Heal v. Heal

• Decision Date: 01 December 2000
• Docket Number: No. 98-577-Appeal.,98-577-Appeal.
• Citation: 762 A.2d 463
• Parties: Astrida HEAL v. Stephen HEAL.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

762 A.2d 463

Astrida HEAL v. Stephen HEAL.

No. 98-577-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

December 1, 2000.

Present WEISBERGER, C.J., LEDERBERG, BOURCIER, FLANDERS, and GOLDBERG, JJ.

Carol A Zangari, Providence, for Plaintiff.

James J. Lepore, Providence, Amy R. Tabor, Edward P. Nolan, Jr., Lauren E. Jones, Providence, Michael T. Eskey, John DiMeglio, North Providence, for Defendant.

OPINION

GOLDBERG, Justice.

This case came before this Court on an appeal from a Family Court decision imposing a monetary sanction upon the defendant's attorney based on a finding by the trial justice that counsel filed and litigated a frivolous counterclaim in which the defendant sought custody and physical possession of his minor children.

Facts and Travel

In the decision pending entry of final judgment in this divorce matter, the trial justice made the following findings of fact: Mr. Stephen Heal (husband or defendant) and Mrs. Astrida Heal (wife or plaintiff) were married in the State of Rhode Island on November 13, 1974. The plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce in Kent County Family Court on October 24, 1996. There were five children born of the marriage, three of whom were minors at the time the complaint was filed, Christopher, born September 11, 1982; Michael, born April 7, 1989; and Adam, born September 10, 1993.

Throughout the course of the marriage, plaintiff was employed as a school teacher in the Providence school system. The trial justice found that plaintiff was the nurturing parent and primary caretaker for the parties' five children and that, at all times, she conducted herself as a fit and proper parent and a faithful wife, performing all the obligations of the marriage covenant. She also provided for the husband throughout his many years of alcoholism.

The trial justice found that in addition to the husband's long history of alcohol abuse, he was unable to hold a job and he participated in extended periods of emotional abuse toward his two older children. This abuse alienated the children and caused them to fear the possibility of their father's obtaining custody of their younger brothers. The trial justice also found that the husband's failure to exercise visitation with his younger children throughout the long divorce proceeding is continuing evidence of his failure to put the best interests of his children first. Finally, the trial justice found that husband's efforts to obtain custody of his children were,

"totally lacking in good faith and that his purposes in pursuing this issue have been to pressure Mrs. Heal into some sort of settlement favorable to the defendant and to make good on his threat to make the plaintiff's life `a living hell' for initiating these proceedings. The Court further finds Mr. Heal's actions in this regard have wasted substantial Court time and caused the plaintiff to expend unnecessary legal expenses, thereby wasting an already financially overburdened marital estate. His lengthy pursuit of this issue is hereby found to be frivolous."

Despite such an abuse of process, resulting in the further waste of marital assets, the trial justice found that husband had no ability to pay wife's counsel fees.

However, based upon these findings, the trial justice, sua sponte imposed monetary sanctions upon husband's attorney, Edward P. Nolan, Jr. (Nolan). The court found that counsel failed to make a reasonable inquiry into whether there were sufficient grounds to support the husband's attempt to gain custody and physical possession of the children. Further, the court found that counsel "should have known" that husband's attempt at obtaining custody of the children was made in bad faith and would result in a waste of the court's time as well as a waste of the already sparse marital estate. It is the imposition of these sanctions from which Nolan seeks our review. Several issues have been raised in Nolan's brief, as well as the briefs submitted by the various amici curae.¹ We shall discuss those issues that we deem central to this appeal.

Discussion

The authority upon which the trial justice relied when imposing sanctions consists of Rule 11 of the Family Court Rules of Procedure for Domestic Relations (Family Court Rule 11) and G.L.1956 § 9-29-21. In this case we are called upon to interpret and clarify Rule 11² and we shall thereupon review the history and development of the rule. Family Court Rule 11 is identical to the original version of Rule 11 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure (Superior Court Rule 11) that was modeled after the 1938 version of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Rule 11). Since 1938, Federal Rule 11 has been significantly revised on two separate occasions, once in 1983, and then again in 1993. In 1995, Superior Court Rule 11³ was revised to more closely resemble the 1983 version of the Federal Rule. However, Family Court Rule 11 has never been amended or changed, and continues to follow the 1938 version of the Federal Rule.

This Court has stated that where the Federal rule and our state rule are substantially similar, we will look to the Federal courts for guidance or interpretation of our own rule. Smith v. Johns-Mansville Corp., 489 A.2d 336 (R.I.1985); see Nocera v. Lembo, 111 R.I. 17, 20, 298 A.2d 800, 803 (1973)

; Giarrusso v. Corrigan, 108 R.I. 471, 472, 276 A.2d 750, 750 (1971). For these reasons, Federal precedent offers significant guidance, particularly with respect to the rule's due process considerations.

Family Court Rule 11 and G.L.1956 § 9-29-21

We shall first discuss the issue of whether the finding made by the trial justice that Nolan knew or should have known that husband's claim for custody was not made in good faith comports with the subjective good faith standard of Family Court Rule 11. Nolan has also challenged whether § 9-29-21 provides a lawful basis for the imposition of sanctions by the trial justice. It was argued that the standard under § 9-29-21⁴ is one of objective reasonableness that is in direct conflict with the subjective good faith standard that the Family Court Rule 11 encompasses, and therefore cannot be the basis for the sanctions ordered here.

It is well established that in situations in which a statute and a rule approved by the Rhode Island Supreme Court are in conflict, the court rule prevails. G.L.1956 § 8-6-2(a); G.L.1956 § 8-1-2; Berberian v. New England Telephone and Telegraph Co., 114 R.I. 197, 330 A.2d 813 (1975); Rhode Island Bar Association v. Automobile Service Association, 55 R.I. 122, 179 A. 139 (1935). The statute is unaffected by the rule when each deal with entirely different types of conduct. In re Rhode Island Bar Association, 106 R.I. 752, 762, 263 A.2d 692, 697 (1970). We have often held that the Legislature can act "in aid of" the court's jurisdiction over the practice of law. Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee v. State Department of Workers Compensation, 543 A.2d 662, 664 (R.I. 1998); In re Rhode Island Bar Association, 106 R.I. at 760-64, 263 A.2d at 696-98. Accordingly, § 9-29-21 creates a remedy that can be used by the courts of this state to deal with pleadings that are not objectively reasonable.

In Forte Brothers, Inc. v. Ronald M. Ash & Associates, 612 A.2d 717 (R.I.1992), we had occasion to consider whether an objective standard of reasonableness was applicable in the original version of Superior Court Rule 11 and we noted that Superior Court Rule 11 had not yet been amended and "[t]herefore, the subjective standard remain[ed] applicable in determining whether the pleadings are in fact violative of the pleading process." Forte Brothers Inc.,612 A.2d at 724. "A claim is not made in `bad faith' so as to shift the burden of costs so long as the claim has some legal and factual basis when considered in light of the reasonable belief of the individual making the claim." Id. (quoting Quill Co. v. A.T. Cross Co., 477 A.2d 939, 944 (R.I.1984)). Thus, so long as the pleader has a good faith belief that the pleading has some merit in light of the facts and circumstances known at the time, and that it was not interposed for delay, the imposition of sanctions is improper. See D'Amario v. State, 686 A.2d 82, 85 (R.I.1996)

.

We are satisfied that Family Court Rule 11 can be analogized to our holdings in D'Amario and Forte Brothers and that the subjective standard of the rule remains applicable. We are also satisfied that the rule and the statute are not in direct conflict with each other, the primary difference being that the rule applies a subjective good faith standard where the statute applies an objective reasonableness standard. Although good faith and honesty is required in every pleading in Family Court, § 9-29-21 mandates that the pleader make a reasonable inquiry that the claim is "well grounded in fact" and is "warranted by existing law." Clearly, the subjective belief of the person making the claim is not sufficient under the statute and an additional duty of good faith investigation obtains.

Family Court Rule 11 provides that "[f]or a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action," this language is limited to willful and knowing misconduct. Rather, under Rule 11, the filing of a claim that the attorney knows is frivolous or intended for delay is a willful violation of the rule. Similarly, a claim for which there is no reasonable legal or factual basis that is filed nonetheless constitutes a willful violation of the rule.

Accordingly, the statute in conjunction with the rule permit the Family Court to deal with a full range of inappropriate conduct by a litigant or counsel. For these reasons, § 9-29-21 need not give way to the rule. In this case the trial justice specifically found as follows:

"The Court finds that defendant's counsel failed to make reasonable inquiry as to whether defendant's allegations were supported by sufficient grounds and that they were not interposed for the...