Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Walker
| Decision Date | 29 May 1945 |
| Docket Number | 31750. |
| Parties | HAZEL-ATLAS GLASS CO. et al. v. WALKER et al. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Original proceeding by Hazel-Atlas Glass Company, employer, and London Guarantee & Accident Company, insurer, to obtain a review of an order of revivor and award by the State Industrial Commission in favor of Kathryn Walker, surviving widow of T B. Walker, deceased employee, and Kathryn Walker as guardian and next friend of Joe Lee Walker, and others.
Order sustained.
Syllabus by the Court.
1. The statute, 85 O.S.1941 § 41, which provides 'an award for disability may be made after the death of the injured employee when death results from causes other than the injury' does not purport to violate the cause of action for death from injury nor limit liability therefor contrary to section 7, Art. XXIII of the Constitution, and confers jurisdiction upon the State Industrial Commission to revive a proceeding and to award compensation where the conditions named in the statute exist.
2. Where the cause of death of an injured workman is wholly independent of the injury involved and there is no contention to the contrary, there is presented no issue for determination, but the cause of death stands as an admitted fact.
3. It is only where an employee dies as the result of his injury that the State Industrial Commission is deprived of jurisdiction to make an award in favor of his dependents.
Clayton B. Pierce and Harold Elbert, both of Oklahoma City, for petitioners.
Kerr Catlett, Lambert & Conn, of Oklahoma City, and Randell S Cobb, Atty. Gen., for respondents.
This is an original proceeding in this court brought by Hazel-Atlas Glass Company and its insurance carrier, hereinafter referred to as petitioners, to obtain a review of an order of revivor and an award which was made by trial commissioner of the State Industrial Commission in favor of Kathryn Walker, the widow, and the minor children, including an unborn child of said Kathryn Walker and T. B. (Jack) Walker, deceased.
The facts are not in dispute. On December 5, 1942, T. B. (Jack) Walker sustained a compensable injury which resulted in a total loss of use of his right hand. Petitioner furnished medical attention and made voluntary payments of compensation for a period of some months and thereafter the State Industrial Commission made an order directing a continuance of such temporary compensation. In compliance with this order the petitioners paid further temporary total compensation until September 8, 1943, and filed a motion to suspend further payments and to have the Commission make an award for the permanent partial disability which the said T. B. (Jack) Walker had sustained and which petitioners alleged consisted of the loss of use of his right hand and for which they desired to make payment. While the matter was still pending before the Commission the said T. B. (Jack) Walker departed this life as the result of a ruptured appendix. Thereupon Kathryn Walker, the widow, on behalf of herself and the minor children, including an unborn child of herself and the deceased T. B. (Jack) Walker, filed a motion to revive the proceeding and to obtain an award of the compensation to which the said T. B. (Jack) Walker was entitled. Petitioners objected to the revivor and to the taking of any evidence in connection therewith on the ground that the State Industrial Commission was without jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding or to make the award and that the statutory provision 85 O.S.1941 § 41, which purported to authorize the Commission to entertain such proceeding, was unconstitutional in that it contravened the provisions of sec. 7, Art. XXIII of the Constitution.
The sole issue presented for determination is the constitutionality of the statute cited supra. Petitioners contend that the legislature was without authority to enact the provision of 85 O.S.1941 § 41 which provides: 'An award for disability may be made after the death of the injured employee, when death results from causes other than the injury'--for the reason that sec. 7, Art. XXIII of the Constitution provides: 'The right of action to recover damages for injuries resulting in death shall never be abrogated, and the amount recoverable shall not be subject to any statutory limitation.'
Petitioners argue that since the State Industrial Commission is an administrative tribunal and not possessed of judicial power, therefore it is without authority to determine the cause of death in any case and that such determination must be had in duly constituted courts of law. In support of the contention so made our attention is directed to Adams v. Iten Biscuit Co., 63 Okl. 52, 162 P. 938; Lahoma Oil Co. v. State Industrial Commission, 71 Okl. 160, 175 P. 836, 15 A.L.R. 817, and to a number of decisions where the State Industrial Commission has been held to be an administrative board of limited jurisdiction. None of the decisions cited are in point upon the issue presented for determination, that is, whether or not the statute, supra, is a constitutional exercise of power by the legislature. It is well settled that an act of the legislature will not be declared invalid and void unless it is clearly, palpably, and plainly inconsistent with the terms of the Constitution. See Perry v. Carter, 173 Okl. 267, 48 P.2d 278; Protest of Downing et al., 164 Okl. 181, 23 P.2d 173. The statutory provision here under consideration has been considered in...
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