Haywood v. Briggs
| Decision Date | 31 January 1947 |
| Docket Number | 737 |
| Parties | HAYWOOD v. BRIGGS et al. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
This was a petition for the sale for partition of certain real property in Durham by the surviving children and remaindermen under the will of the late Atlas M. Rigsbee. The proceeding was instituted March 5, 1946.
The property described in the petition was devised by the testator to his daughter Sallie A. Rigsbee for life with remainder in fee, on failure of issue, to the testator's surviving children. These are all parties to the proceeding. Sallie A. Rigsbee died unmarried and intestate September 19 1945.
In this proceeding F. G. Satterfield, J. G. Satterfield and Walker Stone, doing business under the firm name of Satterfield & Stone, were permitted, over objection, to intervene. They filed pleadings alleging that pursuant to certain leases executed to them by Sallie A. Rigsbee on two of the lots described, in 1925 and 1935, renewed in 1944, they had erected two large tobacco auction warehouses (both under same roof), at a total approximate cost of some $73,000, and that by the terms and provisions of these leases they had the right to remove the buildings from these lots at the expiration of the leases or when by devolution of the title the leases were terminated. They asked authority of the court to remove the buildings.
The parties to the original proceeding denied the interveners' right to the buildings on the ground that whatever rights the interveners had under the leases expired at the death of the lessor, that none of the remaindermen was party to either of the leases, and that the buildings were permanent structures and erected with full knowledge and understanding that Sallie A. Rigsbee had only a life estate in the lots leased to them. They further allege that interveners had protected themselves against the contingency of the falling in of the life estate during their term by requiring substantial bonds from the lessor.
It was admitted that interveners used the buildings erected by them on the leased lots as tobacco auction warehouses, known as Liberty Warehouse 1 and 2, during the entire period covered by the leases, and since the death of the life tenant have continued to occupy and use the warehouse during the tobacco marketing seasons of 1945 and 1946. No consent to its use, or waiver of any right by any of the remaindermen was shown. The lease of 1925 was for 15 years with privilege of extension for five years additional. The lease of 1935 was for 10 years, and the lease of 1944 was for five years. The annual rental began with $2800, and the highest was $4280, but the amount was made subject to the varying conditions of the tobacco market.
It was not controverted that the buildings referred to were erected on concrete foundations, with 100,000 feet of floor space partially concrete. It was stated that the buildings covered half a city block.
Each of the leases contained the provision that in consideration of the fact that the lessor had only a life estate in the lots the lessor should give bond in penal sums of $30,000, $5,000, and $35,000, respectively, conditioned upon lessees peaceful occupancy, with further condition that 'if by reason of the death of the lessor during said term, or if for any cause lessees shall be put out of possession of said premises,' the obligation to be in full force.
Judge Frizzelle heard the matter on the appeal from the order of the Clerk permitting interveners to be made parties, and also on the merits as to the rights of the parties under the allegations in the pleadings, and, after finding the facts, adjudged that interveners were proper and necessary parties, and further that the buildings erected by the interveners on the leased lots were trade fixtures and as such the personal property of the interveners, and that they were entitled to remove them within a reasonable time after the death of the life tenant.
The plaintiff and defendants remaindermen excepted and appealed.
Brawley & Brawley, Victor S. Bryant, and Egbert L. Haywood, all of Durham, for appellant.
Fuller, Reade, Umstead & Fuller, Basil M. Watkins, and A. H. Graham, Jr., all of Durham, for appellees.
There was no controversy as to the facts. The question of law presented is whether the lessees of the life tenant, after the death of their lessor, were entitled, as against the remaindermen, to remove the buildings which had been erected by them on the leased premises.
It was provided in each of the leases that all improvements and fixtures placed on the premises by the lessees should remain the property of the lessees, with right of removal, at the termination of the leases whether by expiration of time or by act of law, within a reasonable time. But the remaindermen were not parties to either of the leases and were not bound by any of the terms therein expressed. As to these leases the remaindermen were strangers. There was no privity between the lessees and the present owners of the fee. Upon the death of the life tenant the title to the real property passed by operation of law to the remaindermen unaffected by any leases the life tenant had executed or any agreements she had made with respect thereto. The life tenant could not create an estate to endure beyond the termination of her own estate, nor could the lessees thereafter claim any rights under her leases. Tiffany Real Prop., 3d Ed. 247; Armstrong v. Rodemacher, 199 Iowa 928, 203 N.W. 23; Matter of O'Donnell, 240 N.Y. 99, 147 N.E. 541; Jones v. Shufflin, 45 W.Va. 729, 731, 31 S.E. 975, 72 Am.St.Rep. 848. So that upon the death of Sallie A. Rigsbee, nothing else appearing, the remaindermen were entitled to the immediate possession of the lots described, and also to all structures placed thereon and so attached to the freehold as to constitute a part of the realty.
Recognizing these principles of law, the interveners, the lessees of the life tenant, however, base their claim upon the general principles of law relating to trade fixtures, and contend that under the circumstances of the case the buildings erected by them come within the definition of trade fixtures, and independent of any express agreement the structures were stamped with the character of personal property, and hence removable at their option. They contend that this position is available to them against the remaindermen.
In view of the fact that the buildings here claimed by the interveners consist of two large warehouses under one roof, erected on concrete foundations, with 100,000 feet of floor space, covering half a city block, it is somewhat difficult to conceive of them as personal property, but conceding that under the rule stated by Mr. Justice Story in Van Ness v. Pacard, 27 U.S. 137, 2 Pet. 137, 7 L.Ed. 374, and by virtue of the agreement between the life tenant, lessor, and the lessees, they may be so regarded, it would seem to follow that within the period covered by the leases and during the lifetime of the lessor the lessees would have had the right to remove the buildings from the lots described, if this could have been done without injury to the freehold. Olympia Lodge v. Keller, 142 Wash. 93, 252 P. 121, 52 A.L.R. 795; Davidson v. Crump Mfg. Co., 99 Mich. 501, 58 N.W. 475; Schultz v. Seiler Motor Car Co., 243 Ky. 459, 48 S.W.2d 1068; Pennington v. Black, 261 Ky. 728, 88 S.W.2d 969. But we do not think, under the circumstances of this case, this right can now be maintained against the remaindermen. They were in no wise bound by the leases, and to them the fee-simple unencumbered title to the real property passed under the will of Atlas M. Rigsbee immediately upon the falling in of the life estate. The erections were by those who were strangers to the title as thus devolved and without privity.
The general principles of law relating to the question presented by the appeal in this case have been frequently stated. From 36 C.J.S., Fixtures, s 31, p. 967, we quote: ' In 22 A.J., 744, it was said, 'Where the fixtures are of such a character that, in the absence of any contract on the subject, they constitute, in law, a permanent accession to the estate, it has been held that a tenant for life cannot, by contract with his tenant, so far bind the remainderman as to authorize the removal of such fixtures by his lessee after the termination of the life estate. ' From 1 Tiffany Real Prop., 3d Ed., page 88, we quote: ' And again from the same author, page 247: ...
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