Hazlett v. City of Pine Lawn
| Decision Date | 19 August 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:12-CV-1715 JAR,4:12-CV-1715 JAR |
| Parties | GREGORY HAZLETT, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF PINE LAWN and OFFICER STEVE LOWMAN, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Counts III and IV of Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF No. 7). Count III purports to allege a claim for false arrest and/or false imprisonment against Defendants City of Pine Lawn and Officer Steve Lowman and Count IV purports to allege a claim for malicious prosecution against the City of Pine Lawn and Officer Steve Lowman with respect to Plaintiff's arrest, detention, and prosecution by the State of Missouri.
Defendants assert that Plaintiff's claims in Count III and IV fail because he has not pled an exception to Pine Lawn's sovereign immunity. Defendants also contend that Count III should be dismissed because it is barred by a two-year statute of limitations. Finally, Defendants assert that Counts III and IV against Officer Lowman fail to state a claim because Plaintiff has not alleged facts that, if proven, are sufficient to establish liability. These matters are fully briefed and ready for disposition.
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must view the allegations in the Complaint liberally in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Eckert v. Titan Tire Corp., 514 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Luney v. SGS Auto Servs., 432 F.3d 866, 867 (8th Cir. 2005)). Additionally, the Court "must accept the allegations contained in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party." Coons v. Mineta, 410 F.3d 1036, 1039 (8th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (). While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Huang v. Gateway Hotel Holdings, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1140 (E.D. Mo. 2007).
In the Motion to Dismiss, the City of Pine Lawn claims that Counts III and IV are barred by sovereign immunity. See Mo.Rev.Stat. §537.600.1; Richardson v. City of St. Louis, 293 S.W.3d 133, 136 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009)("Under Mo.Rev.Stat. §537.600, public entities enjoy sovereign immunity as it existed at common law prior to September 12, 1977, unless immunity is waived, abrogated, or modified by statute."); Maune ex rel. Maune v. City of Rolla, 203 S.W.3d 802, 804 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006). "Municipal corporations, such as the City, are 'public entities'entitled to sovereign immunity within the meaning of Section 537.600." Richardson, 293 S.W.3d at 136 (citing Gregg v. City of Kansas City, 272 S.W.3d 353, 358 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008)).
"A municipality has sovereign immunity from actions at common law tort in all but four cases: (1) where a plaintiff's injury arises from a public employee's negligent operation of a motor vehicle in the course of his employment (section 537.600.1(1)); (2) where the injury is caused by the dangerous condition of the municipality's property (section 537.600.1(2)); (3) where the injury is caused by the municipality performing a proprietary function as opposed to a governmental function (State ex rel. Board of Trustees of the City of North Kansas City Memorial Hospital, 843 S.W.2d 353, 358 (Mo. banc 1993)); and (4) to the extent the municipality has procured insurance, thereby waiving sovereign immunity up to but not beyond the policy limit and only for acts covered by the policy (section 537.610)." Bennartz v. City of Columbia, 300 S.W.3d 251, 259 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009).1 None of these exceptions have been pled here.
In response, Plaintiff contends that Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Counts III and IV of Plaintiff's Complaint and Alternative Motion for Leave to Amend ("Opposition"), ECF No. 11, p. 2 (citing Palermo v. Cottom, 525 S.W.2d 758, 762 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Motley v. Dugan, 191 S.W.2d 979, 982 (Mo. Ct. App. 1945)).
As noted by Defendants, however, Palermo and Motley involved individual rather than official or municipal liability. See Palermo, 525 S.W.2d at 762 (); Motley, 191 S.W.2d at 982 (). Plaintiff does not address the case law holding that false arrest and malicious prosecution claims against municipalities are barred by sovereign immunity under Missouri law. See Warren v. City of Wentzville, No. 4:09CV1330 JCH, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87703 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 25, 2010)( that sovereign immunity applies to Plaintiff's claims against the City for malicious prosecution related to the City's "operation and maintenance of its police force, a governmental function"); Oliver, 2006 WL 2505994 at *5 (citation omitted); see also Wilson v. City of Hazelwood, Mo., 530 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1069 (E.D. Mo. 2007)(plaintiff conceded that his claims for false imprisonment and battery were barred by sovereign immunity). These cases applying sovereign immunity to municipalities appear to be applicable, given that Plaintiff has not pled any exception to Mo.Rev.Stat. §537.600.
Plaintiff, however, also contends that the City of Pine Lawn is not entitled to sovereign immunity because there is insurance coverage for Defendants. (Opposition, p. 3 (citing Mo.Rev.Stat. §537.610)). Plaintiff requests leaves to file an Amended Complaint clarifying that there is insurance coverage for his claim.
Plaintiff's Complaint, as currently pled, does not state that his claim falls into any of the exceptions to the sovereign immunity of municipalities. The Court, however, grants Plaintiff's request to file an Amended Complaint and re-plead his claims in Count III and IV against theCity of Pine Lawn. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint within ten (10) days of the date of this Order.
Defendants also assert that the statute of limitations bars Plaintiff's claim for false arrest/false imprisonment against Officer Lowman. Plaintiff's lawsuit was filed in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County on August 23, 2012. Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that his false arrest by Officer Lowman occurred on May 16, 2010. Plaintiff also contends that he was held in the Pine Lawn City Jail for two days and, thereafter, in the St. Louis County Jail for approximately one week. (Complaint, ¶¶21, 22). In other words, Plaintiff alleges that he was imprisoned for approximately nine days, beginning on May 16, 2010. Under Mo.Rev.Stat. §516.140, an action for false imprisonment/false arrest must be brought within two years of the accrual of that cause of action. "[A] cause of action for false imprisonment accrues on the discharge from imprisonment." Stafford v. Muster, 582 S.W.2d 670, 680 (Mo. 1979). Because Plaintiff was released from jail in May 2010 and did not file his claim until August 23, 2012, Defendants contend that his false imprisonment/false arrest claim was time barred.
In response, Plaintiff asserts that Count III is not barred by the applicable statute of limitations.3 Plaintiff contends that the three-year statute of limitations of Mo.Rev.Stat. §516.130 applies to a claim against a police officer acting in his official capacity. (Opposition,p. 4 (citing Lovejoy v. Goodrich, 798 F.2d 1201, 1202 (8th Cir. 1986)).4 Plaintiff claims that because his filed this lawsuit within 3 years of his May 16, 2010 arrest and imprisonment, then his false arrest/imprisonment claim is timely.
In reply, Defendants maintain that Plaintiff's claim against Officer Lowman fails. (Reply, p. 3). If Plaintiff is suing Officer Lowman in his official capacity, then "a suit against a governmental officer 'in his official capacity' is the same as a suit against [the] entity of which [the] officer is an agent[.]" McMillian v. Monroe Cnty., Ala., 520 U.S. 781, 785 (1997)(internal citations and quotations omitted). Thus, Defendants argue that if Plaintiff's false arrest claim against Officer Lowman is against him in his official capacity, then it is barred by sovereign immunity, just as it is against the City of Pine Lawn. (Reply, p. 3). However, if Plaintiff is suing Officer Lowman in his individual capacity, then Mo.Rev.Stat. §516.140 applies and the two year statute of limitations bars Plaintiff's claim for false arrest. (Reply, p. 3).
The Court's analysis depends on whether Plaintiff is suing Officer Lowman in his individual or official capacity. Any claim against Officer Lowman in his individual capacity is clearly barred by the two year statute of limitations. See Mo.Rev.Stat. §516.140. To the extent that Plaintiff alleges a claim against Officer Lowman in his official capacity, the Court's analysis depends upon if Plaintiff files an amended complaint that embraces one of the exceptions to the sovereign immunity of municipalities. Accordingly, the Court orders Plaintiff to file an amended complaint within ten (10) days of the date of this Order clarifying the basis for his theory of liability against Officer Lowman.
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