Headington v. Woodward

Decision Date27 September 1919
Docket NumberNo. 20188.,No. 20187.,20187.,20188.
Citation214 S.W. 963
PartiesHEADINGTON v. WOODWARD et al. (two cases).
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Appeal from Circuit Court, Audrain County; Ernest S. Gantt, Judge.

Actions by Joel A. Headington against Susan Woodward and William D. Woodward, and against Susan Woodward and A. G. Woodward. From judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

R. D. Rodgers and Fry & Fry, all of Mexico, Mo., for appellants.

E. L. McCall, of Fulton, and McBaine, Clark & Rollins, of Columbia, for respondent.

BROWN, C.

These two cases involve substantially the same questions of law and fact. They were tried together in the circuit court and were submitted by agreement in this court upon a single record as one appeal, and will be so considered. During the pendency of this appeal, the plaintiff has died, and the cause has been revived in this court in the name of Mary Gregory and Utie McCall, his only children and heirs, as plaintiffs. The defendant Susan Woodward has also died, and the cause has been revived as to her in this court in the name of William D. Woodward, A. G. Woodward, and Carol Woodward, her only children and heirs, to stand in her stead as defendants.

All said parties by their respective counsel have entered their appearance.

The cause was instituted in the Audrain circuit court on May 4, 1915, by petition in which the original plaintiff states, in substance:

That he was married to Margaret B. Rodman February 27, 1871, and continued to live with her as her husband until the 30th day of December, 1914, when she died without leaving any children or other lineal descendants. That in 1903 she became the owner of the two lots in the city of Mexico in said county involved in this suit. That in 1897 she made a will in which she gave to her husband, the plaintiff, one-half of all property, real, personal, and mixed, that she should own at her death, subject to the payment of her debts, and, after some minor bequests of personal effects and $250 in money to distant relatives, she gave the remaining half to her sister the defendant Susan Woodward. Upon her death the will was duly probated, and the public administrator appointed administrator of her estate with the will annexed.

That in February, 1910, she made two quitclaim deeds purporting to convey the two lots in question respectively to her nephews, defendants A. G. Woodward and William D. Woodward, sons of the defendant Susan Woodward. That neither of said deeds was delivered to the grantee therein named during her lifetime, and that both were recorded on January 2, 1915, after the death of the grantor.

That at the time of the making of these deeds her mind was so impaired from causes stated that she was unable to transact business and to understand and appreciate the nature of her acts. That her sister, the defendant Susan, was her constant companion and controlled her and procured the execution of these deeds by undue influence over her while in such condition.

It also charges that the plaintiff had no knowledge of the making of these deeds, that neither of the grantees therein paid any consideration therefor, and that they were made for the sole purpose of defeating the marital rights of plaintiff, of which purpose the grantees named therein had full knowledge at the time and participated therein.

The prayer which, like the body of the petition, was expressed in great detail, asked that the respective deeds be declared fraudulent and void because, among other reasons, they were in fraud of the marital rights of plaintiff under the statutes; that the plaintiff be adjudged the owner in fee of the undivided half of each of the lots; and that partition be made accordingly.

The answer in each case was a general denial. The trial court found, upon the issue of mental capacity of the grantor, in favor of the defendants.

It further found, In substance, that the deeds were made for the purpose of defeating the marital rights of her husband by retaining the possession and entire beneficial use of the property during her life, and transferring the same to her nephews only after her death, and that the grantees knew of its purpose and participated in and aided its execution; that to accomplish it the deeds were, by arrangement between them made at the time of their execution, withheld from record during her lifetime; and that she during all that time remained in sole possession and enjoyment of the property and concealed the execution of the deeds from her husband, so that his first knowledge of the transaction came to him from the record after her death, and that the transaction was a present gift only in form, while in fact it was an attempt to make a testamentary gift which would take effect at her death in fraud of the marital rights of her husband. In pursuance of this finding, the court set aside the deeds as to an undivided half of the property they purported to convey in each case, and ordered the partition of the land accordingly.

There was no substantial difference as to the facts in evidence upon which the court made its finding.

Mr. and Mrs. Headington were elderly people; Mr. Headington being, at the time of the trial on July 3, 1916, 77 years old, and Mrs. Headington seems to have been about the same age. They were married in 1871; Mr. Headington being then a widower with two children, the present plaintiffs Mrs. McCall and Mrs. Gregory. At the time of the marriage, Mr. Headington was living in a house in Mexico which had belonged to his first wife, and was subject to a mortgage which, with accumulated interest, amounted to about $1,000. This sum was advanced by Mrs. Headington's father for the purpose of acquiring the title to the property in the name of the new Mrs. Headington. Mr. Headington was then, and continued to be during his lifetime, a preacher, as he describes it, and was also engaged, to some extent, in literary pursuits. He was also, as shown by the evidence, something of a trader. When Mrs. Headington's father died, she received $3,000 from his estate, and this seemed to grow under her husband's manipulation so that at one time on closing out his land transactions she received $7,000 as her share of the proceeds. Some difference seems to exist between the parties as to the value of her holdings at the time of her death which occurred in December, 1914; the plaintiff placing it at $7,300 including the value of the lots in question, which they placed at $1,700, while the defendants placed the value at about $12,000. The first of these estimates seems to be nearer the true value, although, in the view we take of the case, this is of little consequence.

On February 2, 1904, Mrs. Headington executed to her sister Mrs. Woodward her note for $1,500 with 8 per cent. interest. After Mrs. Headington's death, this note, upon which no interest had been paid was presented by Mrs. Woodward to the probate court for allowance against her estate and was disallowed on the ground that it was without consideration. No appeal was taken from this order.

Both the deeds in question here were written in the office of Mr. W. W.Fry, who was Mrs. Headington's relative as well as her attorney and advisor. They were written by his son Wallace Fry, also a lawyer, in his office. The only testimony relating to the circumstance of their execution is their relation of the facts as witnesses for their client Mrs. Woodward, which is substantially as follows:

The elder Mr. Fry testified that Mrs. Headington came to his office on the day they were prepared and told him she wanted to make a little provision for these nephews; that their mother was a widow and invalid; that she thought Mr. Headington was very ungrateful; that she had given him a hundred acres of land in Kansas and he now objected to joining in the two deeds to the boys. Mr. Fry said: "Mrs. Headington, you can make these deeds and convey the land without having him join in them; that will pass title." She said she did not know that, and he explained to her that she had the right under the present law. She said: "I want the deeds drawn up right away." He got the descriptions from her and called his son to draw the deeds, which she acknowledged. Then she said: "Do these deeds have to go on record?" Mr. Fry said: "Not necessarily. They are good without it." She said: "Well, I would prefer them not going on record, because Mr. Headington would see them and make a fuss about them. She did not exact any promise not to put them on record." Mr. Fry then told her that the deeds would have to be delivered to the boys and she said all right. A few days afterwards he called in Gip Woodward and delivered to him the deeds and said to him: "Mrs. Headington requested that you not put them on record, but you can do as you please about it; put them on record or not." He took them.

Mr. Wallace Fry testified, with reference to the same transaction, that when the deeds were prepared and left in their office by Mrs. Headington—

"she said that she would prefer that they wouldn't put them on record until after her. death because she had tried to get Mr. Headington to join in the deeds to the boys and he had refused, and she was afraid he would suppose it wrong and object; to it rather strenuously and cause them a lot of trouble, and she would rather they would not put them on record."

The witness says that he handed the deeds to Gip Woodward after repeating to him this statement of Mrs. Headington.

Mr. Headington testified that his wife never informed him or consulted him about these deeds, and that he continued to look after the property for her, attending to the building of the house on one of the lots, and that he himself paid of his own funds about $90 for plumbing. It is stated in the testimony of both parties that Mrs. Headington continued to collect the rents up to the time of her death.

I. The original plaintiff, Joel A. Headington, claimed an undivided one-half...

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  • Wahl v. Wahl
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
    • December 8, 1947
    ...v. Tucker, 29 Mo. 350; Tucker v. Tucker, 32 Mo. 464; Rice v. Waddill, 168 Mo. 99, 67 S.W. 605; Dyer v. Smith, 62 Mo. App. 606; Headington v. Woodard, 214 S.W. 963; Hach v. Rollins, 158 Mo. 182, 59 S.W. 232; Weller v. Collier, 199 S.W. 974; Merz v. The Bank, 130 S.W. (2d) 611, 344 Mo. Maddox......
  • Clark v. Skinner
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    • United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
    • April 19, 1934
    ...175 S.W. 625; 18 C.J. 205. (3) The deeds were not testamentary in character. Tillman v. Carthage, 247 S.W. 992, 297 Mo. 74; Headington v. Woodward, 214 S.W. 963; Burkey v. Burkey, 175 S.W. 625; 28 C.J. 622. (4) The court did not err in finding that the grantor in the deeds was of sound mind......
  • Clark v. Skinner
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    • United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
    • April 19, 1934
    ......625; 18 C. J. 205. (3) The deeds were. not testamentary in character. Tillman v. Carthage, . 247 S.W. 992, 297 Mo. 74; Headington v. Woodward, . 214 S.W. 963; Burkey v. Burkey, 175 S.W. 625; 28 C. J. 622. (4) The court did not err in finding that the grantor. in the deeds ......
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    • United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
    • November 14, 1949
    ...interest in the property is "Dower." Sec. 324, R.S. 1939; Waddle v. Frazier, 245 Mo. 391; Ferguson v. Gentry, 206 Mo. 189; Headington v. Woodward, 214 S.W. 963; Strock v. Eagle, 48 S.W.2d 851. (3) share in the property, for which he sued, attached when he married. It vested then contingentl......
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