Heard v. Quintana

• Decision Date: 21 April 2016
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 5:16-95-DCR
• Parties: Lionel Vincent Heard, Petitioner, v. Francisco Quintana, Warden, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky

184 F.Supp.3d 515

Lionel Vincent Heard, Petitioner,

v.Francisco Quintana, Warden, Respondent.

Civil Action No. 5:16-95-DCR

United States District Court, E.D. Kentucky, Central Division. (at Lexington).

Signed April 21, 2016

Lionel Vincent Heard, Lexington, KY, pro se.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Danny C. Reeves, United States District Judge

Inmate Lionel Vincent Heard is currently confined by the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") at the Federal Medial Center-Lexington ("FMC"), located in Lexington, Kentucky. Proceeding without an attorney, Heard has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 [Record No. 1]. Heard alleges that Respondent Francisco Quintana, Warden of FMC, has improperly refused to grant him a one-year reduction of his federal sentence after having participated in the BOP's Residential Drug Abuse Program.¹ Heard further alleges that Warden Quintana has also improperly refused to consider him either for placement in a Residential Reentry Center ("RRC"), also known as a half-way house, or for release to home confinement ("house arrest" as described by Heard). Heard has paid the $5.00 filing fee. [Record No. 5]

I.

On November 19, 2009, Heard was indicted in this jurisdiction and charged with conspiring to distribute over fifty grams of cocaine base (i.e., crack cocaine). United States v. Lionel Vincent Heard , No. 2:09–CR–86–DLB–EBA–1, 2009 WL 5328839 (E.D.Ky. Nov 19, 2009) [Record No. 3, therein] On July 9, 2010, Heard pleaded guilty to one count of conspiring to distribute fifty grams cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 [see Record Nos. 39; 40 therein]. On that same date, Heard was sentenced to serve a 108 month term of imprisonment [Record No. 42, therein].²

According to the BOP's website, Heard projected release date is November 17, 2017. Seehttp://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/(last visited on April 20, 2016).

II.

The Memorandum attached to Heard's § 2241 petition is rambling and disjointed, making it difficult to reconstruct the relevant facts with any precision. However, it appears that, as a federal drug offender, Heard was either considered for participation in, or actually participated in, the RDAP. At some point in 2015, he was "expelled" from the program. See Petition [Record No. 1, p. 3] Heard states that "...before he was allowed to enter the program...," Dr. Stenson at FMC-Lexington knew about his preexisting cardiac condition, but "...made no mention of his being expelled at that time and his Equal Protection rights not to be discriminated against because of his disability." [Id. ] Heard states that when he entered into the RDAP contract, he was not informed "...that he would be ineligible for the one-year early release or RRC placement and Respondent was well aware that petitioner had adefibulator [sic] at that time." [Id. ] Heard argues that nothing in 18 U.S.C. § 3621 permits the BOP to deny a federal prisoner the one-year sentence reduction based on his medical condition or medical disability. [Id. , p. 4]

Heard also asserts that Warden Quintana violated his constitutional rights by refusing to consider him for either RRC placement or home confinement based on his pre-existing cardiac condition. He also argues that he should be granted either RRC placement or home confinement under the Second Chance Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–199, 122 Stat. 657 (Apr. 9, 2008). Heard may also be claiming that he qualifies for a compassionate release from federal custody based on 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (c)(1)(A). Finally, Heard claims that, by denying him a one-year sentence reduction, and by refusing to grant him either RRC placement or home confinement, Warden Quintana has discriminated against him based on his medical disability and, therefore, has denied him equal protection and due process guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

Heard administratively exhausted one issue raised in his § 2241 petition, to wit: his dissatisfaction with being denied RRC placement. Heard submitted a BP-9 administrative remedy request to Warden Quintana requesting consideration for such placement. Warden Quintana apparently denied the request, although Heard did not attach either his administrative remedy request or the Warden's denial to his § 2241 petition.

On December 22, 2015, Heard filed a BP-10 appeal to the BOP's Mid-Atlantic Regional Office ("MARO"), seeking consideration for an RRC placement. [Record No. 1–1, p. 8] On January 13, 2016, J.F. Carraway, Regional Director of the MARO, affirmed Warden Quintana's decision and denied Heard's appeal. [Id. ] Carraway explained that a medical evaluation conducted on December 22, 2015, revealed Heard's "...fragile condition due to cardiac problems," and that Heard's condition "...indicates a prolonged need for anticoagulant with an implanted defibrillator

."

[Id. ] Carraway informed Heard that if his medical condition improved, the Regional Reentry Management Branch would reassess whether he would be suitable for RRC placement; that Heard's medical plan of care was adequate and complete; and that Heard's medical needs were being properly addressed. [Id. ]³

Heard alleges that he appealed the MARO's decision to the BOP General Counsel in Washington, D.C. [see Record No. 1, p. 3, ¶ 9], but he neither attached a copy of his BP-11 appeal, nor identified the date on which he filed his BP-11 appeal. Accepting as true Heard's allegation that he filed a timely BP-11 appeal, and further assuming that Heard received no response from the General Counsel, the lack of a response constitutes a denial. See 28 C.F.R. 542.18 ("If the inmate does not receive a response within the time allotted for reply, including extension, the inmate may consider the absence of a response to be a denial at that level.")

In his § 2241 petition and attached memorandum, Heard seeks an order directing Respondent Francisco Quintana, the Warden of FMC-Lexington, to reduce his sentence by one year, based on his participation in the RDAP. [Record No. 1, pp. 6-7; ¶ 13(a); Record No. 1–1, p. 7] Alternatively, Heard seeks an order directing his transfer to an RRC; his release to home confinement; or a "compassionate release" from federal custody. [Id. ]

III.

The Court conducts an initial review of habeas corpus petitions. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 ; Alexander v. Northern Bureau of Prisons , 419 Fed.Appx. 544, 545 (6th Cir.2011). The Court must deny the petition "if it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief." Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts (applicable to § 2241 petitions pursuant to Rule 1(b)). The Court evaluates Heard's petition under a more lenient standard because he is not represented by an attorney. Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) ; Burton v. Jones , 321 F.3d 569, 573 (6th Cir.2003). At this stage, the Court accepts Heard's allegations as true, and liberally construes his legal claims in his favor. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555–56, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). But for the reasons set forth below, the Court has determined that Heard is not entitled to relief under § 2241, and will therefore deny his habeas petition.

IV.

Heard's challenge to his expulsion from the RDAP—and the resulting denial of a one-year reduction on his 108-month federal sentence—lack merit. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3621, the BOP must provide each prisoner the opportunity to participate in residential substance abuse treatment in his place of confinement. See 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b), (e)(1). The statute provides two incentives to prisoners who successfully complete an RDAP. First, the Director has discretion to modify the conditions of the prisoner's confinement. See 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(A). Second, certain prisoners may be eligible for early release from their sentences. Specifically, the statute states:

The period a prisoner convicted of a nonviolent offense remains in custody after successfully completing a treatment program may be reduced by the Bureau of Prisons, but such reduction may not be more than one year from the term the prisoner must otherwise serve.

18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added).

The statute leaves the decision of whether to grant early release to the discretion of the BOP. See Lopez v. Davis , 531 U.S. 230, 241, 121 S.Ct. 714, 148 L.Ed.2d 635 (2001). Thus, even where a prisoner successfully completes the RDAP, the BOP retains the discretion to deny early release. See McLean v. Crabtree , 173 F.3d 1176, 1182 (9th Cir.1999) ; Orr v. Hawk , 156 F.3d 651, 653–54 (6th Cir.1998).

Heard's expulsion or removal from RDAP did not deprive him of either procedural or substantive due process. A prisoner has no liberty interest in discretionary release from prison prior the expiration of his or her sentence. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex , 442 U.S. 1, 7, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979) (holding "[t]here is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence"). Nor does a prisoner have a liberty or property interest in participating in a prison rehabilitation program. See Moody v. Daggett , 429 U.S. 78, 88, 97 S.Ct. 274, 50 L.Ed.2d 236 (1976).

The statute itself does not implicate a constitutionally-protected liberty interest because it does not mandate a sentence reduction. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e). Congress mandated in § 3621 that only inmates who successfully completed the RDAP could be considered for "early release" from confinement, but Congress neither defined the term "successfully," nor identified the contours or requirements for prisoner eligibility. The statute thus leaves the interpretation and related decisions to the BOP's discretion. "In this familiar situation, where Congress has enacted a law that does not answer ‘the precise question at issue,’ all [a reviewing court] must decide is whether...