Hays v. Vanek, D006716

• Decision Date: 30 November 1989
• Docket Number: No. D006716,D006716
• Citation: 266 Cal.Rptr. 856,217 Cal.App.3d 271
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: John HAYS, Sr., et al., Plaintiffs, Cross-Defendants, Respondents and Cross-Appellants, v. George VANEK, et al., Defendants, Cross-Complainants, Appellants and Cross-Respondents.

Page 856

266 Cal.Rptr. 856

217 Cal.App.3d 271

John HAYS, Sr., et al., Plaintiffs, Cross-Defendants, Respondents and Cross-Appellants, v. George VANEK, et al., Defendants, Cross-Complainants, Appellants and Cross-Respondents.

No. D006716.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

Nov. 30, 1989.

Certified for Partial Publication ¹

As Modified on Denial of

Rehearing Dec. 27, 1989.

Review Denied Feb. 21, 1990.

Robert J. Hanna, Santa Ana, and Hillyer & Irwin, San Diego, Ronald R. House and Bryans and House, James H. Harmon, Brawley, Anne C. Richardson, San Diego, and Byrd, Sturdevant, Harmon & Pace, Brawley, Gregory W. Wagner and Conrad, Friday & Wager, and Lesley Ann Ash, for defendants, cross-complainants, appellants and cross-respondents.

Michael H. Wexler, Steven Berkowitz and Lindley, Lazar & Scales, San Diego, David W. Waters, Chris J. Allred and Borgerding, Peterson, McGrath, Burnell, Glauser & Waters, El Cajon, Lloyd M. Harmon, Jr., County Counsel, Daniel J. Wallace, Chief Deputy, Lewis P. Zollinger, San Diego, and Barbara Baird, El Monte, Deputy County Counsels, and Suuzen Ty Anderson, Spring Valley, for plaintiffs, cross-defendants, respondents and cross-appellants.

WIENER, Acting Presiding Justice.

This case involves a winding dirt road--Casa de Roca Way--in rural Alpine. Notwithstanding the apparent simplicity of this mundane subject, the controversy over whether this road is public or private--and whether certain of the parties through adverse possession acquired ownership rights to portions of a 50-foot strip through which the road runs--has generated a gargantuan record suggesting, to put it mildly, that the tranquility of this rural hamlet consisting of about 15 homeowners has been materially disrupted. Except for the County of San Diego (County), all the parties to this litigation are neighbors, owning land abutting the roadway. Some homeowners are pleased with the judgment declaring the road is private and with their newly acquired rights to property obtained through adverse possession. The remaining owners, less satisfied with this result, challenge the judgment on a number of grounds.

The satisfied litigants are plaintiffs John and Carolyn Hays, Earl and Alice Wilson, Leroy Wilson and Richard and Nancy Tobin. The appellants are defendants Kenneth and Alice Hittle, Vasa Snorey, John and Linda Egbert, Enrique and Rafaela Ochoa, Kenneth and Betty Copeland, Richard and Rita Quatman, Shirley Strauch, Jack and Saljaque Haydon and George Vanek.

The County prevailed on the Haydons' and Vanek's cross-complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that title to Casa de Roca Way was in the County or in the general public.

For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

History

To fully understand the arguments made by the respective parties it is necessary to briefly sketch the history of ownership and development of property which is the subject of this litigation.

Shortly before 1900, Casa de Roca Way was depicted on government maps as a traveled way which connected the Viejas Valley with the Sweetwater River. The earliest such map is an 1891 Plane Table Survey map which was drawn in that year by E.T. Perkins for the United States Geological Survey (U.S.G.S.). The road was also depicted on a 1903 "Cuyamaca Quadrangle Map" prepared by U.S.G.S. and on a 1955 Soils Map maintained by the County.

The land through which the road passed was patented under the Federal Homestead Law to the following persons: Robert Dockery (1890); Martha Todd (1893); Jonathan Spencer (1895); and Anna Sandin (1900). Later, title to much of the subject land was acquired by Neil Rasmussen who was the predecessor in title to the parties here.

In 1926, Rasmussen subdivided his property by preparing a Shady Brook Arbitrary Office Map depicting hundreds of 110 by 25 foot lots. The map showed the road as a 50-foot strip running through the subdivision on the same course as on the government maps referred to above. (A copy of the map is attached to this opinion as Appendix A.)

Rasmussen staked the lots shown on the Shady Brook Map and advertised them for sale in San Diego newspapers. He used the road to provide access to the subdivision and to show the lots to prospective purchasers. The newspapers in evidence revealed the lots skyrocketed in value from $20 to $50 as a result of Rasmussen's energetic marketing efforts. Parcels were sold by metes and bounds descriptions and the deeds for parcels adjacent to the road generally conveyed property to the edge of the 50-foot strip. Twenty-foot lateral easements perpendicular to the road were referred to in the deeds for the purpose of accessing lots not adjacent to the road. The deeds did not reserve or grant easements for the use of the road itself. One deed, recorded on March 18, 1927, conveyed a 110-by-75-foot parcel from Rasmussen to Frank and Mabel Knight but excepted from it "that portion which is dedicated for road."

In October 1932, Assessor's Map No. 23 was prepared by the County, certified by the Board of Supervisors and recorded. It is virtually identical to the Shady Brook Map and was obviously made from it. It depicts the same lots and road. (A copy of the map is attached to this opinion as Appendix B.)

After some initial marketing success, interest in Rasmussen's subdivision dwindled. Following some 173 conveyances of varying sized parcels, Rasmussen deeded the remainder of the subdivision property by quitclaim deed to Charles Bernard in 1942. By separate quitclaim deeds in 1943 and 1946, Bernard conveyed the property to William Canning who, in 1957, conveyed a substantial portion of the property to John Kynder. For the first time in the Canning to Kynder deed, the 50-foot strip is physically described and reserved as "an easement and right of way for road, pipe lines and utility purposes...." Later deeds, including conveyances to some of the parties in this case, purport to grant easement rights over the 50-foot strip for purposes of accessing the conveyed property.

Developments leading to this litigation

In recent times the road, less than one mile long, has served basically as an access road traveled mainly by residents and their visitors. (A trial exhibit depicting the 50-foot strip and current ownership of most of the surrounding property is attached as Appendix C.) For a short period of time during the 1950's, the road was maintained by a County employee using County equipment. It was unclear who authorized the maintenance.

The area is covered by dense brush and oak trees. The parties' houses are modest structures built in an eclectic manner to suit their individual tastes. Now, Casa de Roca Way begins at the nearest paved road, Alpine Boulevard, and meanders southward up a steep hill, coming to an effective dead end at the top where a gate blocks the entry to Vanek's 40 acres.

In 1983, Vanek found out that in the event he wished to subdivide his 40 acres, he was prevented from doing so because the Subdivision Map Act required the development to be served by a 50-foot-wide public road. Casa de Roca Way was not wide enough.

At Vanek's request Baseline Engineering Co. surveyed the road. The survey (Survey No. 9610) showed the traveled way ran inside a 50-foot-wide easement. Vanek chalk marked out the easement shown by the survey and told his neighbors he planned to remove all of their improvements

within the marks. Obviously Vanek's plans were not well received by his neighbors who had front yards, landscaping, fences and garages within the chalk marks and who believed the property so occupied belonged to them. When Vanek started to implement his intentions by removing some of his neighbors' encroachments, those neighbors sought an injunction and this case ensued.

Pleadings and Trial

The action split the neighbors into two groups: the defendants owning no property within the chalk marks who did not object to a 50-foot-wide road, and the plaintiffs, owning property within the chalk marks who were unwilling to give up their land for Vanek's benefit. Plaintiffs sought to quiet title to the parts of their front yards that fell within the 50 foot easement and to enjoin Vanek from taking further action to widen the existing road. Defendants filed various cross-complaints and answers alleging the improvements were "encroachments" on what they thought to be a 50-foot-wide public road. Vanek and Haydon cross-complained against the County for declaratory relief which would allow them to develop and sell their land without complying with the Subdivision Map Act. In a separate action (Superior Court Case No. 555466) entitled George Vanek v. Earl Wilson, Leroy Wilson and Alice Wilson, which has now been consolidated with the primary litigation between the parties, Vanek was temporarily restrained from walking in front of the Wilsons' homes and from harassing and annoying them.

In a court trial the principal case was tried in two phases. The court first tried Vanek's cross-complaint against the County, granting a nonsuit on Vanek's eleventh cause of action in which he sought a judgment declaring his 40 acres became a "subdivision" in the 1920's and that he could now develop and sell this "subdivision" without complying with the Subdivision Map Act.

The second phase encompassed all evidence as to the character and width of the road. The plaintiffs' case-in-chief to establish their title by adverse possession was followed by the defendants' case-in-chief principally devoted to proving the 50-foot-wide easement had been dedicated to public use and thus could not have been acquired by adverse possession.

At the conclusion of the evidence and after reviewing the parties' written objections and proposed changes, the court rendered a lengthy statement of decision. That decision excludes several tort claims for nuisance, trespass, emotional distress, etc. which the court said the parties could pursue at a...