Heard v. Coleman, 73873

Decision Date30 January 1987
Docket NumberNo. 73873,73873
Citation354 S.E.2d 164,181 Ga.App. 899
PartiesHEARD et al. v. COLEMAN.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Lee R. Hasty, LaGrange, for appellants.

Michael C. Smith, LaGrange, for appellee.

McMURRAY, Presiding Judge.

In this appeal, we must determine whether the superior court erred by granting a paternal grandmother's petition for visitation rights after the child was adopted by her stepfather. We think the superior court did err and we reverse.

Plaintiff, who resides in Pennsylvania, is the paternal grandmother of a ten-year-old child. Until recently the child also lived in Pennsylvania with her mother, defendant Wanda Heard. The mother married defendant Joseph Heard. The Heards make their home in Georgia and the child lives with them. The natural father of the child has been serving time in a Pennsylvania prison. He never married the child's mother and he never legitimated the child.

Before the child moved to Georgia, a Pennsylvania court awarded the grandmother "partial custody" of the child on alternate weekends. After the child began living in Georgia, the grandmother filed an action in this State to domesticate the Pennsylvania "custody" decree and to modify the decree to allow for the change of residence of the child. An order was entered in superior court allowing the grandmother to have extended visitation during the summer months and the month of December. Pursuant to the order, the grandmother was to pay the child's travel expenses to and from Pennsylvania.

In the summer of 1985 the visitation privileges awarded to the grandmother were carried out. Then the child was adopted by her stepfather, defendant Joseph Heard. When the grandmother sought to exercise her December visitation rights, the mother refused and the grandmother filed a "motion for contempt, petition to modify and objection to adoption." The mother answered, denying that the grandmother was entitled to relief.

Thereafter, the grandmother amended her petition by requesting visitation rights pursuant to OCGA § 19-7-3 (the "Grandparents' Bill of Rights"). On July 17, 1986, following a hearing, the superior court entered an order granting visitation rights to the grandmother pursuant to that Code section. The mother and adoptive father sought, and we granted, this discretionary appeal. Held:

In pertinent part, OCGA § 19-8-14 provides: "A decree of adoption, whether issued by a court of this state or by a court of any other jurisdiction, shall have the following effect as to matters within the jurisdiction of or before a court in this state: (1) Except with respect to a spouse of the petitioner and relatives of the spouse, a decree of adoption relieves the natural parent(s) of the adopted individual of all parental rights and responsibilities and terminates all legal relationships between the adopted individual and his relatives, including his natural parent(s), so that the adopted individual thereafter is a stranger to his former relatives for all purposes, including inheritance and the interpretation or construction of documents, statutes, and instruments, whether executed before or after the adoption is decreed, which do not expressly include the individual by name or by some designation not based on a parent and child or blood relationship." (Emphasis supplied.)

The grandmother contends that OCGA § 19-8-14 notwithstanding, the superior court properly awarded her visitation rights pursuant to OCGA § 19-7-3. Subsection (a) of that Code section reads: "Whenever any court in this state has before it any question concerning the guardianship of any minor child or whenever one parent dies or whenever one parent dies and the survivor remarries, regardless of whether the minor child is adopted by its stepmother or stepfather, or whenever any court has terminated the parental rights of one of the natural parents of the minor child, the court may, in its discretion pursuant to subsection (b) of this Code section, grant reasonable visitation rights to the maternal and paternal grandparents of the child. Any court granting such rights may issue its necessary order to enforce the grant." (Emphasis supplied.)

The grandmother contends that OCGA § 19-7-3 constitutes an exception to OCGA § 19-8-14. Specifically, the grandmother argues she is entitled to seek visitation because her son's parental rights were terminated in the adoption proceeding. We cannot agree. In Mitchell v. Erdmier, 253 Ga. 335, 320 S.E.2d 163, the Supreme Court made it clear that an adoption "eliminates any claim of right to visitation with the adopted child by a former relative." In so doing, the high court rejected the argument that the "Grandparents' Bill of Rights" is an exception to OCGA § 19-8-14. In the words of the Supreme Court in Mitchell v. Erdmier, 253 Ga. 335, 336, 320 S.E.2d 163, supra: "We do not interpret the code section to have this meaning. To do so would frustrate the apparent object of OCGA § 19-8-14, to sever former relations of an adopted child. The only provision which grants grandparents visitation rights after an adoption is the limited one of the death of one parent, the remarriage of the surviving parent, followed by the adoption of the child by the stepparent. In other adoptions, such as this one, the severance of relationships provision of OCGA § 19-8-14 controls, and no rights of visitation by former grandparents exist." (Emphasis supplied.)

In 1986 the legislature reinforced the Supreme Court's interpretation. Via amendment to OCGA § 19-7-3(c), the legislature made it clear that while grandparents have the right to seek visitation where custody is in issue, no such right exists in an "adoption in which all legal relationships between the adopted child and the adopted child's relatives have been terminated as provided in Code Section 19-8-14." OCGA § 19-7-3(c) (Ga. L.1986, p. 1516).

Since the grandmother's relationship with the child was terminated by the adoption, the grandmother's rights of visitation were cut off. Mitchell v. Erdmier, 253 Ga. 335, 320 S.E.2d 163, supra. See also Sachs v. Walzer, 242 Ga. 742, 251 S.E.2d 302. The superior court erred by awarding visitation rights to the grandmother pursuant to OCGA § 19-7-3.

We recognize, of course, the heartache inherent in this case. After all, the child...

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4 cases
  • Brown v. Coastal Emergency Services, Inc., 73501
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • February 13, 1987
  • Adoption of RDS, Matter of
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • February 23, 1990
    ...Voss v. Ralston, 550 P.2d 481 (Wyo.1976), RDS's adoption cut off the mother's and Appellant's visitation rights. See Heard v. Coleman, 181 Ga.App. 899, 354 S.E.2d 164 (1987); In re W.E.G., 710 P.2d 410 (Alaska 1985); and Bikos v. Nobliski, 88 Mich.App. 157, 276 N.W.2d 541 (1979). The petiti......
  • Murphy v. McCarthy
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • September 3, 1991
    ...to terminate parental rights within the meaning of OCGA § 19-7-3. Mitchell v. Erdmier, 253 Ga. 335, 320 S.E.2d 163; Heard v. Coleman, 181 Ga.App. 899, 900, 354 S.E.2d 164. Moreover, it is clear from their pleadings the McCarthys did not intervene to seek visitation rights, but instead inter......
  • Campbell v. Holcomb, A89A1720
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • November 9, 1989
    ...Compare Mitchell v. Erdmier, 253 Ga. 335, 336, 320 S.E.2d 163 (1984) (decided under the 1980 statute), and Heard v. Coleman, 181 Ga.App. 899, 900, 354 S.E.2d 164 (1987) (decided under the 1986 In the instant case the minor child was adopted by his stepfather, not by a blood relative; thus t......

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