Heard v. Fudge
| Decision Date | 05 March 2014 |
| Docket Number | NO. 5-12-0160,5-12-0160 |
| Citation | 2014 IL App (5th) 120160 |
| Parties | ANGELLA HEARD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROBERT FUDGE and RENALDO JACKSON, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
NOTICE
Decision filed 03/05/14. The text of this decision may be changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for Rehearing or the disposition of the same.
NOTICE
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the
Circuit Court of
St. Clair County.
Judge, presiding.
¶ 1 Held: The trial court erred by not entering judgment notwithstanding the verdict against defendant Fudge on the issue of liability.
¶ 2 Plaintiff, Angella Heard, filed suit against defendants, Robert Fudge and Renaldo Jackson, the drivers in the two-car accident in which she was a passenger. After a jury trial in St. Clair County, the circuit court denied Heard's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or in the alternative for a new trial and entered judgment on the verdict. On appeal, Heard raises the issues of whether the trial court erred by not entering a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and abused its discretion by not ordering a new trial.
¶ 4 This litigation derives from a two-vehicle traffic accident. One vehicle was a Chevrolet Impala driven by Renaldo Jackson. Jackson entered onto the northbound lanes of Interstate 255 from Camp Jackson Road. After the ramp tapers to an end, northbound I-255 has three through lanes. Jackson merged onto the right-most through lane. Jackson testified that when he entered onto I-255 the roadway was clear with a tractor-trailer in the center-most through lane, approximately "a football field" ahead of him. Jackson remained in the right-most lane, accelerated, and proceeded to pass the truck.
¶ 5 Jackson testified that he attempted to pass the truck on the right because "that was the lane I was in so I just wanted to get past." He testified that he was in the act of passing for approximately 10 to 15 seconds. Jackson asserted that he was concerned about being in a blind spot for the truck so he sped up. Jackson also testified that he was urged by a front seat passenger, his brother Rashad Jackson, to hurry while they were overtaking the truck and that he was almost past the cab of the truck at the time of collision. Heard, Jackson's aunt, was a back seat passenger.
¶ 6 The other vehicle involved in the accident was the truck-an 18-wheel semitrailer truck loaded with 50,000 pounds of lime. The truck was driven by Robert Fudge. Fudge testified that he had entered the middle lane while in a construction zone about five miles before the site of the accident and that he had been planning to exit onto I-70 about four miles ahead. Fudge described his actions:
"A. I turned my signal on. I slowed down. I speeded up a little bit. I looked in my mirrors. I slowed down. I let off of it. It slowed back down. Novehicles ever showed themselves in my mirrors at all and that usually counts for-you know, I'm doing 55. There ought to be no vehicles sitting beside me at that time.
Q. [Attorney for defendant:] All right. So you're saying you looked at this mirror?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you didn't see anything?
A. I did not see nothing. I had cars coming out of the construction zone. Since I was in the middle they were passing me on the right all the way up through there. I knew they was coming and coming and, you know, sometimes I'd see them and say well, okay. And the next thing you know another one goes by, okay, and they was all passing on the right. "
Fudge continued:
¶ 7 Jackson's Impala came to rest upside down against a concrete barrier in the middle of I-255. Its occupants, including Heard, were transported from the scene by ambulance.
¶ 8 Fudge pled guilty to a traffic citation, received two months of court supervision, and was fined $150. The order indicated that the citation was amended to failure to obey a traffic control device (625 ILCS 5/11-305(a) (West 2012)). The order read: "Defendant disobeyed a traffic control device, specifically a lane line, which resulted in an accident involving another vehicle."
¶ 9 Passengers Heard and Rashad Jackson filed a complaint sounding in negligence against Fudge. Renaldo Jackson filed a separate complaint against Fudge. These complaints were consolidated. Heard and Rashad Jackson filed an amended complaint naming both Fudge and Renaldo Jackson as defendants. Rashad Jackson settled. Heard proceeded to trial on her complaint against Fudge and Renaldo Jackson.
¶ 10 After trial, the jury returned separate verdict forms against Heard for Fudge and Jackson. The verdict forms named the parties, but did not mention negligence. The verdict in favor of Fudge read: "We, the jury, find for ROBERT FUDGE and againstANGELLA HEARD." Heard filed a posttrial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or alternatively for a new trial. The circuit court denied the motion, ruling:
¶ 11 Heard appeals.
¶ 13 Judgment notwithstanding the verdict should be granted only when all the evidence if viewed most favorably to the nonmoving party so overwhelmingly favors the moving party that no contrary verdict based on the evidence could ever stand. Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co., 37 Ill. 2d 494, 509, 229 N.E.2d 504, 513 (1967). The consideration of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict does not rest on the credibility of the witnesses or discernment of the weight to be given conflicted evidence. Maple v. Gustafson, 151 Ill. 2d 445, 453, 603 N.E.2d 508, 512 (1992). The motion requires the court to limit its consideration to the evidence in the record and any rational inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Maple, 151 Ill. 2d at 453, 603 N.E.2d at 512. A judgment notwithstanding the verdict is not justified merely because the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Maple, 151 Ill. 2d at 453, 603 N.E.2d at512. On appeal, a trial court's denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is reviewed de novo.
¶ 14 A motion for a new trial requires a trial court to weigh the evidence, set aside a verdict, and order a new trial if a verdict is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. A verdict is considered against the manifest weight of the evidence if the opposite result is clearly evident or where the findings of the jury are unreasonable, arbitrary, and not based on the evidence. Maple, 151 Ill. 2d at 453, 603 N.E.2d at 512. As the trial court had the opportunity of observing the witnesses, the ruling on motion for a new trial will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.
¶ 15 A driver may change lanes "only when such change can be accomplished with due regard to the safety of other motor vehicles." Hasselbacher v. Mendell, 119 Ill. App. 2d 90, 94, 255 N.E.2d 484, 486 (1970). The evidence that Fudge negligently changed lanes in breach of this duty is overwhelming.
¶ 16 Fudge admits that the accident happened upon his changing into the right-hand lane. Fudge's excuse is that he actually did look but that "[n]o vehicles ever showed themselves in my mirrors" and that "[t]here ought to be no vehicles sitting beside me at that time." The record belies any claim that Jackson's Impala had just entered onto the side of the truck. The record overwhelmingly indicates that the Impala was almost past the truck, and not just "beside" it. Fudge himself testified that the impact was on the front of his cab, and the physical evidence indicates that point of impact between the two vehicles was the cab of the truck and the rear portion of driver's side of the Impala.
¶ 17 Moreover, Fudge's assertion that he looked in his mirror does not make this a matter of credibility. In Grass, the appellate court reversed judgment on a jury verdict rendered in favor of the defendant. Grass v. Hill, 94 Ill. App. 3d 709, 714, 418 N.E.2d 1133, 1137 (1981). The defendant had attempted to pass three slow-moving vehicles within 100 feet of an intersection and claimed that the vehicles he was passing obstructed his view of the intersection. Despite the defendant's claim that he was on proper lookout, the court in Grass found that his negligence should have been found as a matter of law, holding:
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