Hays v. State, 44852

Decision Date09 May 1972
Docket NumberNo. 44852,44852
Citation480 S.W.2d 635
PartiesCoke HAYS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
CourtTexas Court of Criminal Appeals

G. C. Harris, Greenville, for appellant.

Jack Q. Neal, Dist. Atty., L. M. Braziel, County Atty., Sulpher Springs, and Jim D. Vollers, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.

OPINION

ONION, Presiding Judge.

Appellant was indicted for assault with intent to murder with malice aforethought. He was convicted of the lesser included offense of aggravated assault. The jury assessed his punishment at confinement in the county jail for two years and at a fine of $1,000.00.

The court's charge authorized the jury to convict for aggravated assault if they found that the assault had been committed with a deadly weapon, under circumstances not amounting to an attempt to murder or maim, or if serious bodily injury was inflicted on the person assaulted.

Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction, particularly contending that the evidence fails to reflect that the assault was committed either with a deadly weapon, or that the complaining witness suffered serious bodily injury.

In Garrett v. State, 164 Tex.Cr.R. 275, 298 S.W.2d 945 (1957), it was held that under an indictment charging an assault with intent to murder, a conviction for aggravated assault was not authorized where the instrument used was not a deadly weapon and the injuries inflicted were not serious.

Jesse Jones, the 55-year old complaining witness, was in the wholesale meat business and made deliveries to the appellant's grocery store in Emory at least twice a week. He suffered from a heart condition for which he took nitroglycerin tablets.

On January 9, 1970, Jones arrived at appellant's store between 6 and 7 p.m., which was the time of day that he normally arrived, to make his deliveries there. After checking the store's merchandise to see what might be needed, he took certain items out of his truck and placed them on a dolly. At this time, appellant, with a rifle in his hand, approached Jones and told Jones that if his (appellant's) business wasn't appreciated anymore than to make him the last delivery of the day, Jones should get off the premises before he (the appellant) blew his head off. The rifle was then pointed at Jones.

After some words were exchanged, Jones threw the merchandise back into the truck and shut the door. At this time, the appellant laid the rifle down and walked over to Jones and said, 'You yellow bellied so and so, if you had any guts at all you would not stand there and take the things I'm calling you. You sorry so and so.' Jones then struck the appellant, who retrieved his rifle and struck Jones over the head with it, breaking the rifle stock. The blow 'bursted' Jones' head 'plumb to my skull,' knocking him to the ground where the appellant kept striking him, this time with the steel barrel of the rifle. When Jones got to his feet, the appellant 'cut' at him with a pocket knife, but missed. And when appellant's wife came out of the store, Jones was able to get his truck started and drive off, stopping the first person he saw, who took him to the Sheriff's office. Jones' wife came to Emory and took him to Greenville where, in the hospital emergency room, a doctor 'sewed his head up.' Thereafter he went home that night; was 'off work' for three weeks and, subsequently, took a lighter job.

Edna Jones testified she took her husband to the Greenville hospital; that when she first saw him there was 'blood all over his clothes' and a large cut on his forehead 'large enough that you could see into it.'

Sheriff Robinson testified that when he saw Jones he was covered with blood and his 'head was split open in a couple of places.'

No doctor was called by the State.

The 47-year old appellant testified he had been target practicing with his .222 carbine and returned to his store and observed Jones unloading merchandise and complained to him about the lateness of his deliveries; that he lost his temper and started arguing; that Jones threw the merchandise into the truck and swung around and hit him in the jaw, cutting the inside of his mouth; that he struck Jones with the rifle, breaking the stock and did not, thereafter, use the rifle. He denied he struck Jones with the rifle barrel or that he tried to cut Jones with a pocket knife, and testified he acted in self-defense. He acknowledged he saw some blood running down Jones' face before Jones left. He also admitted he was a younger, heavier and larger man than the complaining witness.

The general verdict returned by the jury is sufficient, if the evidence shows that the assault was committed with a deadly weapon, or if serious bodily injury was inflicted.

'If the only proof that the weapon used in the assault was a deadly weapon is that it was a pistol used as a bludgeon, the proof is insufficient to show that it was a deadly weapon. When an instrument or weapon is used to strike with, the size, weight, and effect should be shown in order that there may be some evidence from which to determine whether or not, as used, it was a deadly weapon.' 4 Branch's Ann.P.C.2d ed. § 1753, p. 131.

'The wounds inflicted upon the person assaulted will be looked to in determining whether or not the pistol, knife, or other weapon used was a deadly weapon, and proof that the wounds thereby inflicted were of a serious nature and of the size and weight of the weapon, or either, and of the manner of its use may be sufficient to show that the weapon as used was a deadly weapon.' 4 Branch's Ann.P.C.2d ed. § 1753, p. 132.

In the instant case, the evidence reflects that after pointing the rifle at Jones, the appellant used the rifle as a bludgeon and broke the rifle stock with a blow to Jones' head which knocked him to the ground, inflicting a wound 'plumb to the skull'; and, then, began to beat him with the 22-inch long metal barrel of the .222 rifle. The 55-year old heart patient was covered with blood; the head wound required stitching by a doctor, and he was unable to work for three weeks and was forced to accept 'a lighter job.'

The court, in its charge, defined a deadly weapon as 'one which, according to the manner and mode of its use, is reasonably calculated or likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.'

'To constitute 'serious bodily injury,' the injury must be grave, not trivial--such an injury as gives rise to apprehension of danger to life, health, or limb.' 4 Branch's Ann.P.C.2d ed. § 1749, p. 127. While the decided cases do not appear to have always been consistent as to certain facts, id., it has been held that where the scalp was cut an inch or two long and to the bone by a blow from the butt...

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11 cases
  • Williams v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
    • 24 Mayo 1978
    ...but the same testimony is later admitted, this Court has consistently held such exclusion does not require reversal. Hays v. State,480 S.W.2d 635 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Preston v. State, 481 S.W.2d 408 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). Even if appellant's argument and theory are correct, the error, if any, in......
  • Andrews v. State, 701-82
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
    • 20 Abril 1983
    ..."serious bodily injury," if there was a question or issue concerning the nature of the victim's injuries. Porter, Id.; Hays v. State, 480 S.W.2d 635, 636 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Bowman v. State, 504 S.W.2d 880, 881 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). However, more often than not, it was held not to be error not ......
  • Womble v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
    • 1 Julio 1981
    ...where the same testimony was later admitted without objection. See Wagoner v. State, 402 S.W.2d 738 (Tex.Cr.App. 1966); Hays v. State 480 S.W.2d 635 (Tex.Cr.App. 1972); Preston v. State, 481 S.W.2d 408, 409 (Tex.Cr.App. 1972). See also Hare v. State, 460 S.W.2d 124 (Tex.Cr.App. Lastly appel......
  • Ashley v. State, 50420
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
    • 23 Septiembre 1975
    ...it was improper for a trial court to prohibit testimony as to whether or not the victim of an assault 'appeared angry.' Hays v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 480 S.W.2d 635. We have always permitted lay opinions as to the attitude or emotional state of the accused as well as others. Ross v. State, 15......
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