Hazleton v. Lewis

• Citation: 267 Mass. 533,166 N.E. 876
• Parties: HAZLETON v. LEWIS.
• Decision Date: 08 June 1929
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

267 Mass. 533

166 N.E. 876

HAZLETON

v.LEWIS.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Barnstable.

June 8, 1929.

Appeal from Superior Court, Barnstable County; Louis S. Cox, Judge.

Suit by James B. Hazleton against Ida H. Lewis. Decree for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed.

C. C. Campbell, of Hyannis, for appellant.

Charles C. Paine, of Hyannis, for appellee.

WAIT, J.

This is an appeal from a final decree ordering a conveyance of certain premises in Barnstable, formerly the property of Betsey C. Hazleton, to be made to the plaintiff by the defendant, who is his sister of the half blood. No question of the form of procedure is raised.

Betsey C. Hazleton died in 1915, leaving as heirs at law five children of full age: Julia Ellis, whose residence was then unknown and who has since deceased; Charles H. Warren E., James B., the plaintiff, and Ida H. Lewis, the defendant. Her estate consisted of $66, personal property, and of real estate in Barnstable appraised at $1,200. These were true values in 1915. The real estate is now worth $15,000. She owed a few debts and two mortgages on the real estate. With the expense of her illness and funeral the debts of the estate were $408.48. One Bearse was appointed administrator. The son, Warren E., was a cripple unable to earn or to care for himself. James B. Hazleton before Betsey's death moved into the real estate to care for his mother and his brother Warren. It was agreed among the children, other than Julia, that petition should be made to the Probate Court for leave to the administrator to sell the real estate for $1,200 at private sale for the payment of debts and charges of administration; that from the amount received those debts and charges should be paid, and, in addition, Charles H. Hazleton should be paid his distributive share in the estate, calculated to be $152.96; that distributive share of Julia, $152.96 should be paid to Frank P. Lewis, husband of the defendant, upon an execution to be obtained against her by him for loans due from Julia; that the plaintiff should have the real estate for his distributive share and for caring for Warren during his lifetime, but the title to the real estate should be taken in the name of the defendant who should give a note, secured by mortgage of the real estate, for the amount of money necessary to pay the debts, charges, and the shares of Charles and Julia; and, who when his financial affairs became such that it would be safe for him to take title without interference by his creditors, should on plaintiff's request make conveyance to him subject to the mortgage.

This arrangement was carried out. Leave to sell for $1,200, was granted August 8, 1916. The administrator made a deed of the real estate to Mrs. Lewis for a recited consideration of $1,200 under date of November 3, 1916. By deed of the same date, the plaintiff, and Warren E., reciting consideration of ‘One dollar and other good and valuable consideration’ released with quitclaim covenants to Mrs. Lewis, ‘Each, every and all the entire right, title and interest we now have, may have had or shall ever have, whether as heirs or otherwise, in the real and personal estate of the late Betsey C. Hazleton.’ On the same date, Mrs. Lewis executed a mortgage deed of the real estate to one Hamblin for $825, due in two years with interests at six per cent. payable semi-annually. The administrator obtained the amount of the mortgage, and paid the debts, charges, and distributive share of Charles. He received from the court, on August 4, 1917, leave to deposit $152.96, the share of Julia, in her name in a savings bank where it was attached and eventually applied upon the contemplated execution against Julia. He filed a first and final account in January, 1919, showing receipts of $891, and expenditures of the same amount, which, after notice and hearing, was allowed by decree dated February 25, 1919. The account set out a payment of $83.91 to Mrs. Lewis, not, however, on account of her distributive share; and the administrator filed a release of all claims and demands against the estate signed and sealed by her and her husband, dated November 23, 1916.

The plaintiff lived on the real estate, paid the taxes, insurance and interest on the mortgage, made and paid for some repairs, and furnished a home and care for Warren until the latter's death in October, 1925. Contributions toward Warren's care and support were made by the Town of Barnstable at $2 per week; by a fraternal order, also $2 per week; by the defendant, who sent articles of clothing and small amounts for spending money amounting in all to about $200; and by the plaintiff. The contributions of the defendant were made at Warren's request, communicated to her by neighbors.

In 1919 the plaintiff visited the registry of deeds and learned that the title stood absolutely in the defendant's name. He consulted a lawyer about it, and inquired of the administrator as to his understanding of the agreement. He made written demand on the defendant, July 27, 1925 for a reconveyance to him. She refused, denying that he had any right, claiming that she bought the property in good faith, but offering to sell him one-half ‘very cheap.’ About the time of Warren's death, he again demanded a conveyance, but was again refused. This bill was filed March 1, 1926.

At the time of Betsey's death the plaintiff owed small amounts of money which he could not pay. Some of this indebtedness has been cleaned up; and at the date of the decree, while he still owed bills, the finding was justified that title now would not be taken from him by pressing creditors. The title was taken by Mrs. Lewis rather than by the plaintiff in order to avoid attachment or levies by his creditors.

The plaintiff did not pay the taxes for 1925, after the defendant's refusal to convey, and defendant paid them on demand of the collector of Barnstable. She has paid something for insurance. No payment has been made on the principal of the mortgage. She has never received any distributive share of her mother's estate.

These facts justify findings as follows: The defendant obtained conveyance of the plaintiff's distributive share in his mother's estate and his individual share in her real estate upon her agreement to give a mortgage on the real estate formerly of her mother to facilitate the administration of the mother's estate, and to convey the entire real estate to him, subject to the mortgage, when his financial condition made it safe for him to hold real estate in his own name, if he would furnish a home and support for their brother Warren during Warren's lifetime, and pay the carrying charges of the property, taxes, insurance, interest and repairs. This he has done. On the faith of that agreement Warren has conveyed his distributive share in his mother's estate and his undivided interest in her real estate to the defendant; Charles has accepted $152.96 as his distributive share and only claim against the estate; the defendant's husband has obtained $152.96 due him from Julia; the defendant, although she still remains liable upon the mortgage note for $825, has been relieved from payments of interest upon it, and has been relieved from all except her voluntary contributions to the support and care of her brother Warren; and her mother's estate has been settled in accordance with it.

These findings would support the decree for conveyance by the defendant subject to the mortgage, unless the statute of frauds set up in her answer furnishes a complete defence. That statute is binding in equity as well as at law. It lays down a rule of public policy which must be observed. G. L. c. 203, § 1, provides: ‘No trust concerning land, except such as may arise or result by implication of law, shall be created or declared unless by a written instrument signed by the party creating or declaring the trust or by his attorney.’ There is no writing creating or declaring the trust. The trusts which arise by implication of law are those which result from payment for property either in whole or in aliquot parts of the purchase money, where the title is...