rendered judgment for Taylor, but later, on its own motion, remanded the case to the district court for a new trial. 19 S.W.(2d) 850. The case is now before the Supreme Court on writs of error granted on applications of both parties. We refer to the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals for further statement, and shall make such additional statement in this opinion as we deem expedient.

It seems from the record before us that the Gunter Hotel Company is a corporation owning and operating the Gunter Hotel of the city of San Antonio. The hotel company is a subscriber to the Workmen's Compensation Act, and was insured against liability for injury to its employees under the terms of such act. Among these employees was J. M. Taylor, who was an assistant engineer for the hotel building. Haynes was employed by the hotel company in remodeling and renovating the building. Taylor was injured as the result of Haynes' alleged negligence.

The case was submitted to a jury in the trial court, and in response to such issues the jury found: (a) That Taylor was injured as the result of certain negligent acts of Haynes; (b) that Taylor was guilty of no acts of contributory negligence; and (c) that Taylor was damaged in the sum of $8,000. The jury also found in response to an issue requested by Taylor that Haynes was not an independent contractor. Also the jury found that Haynes was an agent of the Gunter Hotel Company. Based on these findings, the trial court entered a judgment for Haynes.

As stated by the Court of Civil Appeals, the only question involved in this appeal is "whether or not Haynes was such an agent, servant or employee of the Hotel Company as would protect him from liability at common law from his own acts of negligence, or that of his employees under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act." At the special request of Taylor, the trial court submitted the following special issue to the jury:

"Gentlemen of the Jury: At the request of the plaintiff, I submit you the following Special Issue and Question:

"Question: Was the defendant, J. P. Haynes, and Independent Contractor employed by the Gunter Hotel Company? Answer `Yes' or `No.'

"We, the Jury, answer: `No.'

"In connection with the above Special Issue, you are instructed:

"By the term, `Independent Contractor,' as used in the preceding Questions, you are instructed that an Independent Contractor is any person who, in the pursuit of independent business, undertakes to do a specific piece of work for other person using his own means and methods without submitting himself to their control in respect to all its details, and is a person that renders service in the course of an independent occupation representing the will of his employer, only as to the result of his work and not as to the means by which it is accomplished.

                   "Given
                                       "W. S. Anderson
                                  "Judge 37 Judicial District."
                

The Court of Civil Appeals holds as a matter of law that Haynes was not, at the time, and under the circumstances of the accident, such an agent, servant, or employee of the hotel company as is contemplated by section 3 of article 8306, R. C. S. of Texas 1925. The article in question reads as follows:

"The employees of a subscriber and the parents of minor employees shall have no right of action against their employer or against any agent, servant or employee of said employer for damages for personal injuries, and the representatives and beneficiaries of deceased employees shall have no right of action against such subscribing employer or his agent, servant or employee for damages for injuries resulting in death, but such employees and their representatives and beneficiaries shall look for compensation solely to the association, as the same is hereinafter provided for."

In our opinion, the legal effect of the answer of the jury to the above-quoted special issue, and the finding of the jury to the effect that Haynes was an agent of the hotel company, required the trial court to enter a judgment for Haynes.

The Court of Civil Appeals holds that the evidence conclusively shows Haynes to be an independent contractor, and that the verdict to the contrary is without support in the evidence. This issue was submitted to the jury at the special request of Taylor, and he, having requested the submission of the issue, cannot now complain that it should not have been submitted, nor can he now say that the jury's findings thereon are without support in the testimony. In other words, having requested the submission of the issue, he is bound by the finding. Article 2202, subd. 6, R. C. S. 1925; Poindexter v. Receivers Kirby Lumber Co., 101 Tex. 322, 107 S. W. 42; Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Eubanks (Tex. Civ. App.) 294 S. W. 905, 908 (writ ref.); El Paso Electric Co. v. Whitenack (Tex. Civ. App.) 297 S. W. 258; El Paso Electric Co. v. Whitenack (Tex. Com. App.) 1 S.W.(2d) 594.

Subdivision 6 of article 2202, supra, reads as follows:

"6. A special verdict found under the provisions of this article shall, as between the parties, be conclusive as to the facts found."

Under our practice, the jury is the trier of all issues of fact, and our courts have consistently construed subdivision 6, art. 2202, supra, as making the jury's findings on a special issue conclusive on the parties. Also it is settled as the law of this state that, where a party himself requests the submission of an issue to the jury, he is thereafter in no position to assert that the testimony does not raise the issue, or is insufficient to support the finding.

In the Poindexter Case, supra, the Supreme Court expressly held (we quote from the syllabus): "Appellant cannot complain of the submission of an issue by the court's charge as unwarranted by the evidence, where he has asked and had given a charge submitting it as an issue."

In El Paso Electric Co. v. Whitenack, 297 S. W. 258, 259, supra, the Court of Civil Appeals held:

"Appellant tendered special charges submitting said issues of discovered peril, and requested the giving of them to the jury, which request the court granted. Under such circumstances, the answers of the jury, under subdivision 6, article 2202, Rev. Civ. Stat. 1925, as between the parties, are conclusive as to the facts found."

The above holding was approved by the commission, 1 S.W.(2d) 594, supra.

In the Eubanks Case, supra, the court said:

"In response to a special issue requested by appellant and given by the court, the jury found that the National Supply Company exercised `direction and control in material respects over D. L. Eubanks, as to the manner, method and means in which he did his work in all its details.' The effect of this finding makes D. L. Eubanks an employee of the National Supply Company, instead of an independent contractor, and...