Heath v. S. Univ. Sys. Found.
| Decision Date | 24 May 2016 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 13-4978-SS |
| Parties | PANAGIOTA HEATH v. SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY SYSTEM FOUNDATION, et al |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
Before the undersigned is the motion for summary judgment of the defendants named in the second amended complaint, the Board of Supervisors for the Southern University and Agricultural and Mechanical College ("Southern") and Mostafa Elaasar ("Elaasar"). The parties consented to proceed before the assigned Magistrate Judge. Rec. doc. 35. For the reasons described below, the motion is granted.
The plaintiff, Panagiota Heath ("Heath") alleges that: (1) the action is brought pursuant to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; (2) 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (3) provisions of state law forbidding discrimination based on ethnicity and gender and all retaliation provisions of state law.
She alleges that: (1) she is a Caucasian female of Greek ethnicity, who speaks with a Greek accent and is a Greek Orthodox; (2) she began working at Southern in 1996 as an associate professor of mathematics; (3) in 2003 Elaasar became her direct supervisor as chairman of the College of Natural Sciences; (4) Elaasar is a native of Egypt and a Muslim; (5) he consistently appointed Muslim males to vacancies; (6) he made sexist remarks to Heath; (7) when she complained to him, he retaliated by attempting to isolate her professionally; (8) in June 2009, Heath filed suit in state court against Southern and Elaasar; (9) Elaasar committed further retaliatory acts; (10) Heath complained to higher ranking officials at Southern who failed to respond; and (11) because of the repeated humiliation, she suffered a nervous collapse and sought medical treatment. Rec. doc. 50. On April 8, 2013, Heath filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC based on sex discrimination and retaliation. Defendants' Exhibit 4. This suit was filed on July 3, 2013. Rec. doc. 1.
As to the Title VII claims against Southern, defendants contend that Heath failed to exhaust her administrative remedies for either discrimination or retaliation based on her race, religion or national origin. Defendants argue that most of the remaining allegations for the Title VII claims are time-barred. Defendants urge that the timely allegations for the Title VII claims do not support either a retaliation claim or a claim that Heath was subjected to a hostile environment.
As to the Section 1983 claims against Elaasar in his individual capacity, he asserts qualified immunity. Defendants argue that most of the allegations supporting the Section 1983 claims are time-barred. They urge that the remaining allegations are not actionable.
Heath contends that the Title VII and Section 1983 claims present continuous violations. She argues that all allegations after the summer of 2011 are available to support her claims and they are sufficient for Title VII and Section 1983.
Defendants contend that the state law claims against them must be dismissed because: (1) Southern is an arm of the State of Louisiana for the purposes of Eleventh Amendment Immunity and it did not waive its immunity; and (2) Louisiana's law prohibiting employment discrimination does not provide a cause of action against an individual employee. Rec. doc. 67 (Memorandum at 22-23). Heath concedes that her state law claims must be dismissed. Rec. doc. 70 (Memorandum at 26). Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted as to the state law claims.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 provides in pertinent part that summary judgment will be granted when "... the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with theaffidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 889, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 3189 (1990). To that end, the court must "view the facts and the inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Wyatt v. Hunt Plywood, 297 F.3d 405, 409 (5th Cir. 2002). Where the record taken as whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986); Washington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 901 F.2d 1281 (5th Cir. 1990).
Furthermore, the party moving for summary judgment must "demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact," but need not negate the elements of the nonmovant's case. Celotex, 106 S.Ct. at 2553; see Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3187. If the moving party fails to meet this initial burden, the motion must be denied, regardless of the nonmovant's response. If the movant does, however, meet this burden, the nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 106 S.Ct. at 2553-54. A dispute over a material fact is genuine, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Kee v. City of Rowlett Texas, 247 F.3d 206, 210 (5th Cir. 2001).
This burden is not satisfied with "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Matsushita, 106 S.Ct. at 1356, by "conclusory allegations," Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3180, by "unsubstantiated assertions," Hopper v. Frank, 16 F.3d 92 (5th Cir. 1994), or by only a "scintilla" of evidence, Davis v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 14 F.3d 1082 (5th Cir. 1994). The court resolves factual controversies in favor of the nonmoving party, but only when there is an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts. The court does not,however, in the absence of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts. See Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3188. Summary judgment is appropriate in any case "where critical evidence is so weak or tenuous on an essential fact that it could not support a judgment in favor of the nonmovant." Armstrong v. City of Dallas, 997 F.2d 62 (5th Cir. 1993). If the nonmoving party fails to meet this burden, the motion for summary judgment must be granted. See Evans v. City of Bishop, 238 F.3d 586, 588-89 (5th Cir. 2000). The nonmovant may not rest upon the pleadings, but must identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue for trial. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994).
In Fierros v. Texas Dept. of Health, 274 F.3d 187 (5th Cir. 2001), the Fifth Circuit cautioned that summary judgment is not favored in claims of employment discrimination and that the Supreme Court in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2110 (2000), emphasized the paramount role that juries play in Title VII cases, stressing that in evaluating summary judgment evidence, courts must refrain from the making of credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts, which are jury functions, not those of a judge. Fierros, 274 F.3d at 190-91.
Heath was born in July, 1948 in Khalkis, Greece. She was raised in Athens and finished high school in Athens. She came to the United States with her husband, a U.S. citizen. She earned a bachelor's degree in math at Holy Cross College in New Orleans. She obtained a master's degree in math and Ph.D. in mathematics education from UNO.1 Heath Dep. 7-8.
In 1996, Heath began teaching math at Southern.
In May 1998, she was peer evaluated by Elaasar for the period August 1997 to May 1998. He assigned the highest possible score for each of the 20 categories; for example a three was assigned to "acquires increased expertise by reading, attending workshops and enrolling in courses related to the profession." Heath's Exhibit 2 (PL 00429-30).
In 1999, 2000 and 2001, Heath served on committees at Southern. Heath's Exhibit 3. In 2000, she received positive evaluations from students. Heath's Exhibit 4.
In the fall of 2001, Heath sought tenure and promotion to associate professor. There were at least eight letters of recommendation from other faculty, including letters from Elaasar, Joe Omojola, Cynthia Singleton, and Louise Kaltenbaugh. Heath's Exhibit 2 (PL 00421-28). Elaasar stated:
Dr. Heath is a very considerate person with an appealing personality and her commitments to education are a great encouragement to her students. Students find her very approachable and knowledgeable of her subject.
Id. (PL 00427). Heath was promoted to associate professor of mathematics with tenure. Heath Dep. 10.
In 2003, Elaasar became chairman of the department of mathematics and physics. Heath's Exhibit 1 at para. 1.2
In 2003, Heath left New Orleans at Thanksgiving to see her sister in Virginia, who had been diagnosed with cancer. When she returned, she found that her final exam had been rewritten. Her students were being tested on material that she had not covered. Heath's Exhibit 1 at para. 8 and Heath Dep. 122-24.
In 2005, Heath alleges that Elaasar denied her permission to go to Athens to see her dying mother. Heath's Exhibit 1 at para. 7.
On June 20, 2005, Heath wrote a ten page "to whom it may concern" letter with complaints of harassment by Dr. Omojola, dean of science, and Elaasar. The letter refers to: (1) Elaasar's refusal to let her go to Athens to be with her mother; (2) the Thanksgiving 2003 visit to her sister; (3) a spring 2005 incident where a student allegedly was coerced into making a written complaint against her; (4) disparities in her compensation compared to other faculty; and (5) other issues. Heath's Exhibit 10 (PL 00462-71).
In 2005 after Hurricane Katrina, Elaasar and Heath were driving together to Southern University in Baton Rouge. She reports that he related that he was a radical Muslim and the time would come...
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