Heat Energy Advanced Technology, Inc. v. West Dallas Coalition for Environmental Justice
| Decision Date | 12 February 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 03-97-00382-CV,03-97-00382-CV |
| Citation | 962 S.W.2d 288 |
| Parties | HEAT ENERGY ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY, INC.; Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission; and Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commissioners Barry R. McBee, R.B. Marquez and John M. Baker, Jr., in their Official Capacities, Appellants, v. WEST DALLAS COALITION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Cynthia Woelk, Brian E. Berwick, Asst. Attys. Gen., Natural Resources Div., Philip S. Haag, Hutcheson & Grundy, L.L.P., Austin, for appellants.
Robert W. Doggett, Legal Services of North Texas, Dallas, for appellee.
Before CARROLL, C.J., and JONES and KIDD, JJ.
This is a suit for judicial review of an order of the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission ("Commission") concluding that the West Dallas Coalition for Environmental Justice ("Coalition") did not have standing to challenge the application for a renewal permit by Heat Energy Advanced Technology ("HEAT"). The district court reversed the Commission's order and remanded the cause to the Commission for further proceedings. Both the Commission and HEAT appeal the district court's judgment. We will affirm the judgment.
HEAT is a company that operates a hazardous and industrial waste storage and processing facility in Dallas. The Coalition is a group of people who live near the HEAT facility. HEAT applied to the Commission to renew its permit to conduct its business. The Coalition requested that the Commission conduct a hearing on the permit renewal, presumably under the authority of section 361.088 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act, which requires the Commission to provide an opportunity for a hearing to "persons affected" by the permitted activity. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 361.088(c) (West Supp.1998).
The Commission referred the case to the State Office of Administrative Hearings ("SOAH") for a determination of whether the Coalition had standing to participate in a hearing on HEAT's permit. See Tex. Water Code Ann. § 5.115(a) (West Supp.1998) (); 30 Tex. Admin. Code §§ 55.23, .27(a)(3) (1997) (defining associational standing and providing for referral of cases to SOAH at discretion of Commission). An administrative law judge ("ALJ") at Both the Commission and HEAT appeal the district court's judgment. HEAT asserts three points of error, contending: (1) the Coalition failed to invoke the district court's jurisdiction to review the Commission's order; (2) the district court erred in ruling section 361.0832 applies to the Commission's review of the ALJ's proposal; and (3) the evidence supported the Commission's determination of the standing issue, regardless of whether the Commission had limited or unbridled discretion to overturn the ALJ's findings and conclusions. The Commission brings one point of error, which is essentially the same as HEAT's third point of error. We will first address the threshold jurisdictional issue.
SOAH conducted an evidentiary hearing and concluded in a proposal for decision that the Coalition had standing to participate in the requested hearing. The Commission reviewed the proposal and concluded otherwise. In doing so, the Commission substituted its own findings of fact and conclusions of law for some of the ALJ's findings and conclusions. The Coalition filed a motion for rehearing. Before the Commission had ruled on the Coalition's motion for rehearing, however, the Coalition sought judicial review of the Commission's decision in district court. See Tex. Water Code Ann. § 5.351 (West 1988). The district court ultimately determined that section 361.0832 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act limited the Commission's authority to overturn the ALJ's proposal for decision in the proceedings concerning the Coalition's standing. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 361.0832(c), (d) (West 1992). The district court then determined that the Commission had exceeded its authority and that the evidence did not support the Commission's reversal of the ALJ's proposal. Therefore, the court remanded the cause to the Commission for further proceedings.
In its first point of error, HEAT argues that the Coalition failed to invoke properly the jurisdiction of the district court. Specifically, HEAT contends that the Coalition followed improper procedures by filing its petition for judicial review before the Commission had acted upon the Coalition's motion for rehearing. HEAT argues this untimely filing divested the district court of jurisdiction over the lawsuit.
HEAT relies primarily on Lindsay v. Sterling, 690 S.W.2d 560 (Tex.1985). In Lindsay, a county judge sitting in an administrative capacity issued an order denying the renewal of a license. The licensee filed a motion for rehearing but sought judicial review in district court before the county judge had overruled the motion. The supreme court held that the licensee had failed to invoke the jurisdiction of the district court because she petitioned for judicial review without first receiving a ruling on her motion for rehearing. Lindsay, 690 S.W.2d at 563. In other words, she had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. Id.
The licensee in Lindsay argued that the applicable statutes required her to seek judicial review before the county court had overruled her motion for rehearing. The relevant enabling statute required an aggrieved licensee to seek judicial review within thirty days from the date the order became "final and appealable." See id. On the other hand, the Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act ("APTRA," predecessor to the Administrative Procedure Act, Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 2001.001-.902 (West 1998)) allowed the county judge up to forty-five days from the date the order was issued to overrule the motion for rehearing. Id. Thus, the licensee contended that her thirty-day appellate timetable might expire before the county judge had acted upon her motion for rehearing. Accordingly, she filed her petition for judicial review before the county judge acted on her motion for rehearing. She contended that the conflicting statutes created a procedural "catch-22" that required a premature filing of her petition.
The supreme court disagreed with the licensee's assessment of the interplay between the enabling statute and APTRA. APTRA provided that an administrative order did not become final and appealable until after the agency had overruled the motion for rehearing.
The supreme court read this APTRA provision in conjunction with the provision in the enabling statute, which said the judicial-review timetable began when the order became final and appealable. The supreme court concluded that the thirty-day time period to seek judicial review would not begin to run until after the county judge had overruled the licensee's motion for rehearing. Id. Therefore, the supreme court held that the licensee's premature petition for judicial review failed to invoke the district court's jurisdiction. Id. at 564. The supreme court's pronouncement in Lindsay that a timely, ruled-upon motion for rehearing is a prerequisite to a suit for judicial review became a rule generally applicable to all administrative proceedings
The supreme court recently recognized an exception to this rule. In Simmons v. Texas State Board of Dental Examiners, the court addressed a similar situation in which a licensee petitioned for judicial review before the agency had overruled his motion for rehearing. 925 S.W.2d 652 (Tex.1996). The court, however, reached the opposite conclusion from its decision in Lindsay. Id. at 653-54.
The key distinction between Lindsay and Simmons was the difference between the enabling statutes applicable in each case. Instead of requiring the licensee to petition within thirty days of the date the order became final, as the statute provided in Lindsay, the enabling statute in Simmons required the licensee to petition within thirty days of the date the agency sent him notice of the order. Id. at 653. However, the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") still allowed the agency at least forty-five days to rule on the required motion for rehearing. Id. Thus, the APA and the enabling statute could not be harmonized. The judicial-review timetable began and could possibly have expired before the licensee was able to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Recognizing this, the licensee in Simmons filed a motion for rehearing and then filed a petition in district court while the motion was still pending before the agency. The licensee asked the district court to stay the review proceedings until the agency had disposed of his motion. The court did so. After the motion was overruled by operation of law, the licensee asked the district court to reinstate his action for judicial review. The district court refused, relying upon Lindsay.
The supreme court reversed, noting the conflict between the enabling statute and the APA. Id. The court also noted that the licensee had attempted to reinvoke the jurisdiction of the district court after the motion had been overruled. Id. at 653-54. Based upon those facts, the court distinguished Lindsay and held the district court erred in dismissing the suit for judicial review. Id. at 654.
With this background in mind, we must decide whether the Coalition's petition for judicial review invoked the district court's jurisdiction despite the fact that the Coalition filed it while the motion for rehearing was still pending before the Commission. The Coalition contends that this case falls within the Simmons exception to the general rule because Texas Water Code section 5.351(b) requires the Coalition to file its petition before the time expired for disposition of the motion for rehearing. 1 Section 5.351(b) HEAT, on the other hand, argues the "effective date" of the order is not the date it was...
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