Haysom v. Coleman Lantern Co., Inc.

• Decision Date: 12 January 1978
• Docket Number: No. 44163,44163
• Citation: 89 Wn.2d 474,573 P.2d 785
• Parties: , 93 A.L.R.3d 86 Ronald HAYSOM and Gay Haysom, his wife, Appellants, v. COLEMAN LANTERN COMPANY, INC., a Foreign Corporation, Wigwam Stores, Inc., a corporation, and Pay'N Save Corporation, and First Doe, Respondents.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 474

89 Wn.2d 474

573 P.2d 785, 93 A.L.R.3d 86

Ronald HAYSOM and Gay Haysom, his wife, Appellants, v. COLEMAN LANTERN COMPANY, INC., a Foreign Corporation, Wigwam Stores, Inc., a corporation, and Pay'N Save Corporation, and First Doe, Respondents.

No. 44163.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Jan. 12, 1978.

Sullivan, Morrow & Longfelder, Albert Morrow, Kerry D. Kidman, Seattle, for appellants.

Lee, Smart, Cook, Dunlap & Biehl, David L. Martin, Nelson T. Lee, John F. Biehl, Seattle, for respondents.

UTTER, Associate Justice.

Ronald and Gay Haysom appeal from a judgment entered upon a jury verdict in favor of the respondents, Coleman Lantern Company, Pay'N Save Corporation, and Wigwam Stores, Inc., in a products liability case. They assign error to the failure of the trial court to enter a directed verdict against the respondent Coleman, asserting that Coleman's failure to provide sufficient warnings to consumers of the inherent dangers in its product rendered it defective as a matter of law. Appellants also assign error to the refusal of the trial court to give an instruction concerning the Federal Hazardous Substances Act as well as three evidentiary rulings, including the refusal to admit into evidence post-injury labeling changes made by the Coleman Company. We conclude that the trial court's rulings with regard to each of these matters were correct, and affirm.

This case arises as a result of serious injuries suffered by Gay Haysom in a fire which erupted while she was engaged in filling the fuel tank of a Coleman camp stove in the kitchen area of her mobile home on March 26, 1971. The stove in question was purchased by the appellants in 1966 and had been used by both of the Haysoms on numerous occasions without incident prior to the accident here at issue. Mrs. Haysom stated in interrogatories prior to trial that she had lit and filled the stove herself on several occasions. At trial, she admitted having lit the stove and used it, but denied having filled it with fuel herself prior to the date of the accident.

The Coleman stove burns a petroleum product commonly referred to as "white gas," which is delivered to a burner in a vaporized state by means of a generator tube assembly from a fuel tank attached to the stove body. The Coleman Company distributes a form of this fuel, but it is also readily available from other sources. The record does not establish whether the fuel used by Mrs. Haysom on the day of the accident was stored in a can manufactured by the respondent; however, it is clear that Mrs. Haysom had purchased Coleman fuel in the past and was familiar with the warnings and cautions set forth on containers manufactured by the respondent. In addition, she testified to being well aware of the propensities of Coleman fuel.

On the day of the accident there apparently was a power outage in the area of the Haysom home. Mrs. Haysom, having determined to use the Coleman stove to heat her house, went to a nearby storage shed, found the stove, took it inside and placed it on the kitchen counter in the vicinity of the propane range. She then pumped the stove several times and lit the master burner. It remained on for a few moments, then flickered and apparently died out. Believing the stove to be out of fuel, she removed the fuel tank and the connected generator tube assembly from the stove, pulling it back several inches from its connection with the burner so as to leave the generator tube assembly resting within the front panel of the stove. She then went to the shed to obtain additional fuel. While still outside the trailer she transferred some of the stove fuel from its container to a small plastic freezer container. She then returned to the kitchen, unscrewed the fuel tank cap and began to pour fuel from this container into the stove tank. Almost immediately a fire erupted and the appellant was engulfed in flames. As a result of injuries sustained in the fire, she was severely disfigured, suffered loss of movement in portions of her body and other serious injuries.

Appellants sought to prove the fire was a result of one of several asserted defects in the stove, including: design defects resulting in "lingering flames" at various points on the stove after the burners had been shut off; inadequate warnings of the dangers incident to the use of the stove (and, in particular, those dangers associated with lingering flames); and misleading or inaccurate instructions for use. During the course of a six-week trial, conflicting expert testimony was presented as to both the possible circumstances and location in which lingering flames might occur during use of the stove. Conflicting testimony was also presented as to the adequacy of warnings and instructions set forth on the stove and the accompanying instruction brochure, and the probable source of ignition of the fire.

Following the presentation of evidence, the trial court denied appellants' motion for a directed verdict. The jury then returned a verdict, pursuant to written interrogatories, declaring the stove to be not defective. In accordance with instructions accompanying the interrogatories, the jury did not consider such additional issues as proximate cause, damages, or the existence of other defenses. Thereafter the trial court denied appellants' motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or new trial, and granted judgment for the respondents.

At no point in the voluminous record of the proceedings in this case is the precise source of ignition of the fire established. In the absence of a clearly established source of ignition, the question of proximate cause was for the jury. The form of the interrogatories presented prevented the jury from reaching this issue. We address only legal issues relating to the initial question of defects in the product on this appeal.

I

Did the trial court err in refusing to declare the stove defective as a matter of law due to the alleged failure of the Coleman Company to adequately warn the user of dangers associated with it? Washington has for many years recognized the common law negligence principle that a manufacturer is under a duty to warn consumers of hazards associated with the use of potentially dangerous products. Foster v. Ford Motor Co., 139 Wash. 341, 246 P. 945 (1926); Dalton v. Pioneer Sand & Gravel Co., 37 Wash.2d 946, 227 P.2d 173 (1951). The doctrine of strict liability as set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965) has been expressly adopted by this court. Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., 75 Wash.2d 522, 452 P.2d 729 (1969); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash.2d 145, 542 P.2d 774 (1975). It provides that a product may be deemed "defective" and a manufacturer incur liability for failure to adequately warn of dangerous propensities of a product which it places in the stream of commerce. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, comments j and k. These Restatement provisions with regard to warnings have been adopted in this state. Teagle v. Fischer & Porter Co., 89 Wash.2d 149, 570 P.2d 438 (1977); Haugen v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 15 Wash.App. 379, 388, 550 P.2d 71 (1976). Haugen, at page 388, 550 P.2d at page 77 states the rule to be:

(A) manufacturer may be held strictly liable if a plaintiff establishes that a product is unreasonably dangerous, though faultlessly manufactured, when placed in the hands of a user without giving suitable and adequate warnings or instructions concerning the safe manner in which to use it.

It is, however, equally well recognized that a warning need not be given at all in instances where a danger is obvious or known. Shuput v. Heublein, Inc., 511 F.2d 1104 (10th Cir. 1975); Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974); Nelson v. Brunswick Corp.,503 F.2d 376 (9th Cir. 1974); Rindlisbaker v. Wilson, 95 Idaho 752, 519 P.2d 421 (1974); Atkins v. Arlans Dep't Store, 522 P.2d 1020 (Okl.1974); Ewer v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 4 Wash.App. 152, 480 P.2d 260 (1971). See Restatement, supra, § 402A comment j. Those cases in which this court or the courts of other jurisdictions have held products to be defective as a matter of law on the basis of inadequate warnings or labeling have almost uniformly involved dangers which were clearly latent and therefore presented no issue as to the danger being obvious or known. See, e. g., Kritser v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 479 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1973) (malfunction of aircraft fuel tank); Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968) (polio vaccine); Teagle v. Fischer & Porter Co., supra (capacity of flow gauge); Tucson Indus., Inc. v. Schwartz, 108 Ariz. 464, 501 P.2d 936 (1972) (fumes which cause blindness).

Where, as here, the dangers associated with the use of a product cannot be said to be clearly latent, both the question of whether instructions or warnings are adequate to insure safe use of a product, as well as that of whether the dangers involved are so obvious or well known as to eliminate the necessity for detailed warnings, are for the trier of fact.

Virtually any tool on the market today, including the ordinary screwdriver or hammer, may be dangerous to the ultimate user if used in an improper manner or for an unintended use. It is for the jury to determine whether the danger so presented is unreasonable in the absence of some warning or instruction by the manufacturer concerning safety precautions which should be taken to prevent injury.

Haugen v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., supra, 15 Wash.App. at 389, 550 P.2d at 77. See Ewer v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., supra; Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 518 S.W.2d 868 (Tex.Civ.App.1974); Krugh v. Miehle Co., 503 F.2d 121 (6th Cir. 1974); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974); Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., supra; Noel, Products Defective Because of Inadequate Directions...