Hearn v. James
| Decision Date | 04 June 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 81-7808,81-7808 |
| Citation | 677 F.2d 841 |
| Parties | Sarah Louise HEARN, Petitioner, v. Elton Floyd JAMES, Warden, Georgia Women's Correctional Institution, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Philip B. Spivey, Milledgeville, Ga., for petitioner.
Nicholas G. Dumich, Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, Ga., for respondent.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia.
Before TUTTLE, RONEY and CLARK, Circuit Judges.
Sarah Louise Hearn appeals from the district court's denial of her petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We affirm.
Petitioner was indicted for murder by a Muscogee County, Georgia, grand jury in February 1977. Following a jury trial, she was convicted of voluntary manslaughter on April 29, 1977, and received a ten-year sentence. On direct appeal, petitioner's conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Georgia Court of Appeals. Hearn v. State, 145 Ga.App. 469, 243 S.E.2d 728 (1978). Petitioner thereafter filed an application for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of Georgia, and the application was denied.
On July 27, 1978, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court of Muscogee County, Georgia. This petition was denied on October 6, 1978. Petitioner's subsequent application for certificate of probable cause to appeal was denied by the Georgia Supreme Court on October 30, 1978.
On May 14, 1980, petitioner filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus, this time in the Superior Court of Baldwin County, Georgia. The petition was denied on August 7, 1980, and the Georgia Supreme Court denied petitioner's application for certificate of probable cause to appeal on May 7, 1981.
On July 9, 1981, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. Petitioner raised two issues in the district court. First, she alleged that the trial court's instructions to the jury created a presumption on the issue of intent, an essential element of murder, thereby shifting the burden of proof to petitioner on that issue in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Second, petitioner alleged that she was denied due process because the trial court erroneously prohibited her from introducing evidence of prior specific acts of violence by the victim, such evidence being relevant to petitioner's claim of self-defense.
The district court, without conducting an evidentiary hearing, determined that petitioner's claims were unmeritorious and denied relief on September 3, 1981. Petitioner then timely filed her notice of appeal. The district court issued a certificate of probable cause to appeal on October 6, 1981, and the case is now properly before this court for determination pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253. On this appeal, petitioner raises the same two issues presented to the district court. Finding that the district court correctly decided both issues, we affirm the denial of petitioner's habeas corpus petition.
Petitioner's first contention is that the trial court's instructions to the jury created a presumption on the issue of intent, which is an essential element of murder under Georgia law. See Ga.Code Ann. § 26-1101; Mason v. Balkcom, 669 F.2d 222, 224 (5th Cir. 1982). Petitioner argues that this instruction shifted the burden of proof to her on this element of the crime charged, thus relieving the prosecution of its constitutional burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). The challenged instructions read as follows:
Ladies and gentlemen, a crime is a violation of a statute of this State in which there shall be a union or joint operation of act and intention. A person will not be presumed to act with criminal intention, but the triers of fact, and that is the jury, may find such intention in consideration of the words, conduct, demeanor, motive and all of the circumstances connected with the fact for which the accused is prosecuted. A specific intent to commit the crime charged in the indictment is an essential element that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Intent is also a question for the jury and is ordinarily ascertained by acts and conduct. Intent may be shown in many ways, provided the jury finds that it existed from the evidence produced before them. It may be inferred from the proven circumstances or by acts and conduct, or it may be presumed when it is the natural and necessary consequence of the act. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner is correct in her assertion that the emphasized portion of the challenged instructions is very similar to the instruction declared unconstitutional in Sandstrom. Had petitioner been convicted of murder, we might very well conclude that the challenged instructions deprived her of due process. See Mason v. Balkcom, 669 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1981). Petitioner was convicted not of murder, however, but rather of voluntary manslaughter, which under Georgia law requires no proof of specific intent to kill. See Ga.Code Ann. § 26-1102. 1 Therefore, even though the instructions at issue may have relieved the state of its burden of proving an essential element of the crime charged (murder), the crime for which petitioner was convicted (voluntary manslaughter) does not require proof of that element and thus the error must be declared harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
"(B)efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). In making this determination, the test is whether the error might have contributed to the conviction. Id. at 23, 87...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Biller v. Lopes
...findings since it only clarifies an important factual matter not addressed on the record by any state court. Cf. Hearn v. James, 677 F.2d 841, 844 (11th Cir.1982); 28 U.S.C.Sec. 2254(d)(1) and (3). In addition, the respondent has presented no support for his assertion that the petitioner ha......
-
Fulton v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary
...(6th Cir.1980) (intent conceded by accused), or was manifestly not ultimately decided adversely to the accused, e.g., Hearn v. James, 677 F.2d 841, 843 (11th Cir.1982) (erroneous murder instruction on intent; conviction only of On this threshold analysis of the instructions' effects we ther......
-
Connecticut v. Johnson, 81-927
...had no bearing on the offense for which he was convicted, it would be appropriate to find the error harmless. See, e.g., Hearn v. James, 677 F.2d 841, 843 (CA11 1982); State v. Sheldon, 301 N.W.2d 604, 613 (N.D.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1002, 101 S.Ct. 1711, 68 L.Ed.2d 204 (1981). In ad......
-
Lamb v. Jernigan
...intentional killing); Holloway v. McElroy, 632 F.2d at 619 (same).11a We realize that language in the recent opinion of Hearn v. James, 677 F.2d 841 (11th Cir. 1982) suggests that an almost identical instruction may be invalid under Sandstrom. Id. at 843. The Hearn panel did not decide this......