Haynie v. Gold Bond Bldg. Products

• Decision Date: 01 September 1985
• Docket Number: No. 26,26
• Citation: 511 A.2d 40,306 Md. 644
• Parties: Samuel B. HAYNIE, Jr. v. GOLD BOND BUILDING PRODUCTS. ,
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 644

306 Md. 644

511 A.2d 40

Samuel B. HAYNIE, Jr. v. GOLD BOND BUILDING PRODUCTS.

No. 26, Sept. Term, 1985.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

July 11, 1986.

Thomas J. Kwiatkowski, Jr. (Marvin Ellin, Ellin & Baker, on brief), Baltimore, for appellant.

Dale B. Garbutt and Anne Talbot Hardy (Whiteford, Taylor, Preston, Trimble & Johnston, on brief), Baltimore, for appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and SMITH, ELDRIDGE, COLE, RODOWSKY, COUCH and McAULIFFE, JJ.

ELDRIDGE, Judge.

This case began when the plaintiff, Samuel B. Haynie, Jr., filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City a "Bill For Declaratory Judgment." Named as defendant was Haynie's employer, Gold Bond Building Products. The pertinent factual allegations and issues raised were set forth in the Bill as follows.

"The Plaintiff alleges that in March, 1978, a defective piece of machinery at the production plant owned by the Defendant malfunctioned electrically igniting flammable fuel oil. The machinery was labeled a 'rock dryer,' a machine which flame dries gypsum rock to prepare it for processing in the Defendant's plant.

"The manufacturer of the machine had recognized its potential for serious harm and had installed an automatic safety device which would shut down the flow of fuel oil in the event the electrical ignition system short circuited. This automatic cutoff would thereby prevent the occurrence of an extremely hazardous and life-threatening phenomenon known as 'reverse ignition' in which fuel oil splashes against the hot metal of the rock dryer igniting flames back into the area of the workmen. On several previous occasions, known only to the Defendant Corporation and its managerial personnel, the rock dryer ignition system had malfunctioned and the automatic safety device had immediately shut down the machine.

"The Defendant Corporation recognized the potential danger of the rock dryer, but deliberately chose to disregard the risk of injury posed to its employees.

"At sometime prior to March 18, 1978, the managerial personnel of the Defendant Corporation rigged a bypass of the rock dryer's automatic safety device, telling no one about this attempt to maintain continuous operation of the assembly line system. The bypass of the rock dryer's safety device was carried out by the Corporate Defendant so as to prevent the machine from shutting off, thereby reducing the 'down time' for the production assembly line.

"Only hours after the bypass was put in place the electrical ignition system short circuited. This time, however, the rock dryer did not shut down and the continuous flow of fuel oil produced reverse ignition. The flammable fuel struck the super heated inner walls of the rock dryer and searing flames shot out from the mouth of the machine.

"Foreseeably and predictably employees of the Defendant Corporation attempted to extinguish the fire with a fire extinguisher. In so doing, the Plaintiff, Samuel B. Haynie, Jr., was electrocuted when his metal fire extinguisher came in contact with the electrical system of the rock dryer. The Plaintiff survived, but suffered inter alia third degree internal burns which required extensive hospital, medical and surgical care and which have rendered him permanently disabled.

"The Plaintiff asserts that the rule of law controlling this case is that articulated by the Court of Appeals of West Virginia in the case of Mandolidis v. Elkins Industries, Inc., 161 W.Va. 695, 246 S.E.2d 907 (1978), ... which held that proof of outrageous misconduct by an employer plus proof of a strong probability that serious injury would result therefrom, constituted 'a deliberate intention to produce such injury,' under a section of West Virginia's Workmen's Compensation Statute which is nearly identical to Section 44 of the Maryland Workmen's Compensation Act.... The Defendant disagrees arguing that, even if the Maryland Court of Appeals were to adopt the West Virginia rule, Mr. Haynie has made an election of his remedies when he chose to first proceed under the Workmen's Compensation Statute and collect benefits therefrom. [see, Md.Code (1957, 1979 Rep.Vol., 1982 Cum.Supp.) Art. 101, § 58 ...].

"It is alleged that, although Mr. Haynie did first file a claim and receive benefits under the Maryland Workmen's Compensation Act, such was done without full knowledge of his rights and remedies at common law. It is further asserted that without such necessary information, it is impossible for any party to make an informed election of remedies. There are no Maryland Court of Appeals cases which have addressed this issue directly.

"Finally, the Defendant alleges that the Plaintiff may not elect to pursue any law action against Gold Bond Building, Inc., since it was not his 'employer' for purposes of this incident as the term 'employer' is defined under the Workmen's Compensation Act. That is to say, the Defendant argues that because the individuals allegedly responsible for any malfunction of the rock dryer were not the 'alter ego' of the Corporation, Mr. Haynie has failed to satisfy this threshold requirement for an election of any kind. The Plaintiff strenuously disputes this contention.

"WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays that this Court by judgment declare:

"That the rule of law to be utilized in defining the term, 'deliberate intention,' in Section 44 of the Maryland Workmen's Compensation Act is that rule announced by the West Virginia Court in the case of Mandolidis v. Elkins Industries, Inc.....

"That the Plaintiff's initial decision to file and accept Workmen's Compensation benefits does not constitute a binding election of remedies under § 58 of the Workmen's Compensation Act if such a decision was made without full knowledge of his alternatives.

"That the Plaintiff's injuries were the result of acts taken with deliberate intention by the Plaintiff's 'employer,' as that term is defined under the Workmen's Compensation Act."

In its answer to the Bill, the defendant Gold Bond Building Products "admit[ted] that the plaintiff was injured in March 1978 while an employee of ... Gold Bond Building Products, and while performing job duties arising out of and in the course of employment." Gold Bond asked the court to declare that the controlling rule of law "is that of the vast majority of states which have considered this matter which is that 'a deliberate intention to produce such injury' can only be found from a recognized intentional tort and not from negligence however gross." Gold Bond also asked the court to declare that "Mr. Haynie's decision to file and accept Workmen's Compensation benefits constitutes an election of remedies or waiver or estoppel or res judicata as to any right by Mr. Haynie to proceed against his employer at common law." Finally, Gold Bond requested the court to declare that Haynie's "injuries were not the result of any actions by his 'employer' as that term is used in Section 44 of Article 101."

Thereafter the circuit court filed an opinion and a declaratory judgment. The circuit court declined to follow the rule announced by the West Virginia court in the Mandolidis case, choosing instead to adopt the rule followed in other jurisdictions. The court also declared that "the plaintiff's initial decision to file and accept Workmen's Compensation benefits does constitute a binding election of remedies under ... the Workmen's Compensation Act" and that "the plaintiff's injuries were not the result of acts taken with deliberate intention by the plaintiff's 'employer,' as that term is defined under the Workmen's Compensation Act."

The plaintiff Haynie appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, and the appellate court affirmed in an unreported opinion. ¹

Haynie then filed in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari, presenting the legal issues forming the subject of the declaratory judgment. The petition also referred to the fact that "a claim of common law in tort" had been filed by Haynie against Gold Bond prior to the filing of the declaratory judgment action, that in the common law action Gold Bond had relied on the "employer-immunizing provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act," that Gold Bond had filed three motions for summary judgment in that action, that the declaratory judgment action was filed "to bring about a final ruling on ... the existence of a cause of action at common law," that the two actions had been "consolidated," and that the circuit court had ruled that "there was no common law cause of action." The inference from the petition for a writ of certiorari was that the common law action and the declaratory judgment action had both been resolved by final judgments. Gold Bond's opposition to the certiorari petition simply referred to the circuit court having "fully and definitely disposed of petitioner's common-law suit...." We granted the petition for a writ of certiorari in order to decide the important questions presented concerning the Workmen's Compensation Act. ²

At oral argument before us, however, counsel for each side informed us that the tort suit is still pending in the trial court. The record, sent to us pursuant to the writ of certiorari, disclosed that the tort action was filed prior to the declaratory judgment action, in what was then the Baltimore City Court (now part of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City). There was a demurrer by Gold Bond, then an amended declaration, and thereafter three successive motions for summary judgment by Gold Bond. The first motion was withdrawn, and the second was denied. The third motion for summary judgment in the tort suit is still pending. The allegations and the issues raised in the amended tort declaration and third motion for summary judgment are identical to those in the later declaratory judgment action. The same defenses were asserted by Gold Bond in both actions. Nevertheless, the trial court judgment was limited to the declaratory judgment action.

The Declaratory Judgment Act, as amended by Ch....