Haynes v. The State Of Ga.

• Decision Date: 28 February 1855
• Docket Number: No.81.,81.
• Parties: Dennis E. Haynes, plaintiff in error. vs. The State of Georgia, defendant.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

17 Ga. 465

Dennis E. Haynes, plaintiff in error. vs. The State of Georgia, defendant.

No.81.

Supreme Court of the State of Georgia

FEBRUARY TERM, 1855.

Murder, in Fulton Superior Court. Tried before Judge Warner, October Term, 1854.

While impannelling the Jury in this case, the State put upon the prisoner one Reuben Haynes, and also one William McWilliams, without first administering either the oaths prescribed by the Statute of December, 1843, or the oath prescribed by the Act of 1853, to wit: "Have you any conscientious scruples with regard to capital punishment?" The bill of exceptions states that the prisoner accepted both the Jurors, without requesting the oaths to be administered.

The State also put upon the prisoner one Thomas A, Wil-liams, who was accepted by the prisoner, and was required to be sworn in chief. Before the oath, in chief, was administered, the Juror, himself, voluntarily stated to the Court that he was under the age of twenty-one years; and for this cause, he was set aside by the Court, "without the consent, and contrary to the express wish of the prisoner." J. W. Cason, one of the tales jurors, before he was put upon the prisoner, stated under oath, that he had a sick child at home who required his personal attention; and for this reason, asked to be discharged from serving as a Juror. The Court excused this Juror, without the consent of the prisoner.

After the bill of indictment was read to the Jury, the case opened by the Solicitor General, and a portion of the evidence on the part of the State had been received, "a Juryman by the name of Robert W. Fleming was, by the Court, and without the consent of the prisoner, permitted to separate from his fellow-Jurors, under the charge of a Bailiff sworn to attend him, and go to his house in the city, and there remain some two hours, under the charge of the Bailiff, and then return to the Jury, the said Juror having first sworn, that he had then a sick child at home who required his personal attention."

Among the triors appointed by the Court, was a Mr. Beman, an Attorney at Law then residing in Atlanta, Fulton County; after the trial was over, it was made to appear to the Court, that Mr. Beman had not resided in Atlanta six months, and not more than three or four months, before the trial.

After the first forty-eight persons summoned as Jurors were disposed of, other tales Jurors were summoned by the Sheriff; and out of which second set of tales Jurors, the balance of the Jury was made up.

After the evidence and the argument closed, the Counsel for the prisoner asked the Court to charge the Jury as follows:

1st. We ask your honor to charge the Jury, that although drunknenness will not excuse the commission of a crime, and although "a prisoner can derive no privilege from madness voluntarily contracted by him;" yet, voluntary drunkenness uponan indictment for murder, "the intoxication of defendant may be taken into consideration as a circumstance, to show the act was not premeditated."

2d. We ask your Honor to charge the Jury, that a threat made under excitement, no matter from what cause this excitement emanated, will not authorize a Jury to presume that an act done after that threat made was deliberately done, and that a homicide committed without any mixture of deliberation whatever, can not be murder in the law.

3d. We ask the Court to charge the Jury, though voluntary drunkenness can not excuse from the commission of crime; yet when, as upon a charge of murder, the question is, whether the act done was premeditated or done only from sudden heat and impulse, the fact of the party being intoxicated has been held to be a circumstance proper to be taken into consideration.

4th. That being intoxicated is no excuse for crime; yet evidence of drunkenness may be admissible to the question of malice, to show the character of the homicide.

5th. We request your Honor to charge the Jury, that if the prisoner was sensible of what he was about to do and did the act intentionally, still, if the Jury are satisfied, from the evidence, that the killing was the result of a fear for his life or enormous bodily harm induced by the improper unlawful act of deceased at the time of the killing, still, the Jury must, from the evidence, determine whether this homicide was the result of malignity of heart, or whether it was imputable to human infirmity.

6th. That if the Jury believe, from the evidence, that Haynes had been put in possession of this well and premises, Haynes was not, by the law, compelled to run from a trespasser, leaving his property to the mercy of the trespasser; but that, by the law, he may legally oppose force to force, and that he may legally oppose whatever force the pressure of the circumstances demanded, to prevent a felony or to prevent some serious, dangerous, bodily harm.

7th. That if the prisoner, when at the well, was where he had a legal right to be, that he had a right to remain thereand there protect his property or his person; and in such case, he is not obliged to retreat, but may legally pursue his adversary until he finds himself out of danger; and if, in such a conflict, Haynes killed Griggs, it was justifiable.

CHARGE OF THE COURT:

This is a case, The State vs. Dennis E. Haynes and George Lofton and John M. Brown, for murder—and the prisoner, Haynes, having severed on the trial, you will consider this case as against Haynes only. You have listened patiently and attentively to the argument of Counsel. It now remains for the Court to give you its views of the law which it deems applicable to the case. You are judges of the law as well as the facts. I desire your attention while I endeavor, as clearly and concisely as I can, to give you my view of the law, but you are not absolutely bound by the law as given in charge by the Court. You have the right to be judges of it yourselves. You are the exclusive judges of the facts detailed by the witnesses. The indictment is before you. It alleges that Dennis E. Haynes, on a certain day mentioned in the bill of indictment, at a certain place mentioned therein, did of his malice aforethought, unlawfully, wilfully and feloniously kill and murder James E. Griggs. To this charge the prisoner has plead not guilty, and thus has an issue been made up in which the State holds the affirmative. The State must fully prove the prisoner's guilt, as charged in the bill of indictment, which you will have before you. The State, I say, must fully prove the guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, of the crime as charged, before you can find him guilty. Permit the Court to call your attention to some of the rules of evidence as applicable to this case. It is the province of the Court to decide upon the admissibility of evidence. It is your province to judge for yourselves, what facts that evidence establishes. You are exclusively to judge as to the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. Prisoner's Counsel contend that some of the witnesses have been impeached. One mode of impeaching witnesses is to introduce other witnesses, who testify that they are acquaintedwith the general character of the witness for truth and veracity in the neighborhood in which he lives, and from their knowledge of that character they would not believe the witness on his oath in a Court of Justice. If any witnesses have been thus impeached, you have the right to set their testimony aside entirely; and it is your duty to do so unless the testimony of such witness is corroborated by other witnesses, whose credibility has not been attacked; and corroborated, you will give it such weight as you may think it entitled. The credit of a witness may be materially affected or totally destroyed by the manner of giving evidence, as by an inconsistent statement of facts. &c. As to the doctrine "false in one point false in all, " if a witness swear wilfully false in one material point, you may disregard his entire testimony, unless corroborated by the evidence of some unimpeached witness or witnesses, unless it be attributed to mistake or inadvertence, want of memory, &c. If there has been any evidence in this cause impeached by any of these rules, you are at liberty to believe of disbelieve it, as you think proper. An accomplice, or one indicted in the same indictment, not on his trial, is a competent witness—as to his credibility, this is a matter entirely for you to consider—take into consideration his relative position to the case.

The Court charges you that the fact of his being indicted as an accomplice, is a circumstance against his credibility. The weight to be given to such testimony, you must judge exclusively for yourselves. Where a threat is proven to have been made and susceptible of two constructions, the one an innocent, the other a criminal construction, the rule is, that you should give such threat that construction most favorable to the prisoner. But if you believe any threat was made by the prisoner which is only susceptible of a criminal construction, you should give that construction. You are the exclusive judges of this matter.

"A crime or misdemeanor shall consist in a violation of a public law, in the commission of which there shall be a union or joint operation of act and intention or criminal negligence." "A person shall be considered of sound mind, who is neitheran idiot, a lunatic or afflicted by insanity, or who hath arrived at the age of fourteen years, or under that age, if such person knew the distinction between good and evil." "Drunkenness shall not be an excuse for any crime or misdemeanor, unless such drunkenness was occasioned by the fraud, artifice or contrivance of other person or persons, for the purpose of having crime perpetrated, and the person or persons so causing said drunkenness for such malignant purpose, shall be considered a principal, and suffer the same punishment as would have been inflicted on the person or persons committing the offence, if he, she or they had been...