Haynes v. The State Of Tex.
| Decision Date | 09 December 2010 |
| Docket Number | NO. 01-09-00380-CR,01-09-00380-CR |
| Parties | WILLIE FOSTER HAYNES, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
A jury convicted appellant, Willie Foster Haynes, of being a felon inpossession of a firearm.1 Appellant pleaded true to the enhancement paragraphs and the trial court assessed punishment at 37 years' confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. In four issues, appellant contends (1) he did not voluntarily choose to proceed pro se at trial; (2) the evidence was legally insufficient to show knowing possession; (3) the evidence was factually insufficient to show knowing possession; and (4) the trial court failed to instruct the jury regarding the admissibility of his custodial statements. As modified, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Appellant sped past Officers Nathaniel Wackman and Scott Reinert while they were patrolling in an unmarked car. The officers followed appellant and saw him u-turn under the highway and then switch lanes several times without signaling. Appellant then stopped in a parking lot without pulling into a marked space or turning off his headlights.
Officer Wackman, who was in uniform, pulled behind appellant, approached the car, and identified himself as a law enforcement officer. Officer Wackman asked for appellant's license and insurance, but appellant did not have insurance. Officer Wackman ordered appellant out of the car and arrested him for driving without insurance. Officer Wackman handcuffed appellant and asked if there wasanything in the car that the officers should know about. Appellant responded that he had a loaded gun under his seat. Officer Wackman then asked what appellant had been arrested for in the past and appellant responded he had been arrested for —possession and robbery." Officer Wackman interpreted possession to mean drug possession. Appellant also stated these arrests led to final convictions. A third officer arrived in a marked car and ran a criminal history on appellant showing an outstanding warrant for credit card abuse. Officer Wackman asked Reinert to look for the gun, which was clearly visible underneath the driver's seat from Reinert's perspective by the open driver's side door.
Appellant was indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm and trial counsel was appointed. At a pretrial hearing, appellant requested to represent himself at trial. Appellant stated the only reason he wanted to represent himself was because the trial court refused to appoint a new attorney for him. The trial court asked about appellant's age, education, and legal experience. The trial court verbally warned appellant that he would not receive special treatment, that he would be responsible for knowing the law like a lawyer, that neither the trial court nor stand-by counsel would try the case for him, and that his choice would be to his own advantage or peril. The trial court also informed him of the crime charged and the range of punishment. Appellant signed written warnings regarding selfrepresentation and repeatedly stated he understood the risks.
At trial, the jury heard testimony from Officers Wackman and Reinert and several fingerprint experts. Officer Wackman testified without objection to appellant's statements regarding the gun and his prior criminal history. He also testified that he would have searched the vehicle incident to arrest even without the statements. Officer Reinert demonstrated for the jury how the gun was sticking out from underneath the driver's seat and testified that no search was made of the car until after appellant's statements. The fingerprint experts testified that appellant's prints taken at trial matched those on the jail records for his prior conviction for credit card abuse in 2003. However, no identification could be made from a partial latent print pulled from the gun.
Appellant rested without presenting any defense evidence and the jury found him guilty. No additional evidence was heard at the punishment phase and appellant pleaded true to the enhancement paragraphs detailing his convictions for credit card abuse, possession of a controlled substance, and robbery. The trial court sentenced appellant to 37 years' confinement.
In his first issue, appellant argues he did not voluntarily relinquish his right to counsel when he chose to proceed pro se at trial.
Federal and state law guarantee a criminal defendant the right to the assistance of counsel, as well as the right to waive counsel and represent himself. See U.S. Const. amend. VI & XIV; see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.05 (Vernon 2005); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807, 818-20, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 2527, 2532-33 (1975); Hatten v. State, 71 S.W.3d 332, 333 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). A defendant should be warned of the dangers and disadvantages accompanying the waiver of the right to counsel and decision to self-represent. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S. Ct. at 2541; Hatten, 71 S.W.3d at 333. Such a decision, to be constitutionally effective, must be made competently, voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400-01, 113 S. Ct. 2680, 2687 (1993); Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834-36, 95 S. Ct. at 2541; Collier v. State, 959 S.W.2d 621, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Here, neither party raises the issue of competence. The decision is made voluntarily if it is uncoerced. Collier, 959 S.W.2d at 626. The decision is made knowingly and intelligently if made with a full understanding of the right to counsel, which is being abandoned, as well as the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. Id.
Appellant argues his waiver was involuntary because the trial court forced him to choose between representing himself or using counsel already appointed.
Appellant asserts the trial court should have appointed new counsel or at least inquired into the reasons behind his request for new counsel. An indigent defendant's right to counsel does not compel the trial court to appoint counsel agreeable to the accused. Carroll v. State, 176 S.W.3d 249, 256 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. ref'd) (citing King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 566 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)). Likewise, a defendant may not manipulate the right to counsel so as to obstruct the orderly procedure in the court or interfere with the fair administration of justice and must, in some circumstances, yield to the general interest of prompt and efficient justice. Id. A defendant is not entitled to his personal choice of appointed counsel, therefore he is required to accept the attorney appointed by the trial court unless (1) defendant waived his right to counsel and chose to represent himself or (2) defendant adequately demonstrated why appointment of new counsel was necessary. Id.
Appellant had the burden to justify appointment of new counsel, but nothing in the record indicates his reasons for requesting a change. See id. The record also contains no evidence of coercion. Appellant therefore cannot show his decision to self-represent was involuntary. See Collier, 959 S.W.2d at 626. Additionally, the trial court admonished appellant and made all necessary inquiries to demonstrate a constitutional waiver of the right. The trial court explained that appellant would not receive special treatment and would be expected to know rules of procedureand evidence like a lawyer. The trial court detailed the charged offense and the range of punishments emphasizing the severity of the consequences. The trial court also repeatedly asked whether appellant understood and had appellant sign a written version of the warnings. The record shows appellant's decision to proceed pro se was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. See Collier, 959 S.W.2d at 626. We overrule appellant's first issue.
In his second and third issues, appellant argues the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to show his knowing possession of the firearm.
To prove a defendant is a felon in possession of a firearm, the State must establish the accused was previously convicted of a felony offense and possessed a firearm after the conviction and before the fifth anniversary of his release from confinement at any location other than the premises at which the person lives. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 46.04(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2010); James v. State, 264 S.W.3d 215, 218 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.). Possession is a voluntary act if the possessor knowingly obtains or receives the thing possessed or is aware of his control of the thing for a sufficient time to permit him to terminate his control. See Tex. Pen. Code. Ann. § 6.01(b) (Vernon 2003); James, 264 S.W.3d at 218.
If the firearm is not found on the defendant or is not in his exclusive possession, the evidence must affirmatively link him to the firearm. James, 264 S.W.3d at 218-19. An affirmative link demonstrates that the defendant was conscious of his connection with the weapon and knew what it was. Id. at 219. Factors that may establish an affirmative link include: (1) the firearm was in plain view; (2) the defendant was the owner of the car in which the firearm was found; (3) the defendant was the driver of the car in which the firearm was found; (4) the defendant was in close proximity and had ready access to the firearm; (5) the firearm was found on the same side of the car as the defendant; (6) firearm was found on the defendant; (7) the defendant attempted to flee; (8) conduct by the defendant indicated a consciousness of guilt, including extreme nervousness or furtive gestures; (9) the defendant had a special connection or relationship to the firearm; (10) the place where the firearm was found was enclosed; (11) occupants of the automobile...
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