Hearts With Haiti, Inc. v. Kendrick
| Decision Date | 18 May 2018 |
| Docket Number | SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO. CV-16-313 |
| Parties | HEARTS WITH HAITI, INC., and MICHAEL GEILENFELD, Plaintiffs v. PAUL KENDRICK, Defendant |
| Court | Maine Superior Court |
CUMBERLAND, ss
Before the court is defendant's motion for partial judgment on the pleadings. For the following reasons, defendant's motion is denied-in-part and granted-in-part.
On February 6, 2013, plaintiffs filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Maine. In the complaint, plaintiffs alleged: count I, defamation; count II, false light; count III, tortious interference with advantageous relationships; and count IV, punitive damages. On July 23, 2015, a jury found in favor of plaintiffs on their defamation, false light, and tortious interference claims and awarded plaintiffs $14.5 million in damages. Plaintiffs subsequently withdrew their punitive damages claim.
On November 18, 2015, defendant appealed to the First Circuit. On January 12, 2016, defendant filed a motion to dismiss in the District Court, arguing that the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because U.S. citizens who are domiciled abroad are "stateless" and unable to invoke the court's diversity jurisdiction. On February 16, 2016, the First Circuit remanded to the District Court to determine whether diversity jurisdiction existed at the time plaintiffs commenced suit. The District Court held a hearing on the jurisdictional issue on March 30, 2016. On June 20, 2016, the District Court granted defendant's motion to dismiss, finding that plaintiff Geilenfeld was domiciled in Haiti at the time plaintiffs commenced suit. Hearts with Haiti, Inc. v. Kendrick, 192 F. Supp. 3d 181, 204 (D. Me. 2016). On April 27, 2017, the First Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment dismissing the action for lack of federal subject-matter jurisdiction. Hearts with Haiti, Inc. v. Kendrick, 856 F.3d 1, 4 (1st. Cir. 2017).
Plaintiffs filed a complaint in this court on August 12, 2016. In the complaint, plaintiffs alleged: count I, defamation; count II, false light; count III, tortious interference with advantageous relationships; and count IV, intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendant filed an answer on October 3, 2016. On November 18, 2016, all proceedings were stayed. On October 18, 2017, defendant filed a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings. On October 20, 2017, the stay was lifted. On October 25, 2017, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint and alleged count V, negligent infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiffs allege that defendant has continued to make defamatory statements against them since the July 23, 2015 verdicts. (' .) On December 11, 2017, plaintiffs filed an opposition to defendant's motion for partial judgment on the pleadings. On December 18, 2017, defendant filed a reply to plaintiffs' opposition.
When made by the defendant, a motion for judgment on the pleadings "is the equivalent of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim." 2 Harvey, Maine Civil Practice § 12:14 at 430 (3d ed. 2011). When reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court "examine[s] the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff to determine whether it sets forth elements of a cause of action or alleges facts that would entitle the plaintiff to relief pursuant to some legaltheory." In re Wage Payment Litig. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2000 ME 162, ¶ 3, 759 A.2d 217. The court treats the facts in the complaint as admitted. Saunders v. Tisher, 2006 ME 94, ¶ 8, 902 A.2d 830. "Dismissal is warranted when it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief under any set of facts that he might prove in support of his claim." Johanson v. Dunnington, 2001 ME 169, ¶ 5, 785 A.2d 1244.
Defendant argues that, to the extent plaintiffs, in the complaint, allege conduct having occurred prior to August 12, 2014, plaintiffs' claims must be dismissed because they were not filed within the two-year statute of limitations for defamation claims. Defendant also argues that plaintiffs' claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress are subsumed by the defamation claim. Plaintiffs argue that their claims were timely filed pursuant to Maine's "saving statute," 14 M.R.S. § 855 (2016), that principles of equitable and judicial estoppel bar defendant from asserting a defense based on the statute of limitations, and that the emotional distress claims are not subsumed by their defamation claim.
Maine has a two-year statute of limitations for claims alleging false imprisonment, slander, or libel. 14 M.R.S. § 753 (2016). The First Circuit has held that this two-year statute of limitations also applies to claims alleging false light invasion of privacy. Gashgai v. Leibowitz, 703 F.2d 10, 13 (1st Cir. 1983). Because the complaint in this case was filed on August 12, 2016, plaintiff would ordinarily be barred from recovery for damages caused by defendant's defamatory conduct occurring prior to August 12, 2014. Plaintiff asserts, however, that the saving statute has tolled the statute of limitations.
Maine's saving statute states:
When a summons fails of sufficient service or return by unavoidable accident, or default, or negligence of the officer to whom it was delivered or directed, or the action is otherwise defeated for any matter of form, or by the death of either party the plaintiff may commence a new action on the same demand within 6 months after determination of the original action; and if he dies and the cause of action survives, his executor or administrator may commence such new action within said 6 months.
14 M.R.S. § 855. Plaintiff argues that the complaint is timely because it was filed within six months after the First Circuit affirmed the United States District Court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Further, plaintiff asserts that dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a dismissal "for [a] matter of form" within the meaning of the saving statute. Defendant argues that the saving statute does not apply because the complaint was filed during the pendency of the Federal Appeal and not after the First Circuit had issued its decision affirming the District Court's dismissal. Defendant also argues that dismissal due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not defeat for a matter of form.
Defendant argues the court must strictly construe "within" to mean that the complaint can be filed only inside the six-month period following the "determination of the original action." Plaintiff argues that the statute sets only the outer bound of when the complaint must be filed.
The issue before the court is one of statutory interpretation. When interpreting a statute, the court's "primary purpose is to 'give effect to the intent of the legislature.'" Harrington v. State, 2014 ME 88, ¶ 5, 96 A.3d 696 (quoting Joyce v. State, 2008 ME 108, ¶ 7, 951 A.2d 69).The court starts with the plain meaning of the language and considers the language in the context of the whole statutory scheme. Id.
When used as a preposition, "within" can be defined as meaning either "inside" or "not exceeding the limits or extent of . . . time." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISHLANGUAGE 1990 (5th ed. 2016). Both of these constructions of "within" lend support to the parties' respective arguments. The court, therefore, looks to the context of the statutory scheme to determine the proper construction.
The saving statute operates to provide plaintiffs who have had an otherwise timely action defeated for a matter of form an opportunity to correct the defect in form and file a second action despite the statute of limitations having run. See 14 M.R.S. § 855. The purpose of a statute of limitations is to provide repose to defendants by setting a "terminal date to litigation" beyond which a plaintiff may not seek redress through the courts. See Pino v. Maplewood Packing Co., 375 A.2d 534, 537 (Me. 1977). In this context, it is apparent that the language "within 6 months after determination" should be read as setting the limit of time that a plaintiff may not exceed in filing a second action.
In this case, the United States District Court entered an order on June 20, 2016, dismissing plaintiffs' action. Hearts with Haiti, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 3d at 208. Plaintiffs filed the complaint in this court on August 12, 2016. On April 27, 2017, the First Circuit issued a decision affirming the District Court's dismissal. Hearts with Haiti, Inc., 856 F.3d 1. Accordingly, plaintiffs filed the complaint "within 6 months after determination" of their federal case.1
The purpose of Maine's saving statute is "to protect a diligent [plaintiff] from losing his cause of action on account of the abatement of his timely and appropriate action because of some matter not affecting its merits . . . but not to afford the means of a designing [plaintiff] to use toextend his cause of action in violation of the statutory limitation." Densmore v. Hall, 109 Me. 438, 441, 84 A. 983, 984 ( R.S. ch. 83, § 94 (1903)). Accordingly, whether an action was brought in good faith and whether it was defeated on the merits are relevant considerations when determining if defeat was for a matter of form. See id.; Townsend v. George P. Dantos & Old Orchard Beach, No. CV-92-608, 1993 Me. Super. LEXIS 113, at *6 (June 25, 1993). The Massachusetts Court of Appeals has indicated that "a touchstone for what constitutes dismissal for reasons of matter of form is whether, within the original statute of limitations period, the defendant had actual notice that a court...
To continue reading
Request your trial