Hays v. City & County of Denver, 16855
| Decision Date | 02 March 1953 |
| Docket Number | No. 16855,16855 |
| Citation | 127 Colo. 154,254 P.2d 860 |
| Parties | HAYS et al. v. CITY & COUNTY OF DENVER et al. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Charles R. Hays, Denver, for plaintiffs in error.
Leonard M. Campbell, Horace N. Hawkins, Jr., Denver, for defendants in error.
Plaintiffs in error, plaintiffs below, by writ of error, seek a reversal of a judgment of dismissal of their amended complaint, entered on motion of defendants in error, who were defendants below. Said complaint having been dismissed, plaintiffs elected not to plead further.
The record on error, submitted by plaintiffs, did not include their original complaint, defendants' motion to dismiss the same, and the court's ruling thereon. Defendants then applied to the trial court to have the original complaint included in the record, together with their motion to dismiss, and the ruling of the court sustaining such motion. The trial court granted defendants' motion for these additional parts of the record, but ordered them to pay for the same. Defendants have filed cross-specification asserting error in the ruling regarding costs.
Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment, alleging that they owned real and personal property in Denver, subject to taxation, and that 'they bring this action for themselves and on behalf of all other taxpayers of the City and County of Denver similarly situated.'
They alleged that defendant Brodhead is the Manager of Revenue and ex-officio Assessor of the City and County of Denver, and that he has demanded entrance into the home of plaintiffs and 'has threatened that if he be denied admission to said home he would increase the assessed value of said property; that because plaintiffs have refused said Manager of Revenue, ex-officio Assessor, admission to their home he has carried out his threat and increased the assessed value of their home and property', which assessments plaintiffs alleged are 'arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, unequal and punitive.'
Plaintiffs further alleged that, the cause of action herein 'is one of interest to the public generally, so that it may know whether or not the Manager of Revenue, ex-officio Assessor, can lawfully force his way into the homes of the taxpayers by threats and intimidation, and whether he can arbitrarily and capriciously increase the assessments of taxpayers because they refuse his demands for such entrance into their homes.'
Plaintiffs prayed for judgment, declaring that defendant Manager of Revenue has 'no right to force entrance into the home of plaintiffs, or the homes of other taxpayers similarly situated, against their will, by threats and intimidations, or otherwise; and that the duties, rights and responsibilities and legal relations of the parties hereto be determined and declared by this honorable court.'
Did the trial court err in sustaining defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint? It is clear that plaintiffs, in their amended complaint, did not allege facts sufficient to entitle them to a declaratory judgment.
There can, of course, be no doubt or uncertainty about the duty and the right of a county assessor to assess property as demanded by the constitution, and pertinent statutes. Neither such duty, nor right, is, or can be affected by the unwillingness or reluctance of a householder to permit inspection of his premises. This is Hornbook law.
Sections 114 and 116, chapter 142, '35 C.S.A., chapter 158, S.L.Colo. '43, set out the procedure to be followed by a taxpayer who feels that his property has been assessed too high. If no relief be had before the assessor, he may then have the matter reviewed by the County Board of Equalization. In the event of an adverse holding there, he may appeal to the district court. Full and complete remedies are provided by statute, and these remedies must be pursued by a property owner who feels aggrieved.
In Fairall v. Frisbee, 104 Colo. 553, 92 P.2d 748 our court held that in a suit for a declaratory judgment where no...
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Grand Lodge of Ancient and Accepted Masons of New Mexico v. Taxation and Revenue Dept. of State of N.M.
...declaratory judgment were not intended as a substitute for statutory judicial review of administrative action. Hays v. City & County of Denver, 127 Colo. 154, 254 P.2d 860 (1953); V-1 Oil Co. v. County of Bannock, 97 Idaho 807, 554 P.2d 1304 (1976). They should not be used to usurp or repla......
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Davison v. Board of County Com'rs of Park County
...declaratory judgment procedure, which the taxpayers seek to invoke here, be used to circumvent the statutory remedies. Hays v. Denver, 127 Colo. 154, 254 P.2d 860 (1953). In the alternative, the taxpayers contend that because they filed this suit as a class action, there need be no exhausti......
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Clasby v. Klapper, 80SA285
...of review by attempting to obtain declaratory or injunctive relief where the prescribed avenue of review is adequate. Hays v. Denver, 127 Colo. 154, 254 P.2d 860 (1953); Greyhound Racing Association v. Colorado Racing Commission, 41 Colo.App. 319, 589 P.2d 70 (1978); see Snyder v. Lakewood,......
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Janicek v. Hinnen
...in excess of those permitted by C.R.C.P. 68. The trial court's order of costs is therefore reviewable on that issue. See Hays v. Denver, 127 Colo. 154, 254 P.2d 860; Cf. Miller v. Miller, 129 Colo. 462, 271 P.2d 411; Davidson v. Jennings, 27 Colo. 187, 60 P. The final question to be resolve......
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