Maple v. Gustafson

• Decision Date: 24 September 1992
• Docket Number: No. 72357,72357
• Citation: 151 Ill.2d 445,603 N.E.2d 508,177 Ill.Dec. 438
• Parties: , 177 Ill.Dec. 438 Carlos MAPLE et al., Appellees, v. Mervin E. GUSTAFSON, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 508

603 N.E.2d 508

151 Ill.2d 445, 177 Ill.Dec. 438

Carlos MAPLE et al., Appellees, v. Mervin E. GUSTAFSON, Appellant.

No. 72357.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Sept. 24, 1992.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 30, 1992.

Martin K. Morrissey, Reed, Armstrong, Gorman, Coffey, Thomson, Gilbert & Mudge, P.C., Edwardsville, for appellant.

Michael R. Bilbrey and Pamela J. Wise, Bono, Goldenberg, Hopkins & Bilbrey, P.C., Wood River, for appellees.

Justice THOMAS J. MORAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Carlos and Mary Maple (plaintiffs) filed suit against Mervin E. Gustafson (defendant) in Madison County to recover damages caused by the alleged negligence of the defendant in operating his vehicle. At trial, the court found the evidence of defendant's negligence so persuasive that it removed any question of negligence from the jury and instructed it only on the issues of proximate cause, damages, and contributory negligence. After deliberating, the jury returned a general verdict for the defendant; consequently, we do not know on what basis it found for defendant. Plaintiffs then filed a post-trial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (judgment n.o.v.) or, in the alternative, a new trial. The court denied this motion in full.

Plaintiffs appealed the denial of their post-trial motion, arguing that because the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence, they should be entitled to a new trial. The appellate court reversed, finding for the plaintiffs, and remanded the cause to the trial court solely to determine the amount of damages to be awarded. (214 Ill.App.3d 1065, 158 Ill.Dec. 425, 574 N.E.2d 219.) Subsequently, this court granted defendant's petition for leave to appeal (134 Ill.2d R. 315).

The issue before this court is whether the appellate court properly reversed the trial court, by finding for the plaintiffs notwithstanding the jury's verdict for the defendant.

This case involves an automobile accident that occurred in Granite City, Illinois, on October 8, 1986. Plaintiffs were traveling in their vehicle at approximately 35 miles per hour when defendant's vehicle, traveling perpendicular to plaintiffs', pulled out from a cross street and stopped directly in front of them. Carlos tried to avoid colliding with defendant by braking, but his automobile failed to stop in time. Plaintiffs allegedly sustained $400 damage to the front bumper and grill of their car, while defendant's car sustained approximately $800 to $900 worth of damage.

Neither of the plaintiffs struck the interior of their car on impact. Consequently, they did not sustain any cuts, bumps, bruises or abrasions. Additionally, neither plaintiff complained of any injury at the scene; however, they claimed that pain developed within one week after the accident, at which point they sought treatment from a chiropractor, Dr. Charles King, Jr. Plaintiffs were made aware of Dr. King's practice by virtue of a flyer they had received in the mail. After Dr. King treated Carlos, he referred him to Dr. Maurice Miller, who examined him and reviewed his computerized tomography (CT) scans taken at Wood River Township Hospital. Apparently, Mary was not referred to Dr. Miller. He indicated that the CT scans revealed a bulging disc in Carlos' spinal column. While there was some conflicting testimony between Dr. Miller and Dr. King, both of them testified that they believed the October 8 accident caused the conditions they had found in their examinations of plaintiffs. Upon request of defense counsel, on August 31, 1987, Dr. Raymond O. Frederick, a general surgeon, examined the plaintiffs. He opined that the October 8 accident did not cause the symptoms complained of by Carlos and Mary. However, the plaintiffs claim that Dr. Frederick testified to the effect that minor injuries occurred to Mary as a result of the accident.

Plaintiffs initially contend that they had requested the trial judge to enter a directed verdict in their favor, and to only have the jury compute the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiffs. A review of an in-chambers conference held after the introduction of all the evidence, on June 14, 1989, appears to indicate that the judge did in fact agree with plaintiff's counsel, that proximate cause and the existence of damages had been removed as issues, as demonstrated by the following excerpt from that conference:

"THE COURT: * * * There will be one verdict form that they [the jury] find for her [Mary Maple] and against Gustafson. It is up to them to determine the amount of damages. The question as to her is the amount of damages. The question as to Carlos is--Well, they will have to determine the amount of damages, but they would have to determine the applicable degree of culpability or negligence on the part of each side."

Nevertheless, subsequent to this conference, the court clearly instructed the jury, pursuant to instructions submitted by the plaintiffs, that the court had only found defendant to be negligent as a matter of law (i.e., that there existed a duty and a breach by defendant) and that the jury was to determine whether the plaintiffs had proven damages and proximate cause. Consequently, regardless of the implication created by the in-chambers discussion, by virtue of the jury instructions given, we conclude that the elements of proximate cause and damages had not yet been determined at that point.

Defendant maintains that when the appellate court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded it for a new trial only on the amount of damages, it effectively entered a judgment n.o.v. (that is because to send the cause back as it did, the appellate court would have had to find that the plaintiffs proved all of the elements of a prima facie case, including duty, breach, proximate cause, and the existence of damages, whereas the trial court did not so conclude). Defendant alleges that since the appellate court entered its own judgment on the proximate cause and damage issues, leaving only the amount of damages for subsequent jury consideration, the court erred since it did not apply the Pedrick standard, which must be satisfied before a judgment n.o.v. can be entered. (Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co. (1967), 37 Ill.2d 494, 229 N.E.2d 504.) Instead, defendant claims, the appellate court erroneously applied a lesser standard which is used for determining the right to a new trial.

An initial step in analyzing the issue before us is to determine the authority of the jury, trial court, and appellate court, and their relationship to one another. Unquestionably, it is the province of the jury to resolve conflicts in the evidence, to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses and to decide what weight should be given to the witnesses' testimony. (People v. Holmes (1990), 141 Ill.2d 204, 243, 152 Ill.Dec. 268, 565 N.E.2d 950.) A trial court cannot reweigh the evidence and set aside a verdict merely because the jury could have drawn different inferences or conclusions, or because the court feels that other results are more reasonable. (Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union Ry. Co. (1944), 321 U.S. 29, 35, 64 S.Ct. 409, 412, 88 L.Ed. 520, 525; Kahn v. James Burton Co. (1955), 5 Ill.2d 614, 623, 126 N.E.2d 836.) Likewise, the appellate court should not usurp the function of the jury and substitute its judgment on questions of fact fairly submitted, tried, and determined from the evidence which did not greatly preponderate either way. Brendel v. Hustava (1981), 97 Ill.App.3d 792, 799-800, 53 Ill.Dec. 119, 423 N.E.2d 503; Ford v. Baker (1978), 61 Ill.App.3d 45, 48, 18 Ill.Dec. 368, 377 N.E.2d 853; Koris v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. (1975), 30 Ill.App.3d 1055, 1058, 333 N.E.2d 217; Johnson v. Princeville Community High School District 206 (1965), 65 Ill.App.2d 487, 493, 212 N.E.2d 755.

There are established standards to be used in determining whether a directed verdict, judgment n.o.v., or a new trial should be granted. A directed verdict or a judgment n.o.v. ¹ is properly entered in those limited cases where "all of the evidence, when viewed in its aspect most favorable to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors movant that no contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever stand." (Pedrick, 37 Ill.2d at 510, 229 N.E.2d 504.) In ruling on a motion for a judgment n.o.v., a court does not weigh the evidence, nor is it concerned with the credibility of the witnesses; rather it may only consider the evidence, and any inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the party resisting the motion. (Mizowek v. De Franco (1976), 64 Ill.2d 303, 309-10, 1 Ill.Dec. 32, 356 N.E.2d 32; Oberman v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. (7th Cir.1974), 507 F.2d 349, 353.) Most importantly, a judgment n.o.v. may not be granted merely because a verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Oberman, 507 F.2d at 353.

"The standards relating to the direction of verdicts and to the granting of new trials are of course different. In Pedrick this court declared: 'We have rather carefully preserved the distinction between the evidentiary situation which will require a new trial [citation], and that justifying direction of a verdict or judgment n.o.v. There is, in our judgment, excellent reason for so differentiating to be found in the radically different results of allowance of the two motions, and we believe a more nearly conclusive evidentiary situation ought to be required before a verdict is directed [or judgment n.o.v. is entered] than is necessary to justify a new trial.' " (Mizowek, 64 Ill.2d at 310, 1 Ill.Dec. 32, 356 N.E.2d 32, quoting Pedrick, 37 Ill.2d at 509-10, 229 N.E.2d 504.)

The court has no right to enter a judgment n.o.v. if there is any evidence, together with reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, demonstrating a substantial factual dispute, or where the assessment of credibility of the witnesses or the determination regarding conflicting evidence is decisive to the outcome. See Villa v. Crown Cork...