Healdsburg Police officers Assn. v. City of Healdsburg

• Decision Date: 23 March 1976
• Citation: 57 Cal.App.3d 444,129 Cal.Rptr. 216
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3234 HEALDSBURG POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. CITY OF HEALDSBURG et al., Defendants and Appellants. Civ. 36325.

Page 216

129 Cal.Rptr. 216

57 Cal.App.3d 444, 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3234

HEALDSBURG POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. CITY OF HEALDSBURG et al., Defendants and Appellants.

Civ. 36325.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 2, California.

March 23, 1976.

Bobert Y. Bell, Santa Rosa, John E. Short, Healdsburg, Teresa de la O, certified law intern, for plaintiffs and respondents.

John A. Klein, City Atty. of Healdsburg, Santa Rosa, for defendants and appellants.

KANE, Associate Justice.

Defendants appeal from a peremptory writ of mandate and orders of contempt issued thereon.

The present action was brought by respondents, the Healdsburg Police Officers Association and its nine individual members, against appellants, the City of Healdsburg, five city councilmen and the city manager. The facts reveal that three city police officers were summarily discharged by appellants on September 16, 1974. On October 3, 1974, the six remaining association members walked off their job in protest of the dismissal of their fellow officers and as a consequence they too were dismissed by the city. After the city refused to hold a hearing in the matter, respondents filed a petition for writ of mandate in the lower court claiming Inter alia that: their discharge without notice and hearing violated several provisions of the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act ('MMB Act') (Gov.Code, § 3500 et seq.); unlawfully interfered with their organizational rights (Lab.Code, § 922); and violated the basic precepts of procedural due process secured by the Constitution.

After a trial and receiving evidence, the court below concluded: that at the time respondents were employed by the city the Healdsburg Police Department Manual ('Manual') explicitly granted the employees of the police department the right to a hearing before dismissal or imposition of other disciplinary measure; that this provision of the Manual became a part of the employment agreement between the city an respondents; and that as a consequence respondents were entitled to reinstatement until they were given an opportunity to be heard in their own defense. In accordance therewith, on October 29, 1974, a peremptory writ of mandate was issued ordering appellants to reinstate respondents to their former employment with back pay. Based upon the peremptory writ, a contempt proceeding was initiated by respondents, at the conclusion of which the city, under threat of sanctions, reinstated the nine individual respondents to their previous positions with back pay as ordered by the court. Appellants filed notices of appeal from both the peremptory writ of mandate and the contempt orders.

Although the rulings of the trial court are being challenged on a variety of grounds, as appellants themselves admit, the key issue on appeal is whether respondents were dischargeable at will without notice and hearing. While appellants maintain that pursuant to statute respondents held their offices at pleasure (Gov.Code, §§ 36505, 36506) ¹ and could be dismissed without cause and without notice and hearing (Bogacki v. Board of Supervisors (1971) 5 Cal.3d 771, 97 Cal.Prtr. 657, 489 P.2d 537; Ball v. City Council (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 136, 60 Cal.Rptr. 139), respondents contend that in the case at bench the right to a hearing attached by virtue of both the regulatory provisions and the constitutional mandate of due process. A careful analysis of the applicable legal principles convinces us that respondents' position is well taken, and as a consequence the rulings of the trial court must be upheld.

It is, of course, a recognized general proposition that a public officer or employee who serves at the pleasure of the appointing authorities may be terminated without cause and without notice and hearing (Bogacki v. Board of Supervisors, supra 5 Cal.3d at p. 782, 97 Cal.Rptr. 657, 489 P.2d 537; Ball v. City Council, supra 252 Cal.App.2d at p. 141, 60 Cal.Rptr. 139; Humbert v. Castro Valley County Fire Protection Dist. (1963) 214 Cal.App.2d 1, 13, 29 Cal.Rptr. 158; Cozzolino v. City of Fontana (1955) 136 Cal.App.2d 608, 611, 289 P.2d 248; Hackler v. Ward (1951) 105 Cal.App.2d 615, 616-617, 234 P.2d 170). To this general rule, however, there are several exceptions. Thus, it is firmly established that even if a public employee serves at the pleasure of the appointing authorities, he may not be dismissed from his employment for the exercise of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights absent a showing that the restraints which the employing body would impose on the aforementioned constitutional rights are justified by a compelling public interest (Bogacki v. Board of Supervisors, supra 5 Cal.3d at p. 778, 97 Cal.Rptr. 657, 489 P.2d 537; Bagley v. Washington Township Hospital Dist. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 499, 503-505, 55 Cal.Rptr. 401, 421 P.2d 409; Rosenfield v. Malcolm (1967) 65 Cal.2d 559, 562-563, 55 Cal.Rptr. 505, 421 P.2d 697), and in such instances the employee is entitled to a pretermination hearing (Board of Regents v. Roth (1972) 408 U.S. 564, 569-573, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548; Perry v. Sindermann (1972) 408 U.S. 593, 599, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570). The right to a hearing must likewise be afforded when a public officer employed at will claims that he was dismissed because he exercised a statutory right to join and participate in the activities of an employee organization (Ball v. City Council, supra 252 Cal.App.2d at pp. 142-144, 60 Cal.Rptr. 139; see also: Fibreboard Corp. v. Labor Board (1964) 379 U.S. 203, 217, 85 S.Ct. 398, 13 L.Ed.2d 233). Finally, the right to a pretermination hearing may be founded on the existence of rules, regulations, understandings or practices, promulgated, fostered and carried out by agency officials (Perry v. Sindermann, supra 408, U.S. at p. 602, 92 S.Ct. 2694; Perea v. Fales (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 939, 114 Cal.Rptr. 808).

In discussing the causes in a reverse order we conclude that under the circumstances here present respondents were entitled to a pretermination hearing on each of the aforestated grounds. First, the Manual, which constituted a part of the department rules and regulations, delegated to the Chief of Police the power to prescribe the rules necessary for the operation of the department. ² The Manual likewise set out that the Chief of Police shall have the control, management and direction over all members of the department with exclusive power to assign any member to any detail within the department or detail them to any public service. Even more significantly, the Manual provided in explicit terms that the employees of the police department were subject to discipline, including dismissal from employment, only for cause and after a hearing. Section 200.5 of the Manual read in part that 'The Police Chief may reprimand, Relieve from duty, punish or suspend from service, Any member of the Police Department for cause in such a manner as is provided by the Police Department Rules and Regulations, Ordinances or Resolutions of the City of Healdsburg and Regulations as may be now or hereafter in force or effect, with the approval of the City Administrator and/or the City Council.' (Emphasis added.) Chapter III, section I of article III, likewise put forth in pertinent portion that 'Every member or Employee of the Police Department, shall be subject to reprimand, suspension, reduction in rank, deduction in pay or Dismissal from the Police Department and from the service of the City, according to the nature of the offense, for violation of any of the rules, regulations or general orders of the Police Department, now in force, or that may be hereafter issued, After having been given an opportunity to be heard in his or her own defense.' (Emphasis added.) It follows that respondents were entitled to a hearing on double grounds: the Manual expressly so provided, and in addition the right to notice and hearing arose as a matter of law from the provision which authorized the dismissal of employees only for cause (cf. Perea v. Fales, supra).

Secondly, respondents properly alleged ³ and adduced evidence at the trial showing that their discharge violated several provisions of the MMB Act which accords public employees the right to join labor organizations (Gov.Code, § 3502; Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1963) 60 Cal.2d 276, 32 Cal.Rptr. 830, 384 P.2d 158) and prohibits public agencies from interfering with the exercise of the organizational and representational rights of their employees (Gov.Code, § 3506; see also Lab.Code, § 922; Ball v. City Council, supra). While failing to make specific findings of fact to that effect, the trial court in its memorandum decision concluded that 'there was substantial evidence elicited at the hearing to support petitioners' contention that their dismissal resulted from their attempt to exercise such (organizational and representational) right.'

Thirdly, as an alternative cause for issuance of the peremptory writ of mandate, it was also claimed that appellants' failure to provide notice and hearing violated respondents' constitutional right to due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. It is now well settled that the requirements of procedural due process apply to the deprivation of liberty and property protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. When protected property interests are implicated, the right to some kind of prior hearing is a constitutional requisite. As emphasized in cases, the property interests which are subject to procedural safeguards are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source, i.e., statute or regulation (Skelly v. State Personnel Bd. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194, 207, 124 Cal.Rptr. 14, 539 P.2d 774; Board of Regents v. Roth, supra 408 U.S. at pp. 569-570, 577 92 S.Ct. 2701; Perry v. Sindermann, supra 408 U.S. at p....