Hearst Corp. v. Keller, 12784
| Decision Date | 13 March 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 12784,12784 |
| Citation | 100 Idaho 10,592 P.2d 66 |
| Parties | The HEARST CORPORATION, doing business as Hearst Magazines Division (Motor), a corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Frank KELLER, Defendant-Respondent. |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Frank E. Chalfant, Jr., Boise, for plaintiff-appellant.
Iver Longeteig of Runft & Longeteig, Boise, for defendant-respondent.
The complaint herein was filed January 15, 1977, and was served on respondent on January 19, 1977. Thereafter no appearance was made by respondent and default judgment was entered on February 9, 1977, and a copy thereof mailed to respondent. On February 18, 1977, respondent phoned his attorney for an appointment and, on March 16, 1977, motion for relief from default with supporting affidavit was filed. The affidavit alleges a breach of contract by appellant that respondent would plead as a counterclaim. The affidavit does not make any allegations denying appellant's complaint. Respondent's affidavit offers as his reason for not proceeding sooner that he was unaware of the strict requirements of the rules requiring answers and counterclaims to be made within twenty days of service.
I.R.C.P. 55(c) provides for setting aside a default judgment in accordance with I.R.C.P. 60(b). In pertinent part herein, the latter rule provides relief where a default judgment has been entered because of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. Such a motion initially presents questions of fact to be determined by the trial court. However, where the motion was heard on the written record only and without oral testimony, the appellate court may exercise its own discretion in passing on the matter. Fisher v. Bunker Hill Co., 96 Idaho 341, 528 P.2d 903 (1974); Thomas v. Stevens, 78 Idaho 266, 300 P.2d 811 (1956).
A motion to set aside a default judgment is addressed to the sound legal discretion of the trial court whose decision will not be reversed unless an abuse of discretion clearly appears. Fisher v. Bunker Hill Co., supra.
A mistake sufficient to warrant setting aside a default judgment must be of fact and not of law. Neglect must be excusable and, to be of that calibre, must be conduct that might be expected of a reasonably prudent person under the same circumstances. Thomas v. Stevens, supra. The record herein does not raise questions of inadvertence or surprise.
Defendant's affidavit herein offers as his mistake or excusable neglect only his statement that he was unaware of the strict requirements of the rules requiring answer and counterclaim to be made within twenty days of service. He offers no reason for reaching such a conclusion in view of the plain wording of the summons to the contrary. There is no plea that he could not read or understand, or was in any way distracted by other urgent matters. If he mistook the law such a mistake is not sufficient. If he decided the wording of the summons did not mean what it...
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Meyers v. Hansen
...voidable. The district court generally has discretion whether to vacate a default judgment under I.R.C.P. 55(c). Hearst Corp. v. Keller, 100 Idaho 10, 11, 592 P.2d 66, 67 (1979) abrogated on other grounds by Shelton v. Diamond Int'l Corp., 108 Idaho 935, 703 P.2d 699 (1985); Omega Alpha Hou......
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Riverside Development Co. v. Ritchie
...in accordance with the above principle that this Court can on a cold record draw its own inferences and conclusions. Hearst Corp. v. Keller, 100 Idaho 10, 592 P.2d 66 (1979); Fisher v. Bunker Hill Co., 96 Idaho 341, 528 P.2d 903 (1974); Thomas v. Stevens, 78 Idaho 266, 300 P.2d 811 (1956); ......
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Shelton v. Diamond Intern. Corp.
...legal discretion of the trial court, whose decision will not be reversed in the absence of abuse of that discretion. Hearst v. Keller, 100 Idaho 10, 592 P.2d 66 (1979)." After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and accordingly we In its findi......
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Fisher v. Crest Corp., 16003
...that would be sufficient if pled before default. "Factual details must be pled with particularity." Hearst Corporation v. Keller, 100 Idaho 10, 12, 592 P.2d 66, 68 (1979). Recently our Supreme Court reiterated the long-standing rule that "a party alleging fraud must plead the factual circum......