Head v. State
| Decision Date | 17 October 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 41019,41019 |
| Citation | 253 Ga. 429,322 S.E.2d 228 |
| Parties | HEAD v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Carl Greenberg, Atlanta, for Raymond Head.
Lewis R. Slaton, Dist. Atty., Richard E. Hicks, Asst. Dist. Atty., Atlanta, for the State.
Raymond Head was convicted of armed robbery and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
The evidence at trial revealed that Arthur Wilson had picked up a hitchhiker, who threatened him with a pistol and robbed him of his wallet and other personal property. Later, an anonymous telephone caller told Wilson that Raymond Head was the person who had robbed him. Reporting this to the police, Wilson subsequently picked out a picture of Head from seven photographs. A week later, Wilson's wallet was returned to him through the mail.
Both counts of the indictment were dependent exclusively upon Wilson's testimony as to the identity and conduct of Head. However, three prior felony convictions (aggravated assault and armed robbery) were admitted, over objection, to establish that Head was a convicted felon.
Head relies upon the holding in Panzavecchia v. Wainwright, 658 F.2d 337 (5th Cir.1981), for his contention that the admission of three prior convictions deprived him of his right to a fair trial under the Fourteenth Amendment. We granted certiorari to determine whether the trial court was required to sever the two offenses for trial.
1. In Panzavecchia, a defendant was convicted of first degree murder and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon--the prior conviction being for counterfeiting. On a federal habeas corpus writ, a district court in Florida found that the denial of the motion to sever resulted in the admission of irrelevant and prejudicial evidence which violated the defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial. The court of appeals affirmed, finding the trial procedure fundamentally unfair, and hence violative of due process. 658 F.2d at 341.
Holding that the counterfeiting conviction was totally immaterial to the murder charge, it concluded that "the only purpose it served was to show bad character and propensity to commit a crime," that "the jury heard repeated references to the defendant's criminal past without any limiting instructions to relate this evidence only to the firearm violation and to disregard it altogether in considering the murder count;" and that "this prejudice rose to such a level as to make the petitioner's trial fundamentally unfair and in violation of the fourteenth amendment." 658 F.2d at 341.
* * *
This court, of course, is not bound by the conclusions which the trial or intermediate courts of the federal system might reach relative to whether circumstances of criminal prosecutions are "fundamentally unfair" in a due process sense. Nonetheless, the exigencies of a proper and mutual respect draw us to careful consideration of conclusions such as those expressed in Panzavecchia. Further, we must acknowledge that while this court is not bound by the rulings of the federal court of appeals for our circuit, the citizens of this state, including prison officials, are most assuredly bound by the orders emanating from such rulings. We will therefore examine the circumstances of this case in the light of Panzavecchia, but seeking our own conclusions.
2. We have noted above that the only evidence linking Head to the event described by Wilson is the testimony of Wilson. Having reviewed the record, we are satisfied that although Head's conviction is based upon the testimony of one witness only, the evidence is sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
Nonetheless, there being no corroboration to Wilson's testimony, it cannot be said that the evidence of Head's guilt is overwhelming. That being the case, introduction of three prior convictions of similar type offenses might easily be seen by a jury as bolstering Wilson's testimony, when, in fact, they have nothing to do with any element of the robbery charge, except the forbidden (albeit perhaps the most illuminating) realm of character and propensity for violent crimes.
OCGA § 24-9-20(b) provides, in part, that while a defendant may be sworn,
The circumstances of this case seem to create a contradiction between these adjacent principles. Head did not put his character in issue, but his prior convictions were alleged in the indictment charging possession.
There were no limitations imposed by the trial court as to the use to which the jury properly might put the evidence of prior convictions, and hence no "cure" (if, indeed, limiting instructions can ever be curative in fact ) of the perceived harmful effect of the prior convictions upon the robbery count. Under the circumstances of this case, where the prior convictions were not legally material to the robbery charge, and were admitted without limiting instructions, we cannot say with certainty that Head's conviction for robbery was not unduly influenced by evidence of his prior criminal record. Accordingly, the robbery conviction must be reversed, and a new trial ordered. 1
3. We now undertake to formulate for the guidance of trial courts a procedure which we believe will protect the rights of the accused, and at the same time see to the admission of...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Walker v. State, No. S06P0992.
...regarding the jurors' abilities to consider all of the three sentences authorized under Georgia law). 31. See Head v. State, 253 Ga. 429, 431-432(3), 322 S.E.2d 228 (1984), overruled in part on other grounds, Ross v. State, 279 Ga. 365, 368(2) n. 17, 614 S.E.2d 31 (2005) (if charge of posse......
-
Poole v. State, S12A0662.
...of a firearm by a convicted felon might serve as the underlying felony supporting a felony murder conviction. Head v. State, 253 Ga. 429(3a), 322 S.E.2d 228 (1984), overruled on other grounds in Ross v. State, 279 Ga. 365, 368 n. 17, 614 S.E.2d 31 (2005). [291 Ga. 851]3. Appellant complains......
-
Smith v. State
...the court's failure to give limiting instructions concerning the other crimes at the time they were introduced, citing Head v. State, 253 Ga. 429, 322 S.E.2d 228 (1984); that the charge given by the court at the close of evidence was inadequate concerning "like acts"; and that the court fai......
-
Ross v. State, S05A0748.
...170, 171-172, 336 S.E.2d 246 (1985) (no error to refuse to accept proffered stipulation as to prior guilty plea); Head v. State, 253 Ga. 429, 432(3)(b), 322 S.E.2d 228 (1984) (stating in dicta that a curative instruction would be sufficient to avoid harm from admission of prior conviction);......
-
Criminal Law and Procedure: a Two-year Survey - James P. Fleissner
...Sec. 16-8-1 (1996). 324. Id. 325. 265 Ga. 138, 454 S.E.2d 482 (1995). 326. Id. at 138, 454 S.E.2d at 484. 327. Id. 328. Id. 329. Id. 330. 253 Ga. 429, 431-32, 322 S.E.2d 228, 232 (1984). 331. Id. at 431, 322 S.E.2d at 231. 332. Id.at 432, 322 S.E.2d at 232. 333. Jones, 265 Ga. at 139-40, 45......