Hays v. Harris, 4-3382.
| Citation | 65 S.W.2d 526 |
| Decision Date | 06 December 1933 |
| Docket Number | No. 4-3382.,4-3382. |
| Parties | HAYS v. HARRIS, Judge. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Arkansas |
June P. Wooten and A. G. Frankel, both of Little Rock, for petitioner.
W. G. Riddick, of Little Rock, and Roy D. Campbell, of Forrest City, for respondent.
This proceeding is a continuation of the litigation reflected in the following opinions of this court: Terry v. Harris, Judge, 64 S. W.(2d) 80, October 30, 1933; and Terry v. Harris, Judge, 64 S.W.(2d) 324, November 13, 1933, in which there was an opinion per curiam.
It appears that upon the rendition of the opinion per curiam, supra, the contestant, Hays, filed a second or substitute complaint to which there was attached jurisdictional affidavits complying with the requirements of section 3772, Crawford & Moses' Digest. A motion was sustained in the court below to dismiss this second complaint upon the ground that it had not been filed within the time allowed by law, and upon that motion being sustained, the circuit court made an order dismissing the suit for that reason.
The contestant has applied to us for a writ of mandamus to compel the circuit judge to proceed with the trial of the cause. Upon oral argument before us, it was agreed by the parties hereto that this proceeding be treated as an appeal from this order of the circuit court, and we are asked by both parties to decide the case upon its merits. We have for decision, therefore, the question whether this second complaint was filed within the time allowed by law.
The applicable statute is section 3772, Crawford & Moses' Digest, which reads as follows:
It will be remembered that the original complaint has been dismissed and this second or substituted complaint was filed much later than twenty days after the certification of the vote as made by the respective county committees, but within less than twenty days after the chairman and secretary of the state central committee had cast up such returns based on said certification and had certified the congressional nominee to the state election board as required by the opinion delivered October 30, 1933.
Section 3772, Crawford & Moses' Digest, copied above, applies alike to contests for county, district, and state offices. The only difference, in respect to the time within which such contests must be instituted, is that in cases of contests of "the certification complained of" for nomination for county offices, the suits must be instituted within ten days, whereas such suits in regard to the "certification in more than one county" shall be begun within twenty days, after such certification.
Obviously, the right of action conferred by the statute to contest the certification of nomination or the certification of the vote means the same thing in contests for nominations for county offices as in cases of contests for district or state offices. The only distinction made by the statute is in the difference of time within which such contests must be instituted.
This court had occasion, in the case of Wilson v. Land, 166 Ark. 182, 265 S. W. 661, 662, to construe the provisions of the statute authorizing contests for nominations and to determine whether the provisions in regard to contesting certificates of nomination operated to extend the time within which a...
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