Hearn v. State

Citation43 Fla. 151,29 So. 433
PartiesHEARN v. STATE.
Decision Date05 March 1901
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Florida

Error to criminal court of record, Duval county; John L. Doggett Judge.

Wesley Hearn was convicted of being accessory after the fact to the willful burning of his own building, and brings error. Reversed.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

COUNSEL John E. Hartridge, for plaintiff in error.

William B. Lamar, Atty. Gen., for the State.

OPINION

TAYLOR C.J.

The plaintiff in error, Wesley Hearn, was tried and convicted in September, 1900, in the criminal court of record for Duval county, of the crime of being accessory after the fact of the felony of willfully and maliciously burning a building of his own property, and sentenced to confinement in the penitentiary and to the payment of a money fine, and from such judgment takes writ of error.

The information upon which he was tried contains three counts, the first charging him with willfully and malicously counseling, hiring, and inducing one Henry Hicks to willfully and maliciously set fire to, burn, and destroy the dwelling house of him, the said Wesley Hearn; the second charging him with so counseling, hiring, and inducing the said Hicks to willfully and maliciously set fire to, burn and destroy a certain building and furniture therein contained, the property of said Hearn, with intent to defraud three insurance companies having fire insurance policies thereon. Of the crimes charged in these two counts of the information the defendant was acquitted.

The third count, upon which he was convicted, is as follows 'And your informant aforesaid, upon his oath aforesaid further information makes that the said Wesley Hearn, of the county and state aforesaid, in the county and state aforesaid, on the 17th day of May in the year of our Lord 1900, did then and there, the said Wesley Hearn not standing in the relation of husband or wife, parent or grandparent, child or grandchild, brother or sister, by consanguinity or affinity, to the said Henry Hicks, and with the intent that the said Henry Hicks should escape trial and punishment, did then and there maintain and assist the said Henry Hicks by then and there sending him, the said Henry Hicks, money and whisky, and advising him, the said Henry Hicks, to keep his mouth shut, he, the said Wesley Hearn, then and there knowing that the said Henry Hicks had theretofore, on, to wit, the 9th day of May in the year of our Lord 1900, committed a felony, to wit, had willfully and maliciously set fire to and burned a certain building, to wit, a house, the property of the said Wesley Hearn, which said house the said Henry Hicks had theretofore, on, to wit, the 9th day of May in the year of our Lord 1900, willfully and maliciously set fire to and burned, contrary to the form of the statute,' etc.

The first error assigned is that the court erred in denying the defendant's motion to quash the third count in the information. This motion is evidenced to us only in and by the bill of exceptions, and does not appear in the record proper of the transcript certified here. As motions to quash indictments are based wholly upon matters of record, and are addressed directly to the court, demanding a decision directly upon the matter of record presented, so that the motion itself, the matter it presents, and the ruling of the court thereon all appear of record, such motions and the rulings thereon form part of the record proper in the cause, and have no place in a bill of exceptions, and, when evidenced to an appellate court only by a bill of exceptions, such court cannot consider them. Brown v. State, 42 Fla. --, 27 So. 869; Raines v. State, 42 Fla. --, 28 So. 57. The first assignment cannot, therefore, be considered.

From the conclusion we have reached on the evidence in the cause it becomes unnecessary to discuss any other of the assignments of error than the one predicated...

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9 cases
  • Bowen v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
    • June 8, 2001
    ...the greater the potential it had to assist the felon, the more likely it was done with the requisite intent. See, e.g., Hearn v. State, 43 Fla. 151, 29 So. 433 (Fla.1901). See also Stephens v. State, 734 P.2d 555 (Wyo.1987) (holding evidence of intent to aid insufficient when defendant mere......
  • Killingsworth v. State
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Florida
    • September 30, 1925
    ...to convict, and the charge given by the court was full, and covered the proposition submitted in the request. In the Hearn Case, 43 Fla. 151, 29 So. 433, the defendant charged as accessory after the fact, and the court held that the intent alleged in such case to avoid detection, arrest, tr......
  • Ruiz v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
    • September 23, 1980
    ...529 (1966); and (3) aid to the felon with the intent that he escape arrest or punishment for the crime he has committed. Hearn v. State, 43 Fla. 151, 29 So. 433 (1901). Contrary to the state's contention, we think it obvious that the extra-confession showing which has been outlined containe......
  • Johnson v. State
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Florida
    • March 20, 1906
    ...... Jackson county of the offense of resisting and obstructing. without violence an officer in the discharge of his duty and. took a writ of error. The record contains no motion to quash. the indictment, therefore the assignment based on the refusal. of such motion cannot be considered. Hearn v. State,. 43 Fla. 151, 29 So. 433; Houston v. State (Fla.) 39. So. 468. . . The. denial of a motion in arrest of judgment is assigned as. error. Under this assignment it is contended that the. indictment is defective, in that it does not sufficiently set. forth the acts ......
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