Haynes v. E. Tenn. & Ga. R.R.

• Decision Date: 30 September 1866
• Citation: 43 Tenn. 222
• Parties: Alfred H. Haynes v. The East Tennessee, & Georgia Railroad.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

43 Tenn. 222

Alfred H. Haynes

v.The East Tennessee, & Georgia Railroad.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

September Term, 1866.

FROM BRADLEY.

At the September Term, 1862, the defendant demurred to plaintiff's declaration, which was allowed by the Court. Judge JOHN C. GAUT, presiding. Plaintiff appealed.

CAMPBELL & TREWHITT, for Plaintiff.

JESSE GAUT, for Defendant.

SHACKELFORD, J., delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question in this cause arises on a demurrer to the declaration which was sustained by the Court below. The declaration states, the defendants were the proprietors of a certain railroad, over which they ran daily trains of cars in the county of Bradley. The time of the departure of each train, from each end of said road, and its arrival at the respective ends, to-wit: Chattanooga, Dalton in said County, being regulated by advertised schedules; and Knoxville, and all the intermediate points and stations and the defendants, being such owners of said railroad, and proposing to be governed by a fixed schedule, advertised and made public, in the running of its trains of cars, bargained and contracted with the plaintiff, at the defendant's special instance and request, to hire plaintiff to work on said road, by way of repairing it; and plaintiff also, on his part, bargained and contracted to hire, and did hire himself to defendant, at defendant's special request, to work on said road as aforesaid, for wages; and, while so working by way of repairing, under said bargain and contract, on the 9th day of July, 1861, a train of cars was started out on said road, by the agents of the defendants, from Chattanooga, bound for Cleveland, in said county, not in accordance with schedule time regulations, but materially differing from it, so that the train came on the road where plaintiff was at work, being materially off of schedule time, whereby plaintiff was suddenly surprised and overtaken by said train, before he could get himself, and working tools and dumpage car, off the way; and by the train, under the circumstances, was overtaken, ran against, and, by means whereof, one of his legs was broken, etc., etc., etc.

The question presented for our consideration is: Will an action lie by an employe against his principal, for injuries sustained by the carelessness of another employe? The question, in this State, is an open one; it has undergone much discussion in the different Courts of many of the States, and also in the English Courts.

It has been held in England, by a series of decisions, and it seems to be now well settled in the jurisprudence of that country, that a servant who is injured by the negligence or misconduct of a fellow servant, can not maintain an action against the master for such injury: Redfield on Railways, 376, and the authorities cited. The same principle has been recognized and adopted in most of the States of the Union. In a case before this Court, 3 Head., 648, the Court in commenting on this rule of law, say: “That the master is not liable for an injury received by one servant, for the negligent conduct of another, while both are acting in the common business of the same master. As applied to railway companies, it is comparatively a new question everywhere, but especially in our Courts. It is a principle of great practical importance, and care must be taken that it be not applied to cases not clearly falling within the rule; that such latitude be not given to the rule as would enable the corporation to evade liability in all cases by intrenching itself behind its officers and agents. The question was not determined by the principle decided in that case. It is manifest from the reasoning of the Court, they were of the opinion the principle should not be applied to servants acting in different grades who are subordinated. In 20...