Head Camp, Pacific Jurisdiction, W.O.W. v. Clapp

• Decision Date: 04 December 1922
• Docket Number: 10398.
• Parties: HEAD CAMP, PACIFIC JURISDICTION, W. O. W., et al. v. CLAPP.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

211 P. 384

72 Colo. 369

HEAD CAMP, PACIFIC JURISDICTION, W. O. W., et al. v. CLAPP.

No. 10398.

Supreme Court of Colorado

December 4, 1922

Error to District Court, Jefferson County; Samuel W. Johnson Judge.

Action by Dora Clapp against the Head Camp, Pacific Jurisdiction Woodmen of the World, and another. Judgment for plaintiff and defendants bring error.

Affirmed.

George P. Steele, of Denver, for plaintiffs in error.

Quaintance, King & Quaintance, of Denver, for defendant in error.

CAMPBELL J.

This action was instituted in the district court of Jefferson county by Dora Clapp, the widow of Anson Clapp, deceased, to recover as a beneficiary of a life insurance policy, which was issued to Anson Clapp by the Head Camp, Pacific Jurisdiction, Woodmen of the World, a fraternal society.

The issuance of this policy, in which the plaintiff was named as beneficiary, is conceded. It was competent for the insured, by observing the prescribed rules and regulations of the company, at any time to change the beneficiary. The defense interposed at the trial was that the insured did, in accordance with the insurer's procedure, make a change in the beneficiary, and that the name of Lillian H. Frisby, one of the defendants below, who was the daughter of the insured, was substituted in the policy as beneficiary in lieu of the name of the wife, Dora Clapp.

The plaintiff in her pleadings says that, at the time of the alleged change of beneficiary, the insured was mentally incapable of comprehending the nature of his act, and that Lillian H. Frisby exerted an undue influence with her father in securing herself to be the substituted beneficiary.

The allegations of the complaint were denied, and the main defense of the defendant, as to the alleged change of beneficiary, being traversed in the replication, the issues of fact thus joined were submitted by the court to a jury, which returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and to review the judgment rendered thereon the defendants are prosecuting this writ of error.

In the brief of counsel for plaintiffs in error their position here is thus stated:

'Let it be said at the very outset that this is not a case brought here to have a conflict of testimony reviewed; there was no conflict of testimony at the trial. Rather, the case presents undisputed testimony, and the question is whether it was legally sufficient to sustain the judgment.'

It thus appears from this and other statements in the briefs of plaintiffs in error that their counsel admit, if there is a substantial conflict in competent testimony bearing on the issues, that it is the province of the jury to determine the facts. They say that to this rule there are several exceptions, one of which is that where it appears that the verdict is so manifestly against the weight of the testimony that it must have been the result of passion or prejudice, or where there is no legal testimony whatever to support the verdict.

We cannot admit the claim of plaintiffs in error that there is no such substantial conflict in the evidence. Indeed, there were a number of witnesses, who, after stating the facts which they had observed as to the condition of the insured, at and about the time there was an attempt made to change the beneficiary, gave it as their opinion that the insured was not mentally competent to appreciate the nature of his act, and that he was not capable of transacting any business. Testimony directly in conflict was given by a number of witnesses for the defendants, who say that at the time in question the insured's mind seemed clear and that he was competent to transact business.

The plaintiff's witnesses, who were well acquainted with the insured and who were with him during the time in question testified that he was a very...