Head Camp, Pacific Jurisdiction, Woodmen of the World v. Sloss

• Decision Date: 05 December 1910
• Parties: HEAD CAMP PACIFIC JURISDICTION WOODMEN OF THE WORLD et al. v. SLOSS.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

112 P. 49

49 Colo. 177

HEAD CAMP PACIFIC JURISDICTION WOODMEN OF THE WORLD et al. v. SLOSS.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

December 5, 1910

Appeal from District Court, Mesa County; Theron Stevens, Judge.

Action by Mary Sloss against the Head Camp Pacific Jurisdiction Woodmen of the World of the States of California, Colorado Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, Washington, Wyoming and others. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Carnahan & Van Hoorebeke (B. M. Carr, of counsel) for appellants.

Wheeler & Weiser and R. D. Thompson, for appellee.

BAILEY J.

The plaintiff's cause of action is upon an indemnity contract, of date January 2, 1904, denominated a 'Benefit Certificate,' issued by the defendant association to one William J. Bunting, payable upon his death to Mary Sloss, a sister, the beneficiary therein.

Two separate, special defenses were interposed. One, that the deceased came to his death by suicide, within one year after the issuance of the contract, which carries a provision to the effect that if the insured so dies within such period, no benefit whatever shall be paid thereunder; and the other, that the statute of the state of Colorado, in force July 11, 1903, upon which plaintiff relies to recover, despite the foregoing provision of the contract, known as the suicide statute, which in part is as follows: 'From and after the passage of this act, the suicide of a policy holder of any life insurance company doing business in this state shall not be a defense against the payment of a life insurance policy, whether said suicide was voluntary or involuntary, and whether said policy holder was sane or insane' (Laws 1903, c. 119), is unconstitutional and void, as in violation and contravention of the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, because, it is claimed, it infringes and restricts the personal right of a citizen to make a contract for himself, or for the benefit of others, which is neither immoral nor against public policy.

The plaintiff interposed general demurrers to these defenses, which were sustained. The defendants elected to stand by their case as made. By consent, trial was to the court, and upon proofs judgment was for the plaintiff, for eleven hundred dollars, the full amount of indemnity, to review which defendants bring the case here on appeal.

The only questions fairly raised are: First. Is the contract sued upon a policy of life insurance, and, in the absence of allegations and proof of fraud in its procurement, subject to the provision of our suicide statute, since it was issued by a fraternal or mutual association not for profit? Second. Is the statute, for the reasons urged, or for any reason, unconstitutional?

1. This court, speaking through Mr. Justice Hayt, in Chartrand v. Brace, 16 Colo. 19, 26 P. 152, 12 L.R.A. 209, 25 Am.St.Rep. 235, involving a contest over the proceeds of a contract of like character with the one in suit, said:

'The certificate is, in legal contemplation, a policy of life insurance, and to be construed as such. That the amount can only be collected by assessment upon members of the association after due notice of death, and the payment of such assessment is purely voluntary, can make no difference. The association, so far as it is engaged in the business of life insurance, must be treated in law as a mutual life insurance company. The certificate is to be regarded as a written contract, and, so far as it goes, it is the measure of the rights of all parties.'

And again in Supreme Lodge, Knights of Honor, v. Davis, reported in 26 Colo. at page 257, 58 P. at page 596, opinion by Mr. Justice Gabbert, this court said:

'In as far as the insurance feature of the organization is concerned, it is, in effect, a mutual life insurance company, and the general rules governing associations of that character control it in the transaction of this branch of its business.'

That contracts like the one in suit are life insurance policies is, in this jurisdiction, settled beyond recall, and the courts, with great uniformity, have so treated them. Rightfully so because there is no essential difference between the provisions of this contract and those of the ordinary life insurance policy of regular or old line companies. That all life insurance contracts should receive the same construction, and be subject to the same statutory regulation and limitation, unless expressly exempted, must be conceded. The statute in question provides that the act of suicide shall not be a defense to the payment of a life insurance policy, and was directed against such defense in all cases, without regard to the character or class of the company putting forth the contract.

It being once determined that the contract sued upon is in fact a life insurance policy, then the conclusion is irresistible that the bare fact of suicide may not, in the face of the statute, be legally asserted against a suit to recover upon it. For the purpose of its insurance feature the defendant company was and is as much a life insurance company as an old line or regular company, and its contracts of indemnity are just as much life insurance policies as are those of any other company. The statute is clear and specific, and is capable of but one rational construction, namely, that it was the intent and purpose of the Legislature to prevent all companies, of whatsoever kind or character, issuing life insurance contracts, from escaping payment thereon, in the event of death, simply on the ground that the insured committed suicide. There is no exception in behalf of any particular kind of company, either expressed or implied, and manifestly none was intended. No good reason appears for reading into the statute such a limitation or exemption.

At the time this contract was written, and at the time of loss, this statute was the last expression of the Legislature upon the subject, and is controlling as against any prior, if there be such, and we know of none, conflicting legislative expression in reference thereto. The several statutory provisions relied upon by defendants to take this contract out of this statute, were all in force at the time of the former decisions of this court, and they determined, in effect, that notwithstanding them, such a contract is a life insurance policy. These provisions have, and can have, no reference to, or bearing upon, the suicide statute, which is a separate, subsequent, independent and complete enactment in and of itself, and in no sense amendatory of any previous legislative enactment. Neither do they create a limitation upon its application, since by its terms it reaches all...