Hayslip v. Wellford

• Decision Date: 17 July 1953
• Citation: 31 Beeler 621,263 S.W.2d 136,195 Tenn. 621
• Parties: , 195 Tenn. 621, 42 A.L.R.2d 820 HAYSLIP v. WELLFORD et al.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 136

263 S.W.2d 136

31 Beeler 621, 195 Tenn. 621, 42

A.L.R.2d 820

HAYSLIP v. WELLFORD et al.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

July 17, 1953.

Samuel F. Cole and J. E. Madden, Memphis, for plaintiff in error.

Emmett W. Braden, Thomas R. Prewitt, Richard H. Allen, W. Preston Battle, Memphis, Armstrong, McCadden, Allen, Braden & Goodman, Memphis, McDonald, Kuhn & McDonald, Rosenfield, Borod, Fones & Bogatin, Memphis, of counsel, for defendants in error.

BURNETT, Justice.

This was a civil action brought by the plaintiff in error against the defendants, members of the Shelby County Grand Jury for libel. The Grand Jurors, who are the defendants in error, had made a certain investigation and as a result of this investigation filed a report thereof with the criminal judge of Shelby County out of whose court they were working. As a result of this report being filed the plaintiff in error filed a motion to expunge certain portions of the report. The trial judge denied this motion and on appeal, Hayslip v. State, 193 Tenn. 643, 249 S.W.2d 882, certiorari denied by the United States Supreme Court, Hayslip v. Report of Grand Jury of Shelby County, 344 U.S. 879, 73 S.Ct. 176, 97 L.Ed. 681, this Court held that the matter of expunging the questioned report was a matter for the discretion of the trial court and thus denied the motion to expunge.

After the declaration was filed in the instant cause the defendants filed a demurrer which was subsequently amended as well as the declaration and this demurrer was sustained by the trial court. The plaintiff in error has seasonably and duly perfected her appeal.

The essential portions of the alleged libelous statements sued on are quoted in the opinion of Hayslip v. State, supra. The demurrer pleads an absolute privilege. It is based upon the assertion that the defendants, acting officially as a grand jury, presented the document in question containing the objectionable language to the court; that as a result of the official investigation by the Grand Jury into the charges that this amounted to an official, judicial or semi-judicial act on their part; that this being true such act was privileged and the Grand Jurors were not liable civilly for the action that they took thereunder. In this investigation by the Grand Jury the plaintiff had appeared and been sworn as a witness.

Various assignments of error have been made. Principally these assignments contend that the defendants, as Grand Jurors, acted without legal authority in presenting or reporting such matters as they did in this particular to the court, reflecting unfavorably upon the plaintiff, without indicting her or resulting in her indictment. It is argued that such action, being without authority of law, was not a judicial act, and, therefore, the statements involved therein are not entitled to the absolute privilege accorded by law to pertinent statements made in the course of judicial proceedings, and the defendants are not immune from civil liability for their publication. This of course presents the determinative issue in the lawsuit. There are other questions raised such as the right of free speech on behalf of the plaintiff under the State and Federal Constitutions. Const. art. 1, § 19; Const.U.S. Amend. 1. As we view the matter though these questions are not necessary for decision because the question on the right of privilege is absolutely determinative of the lawsuit.

In Hayslip v. State, supra, we reviewed, to some extent, the duties of a Grand Jury in this State. As a result of this is will not be necessary for us now to again review the matter. We think that in view of the duties of the Grand Jury in this State as pointed out in Hayslip v. State, supra, that it naturally follows that they are entitled to the same legal privileges and immunities with respect to their judicial acts as is the judge of the court of which they are a part. This is the holding of many courts. See Turpen v. Booth, 56 Cal. 65, 38 Am.Rep. 48; Phelps v. Dawson, 8 Cir., 97 F.2d 339, 116 A.L.R. 1343; Griffith v. Slinkard, 146 Ind. 117, 44 N.E. 1001; O'Regan v. Schermerhorn, 1946, 50 A.2d 10, 25 N.J.Misc. 1.

It is well settled in all jurisdictions, insofar as we know, that statements made in the course of judicial procedures, relevant and pertinent to the matter involved, are absolutely privileged and cannot form the basis for libel action. This is true irrespective of whether the statements are made maliciously and corruptly. Dyer v. Dyer, 178 Tenn. 234, 156 S.W.2d 445; Independent Life Ins. Co. v. Rodgers, 165 Tenn. 447, 55 S.W.2d 767; Crockett v. McLanahan, 109 Tenn. 517, 72 S.W. 950, 61 L.R.A. 914; Webb v. Fisher, 109 Tenn. 701, 72 S.W. 110, 60 L.R.A. 791; note found in 20 A.L.R. 407. And see host of cases cited in O'Regan v. Schermerhorn, supra, at page 21 of 50 A.2d.

The reasoning of the courts of this State and of other courts behind the rule exempting public officials from the liability in libel actions made in judicial proceedings is stated thus:

'The fact that cases of hardship may arise, and persons who have been defamed in the course of judicial proceedings may be left remediless, is no reason why a wholesome legal principle, founded upon reasons of public policy, should be overthrown. A multitude of instances might be cited where the rights of the individual are required to be sacrificed for the public good.' Crockett v. McLanahan, 109 Tenn. 517, 72 S.W. 950, 953.

And:

'In the imperfection of human nature it is better even that an individual should suffer a wrong than that the general courts of justice should be impeded and fettered by constant and perpetual restraints and apprehensions on the part of those who administer it.' Webb v. Fisher, supra [109 Tenn. 701, 72 S.W. 112].

And again in the Webb case this very pertinent quotation is found:

"There is another class of cases which are absolutely privileged and depend in no respect for their protection upon their bona fides. The occasion is an absolute privilege, and the only questions are whether the occasion existed, and whether the matter complained of was pertinent to the occasion. In this class are embraced judicial proceedings. The proceedings connected with the judicature of the country are so important to the public good, the law holds that nothing which may be therein said with probable cause, whether with or without malice, can be slander, and, in like manner that nothing written with probable cause under the sanction of such an occasion can be a...