Heather v. Delta Drilling Co.

• Decision Date: 15 April 1975
• Docket Number: No. 4459,4459
• Citation: 533 P.2d 1211
• Parties: HEATHER, Dependent child of Bryan, Deceased, * Appellant (Claimant below), v. DELTA DRILLING COMPANY, Appellee (Respondent below).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Page 1211

533 P.2d 1211

HEATHER, Dependent child of Bryan, Deceased, ^* Appellant (Claimant below), v. DELTA DRILLING COMPANY, Appellee (Respondent below).

No. 4459.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

April 15, 1975.

Rehearing Denied May 13, 1975.

Donald L. Painter, Casper, for appellant.

James W. Owens of Murane, Bostwick, McDaniel, Scott, Greenlee & Owens, Casper, for appellee.

Before GUTHRIE, C. J., RAPER and THOMAS, JJ.

RAPER, Justice.

'The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society's condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage. But visiting this condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust.' Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, 1972, 406 U.S. 164, 175, 92 S.Ct. 1400, 1406, 31 L.Ed.2d 768. Thus, we must reopen and reexamine the judicial treatment of the illegitimate child in the application of Wyoming's workmen's compensation laws. ¹

Heather, the appellant, is admitted by appellee to be the illegitimate child of Bryan. When she was only a few months old, her father was killed instantly while employed by the employer-appellee. She has claimed benefits as the dependent child of the deceased workman and the claim was disapproved by the employer. The trial judge held that the status of illegitimacy deprived Heather of any entitlement to death benefits under § 27-89, W.S.1957, C.1967. ²

In re Dragoni, 1938, 53 Wyo. 143, 156, 79 P.2d 465, 468, very positively held that the word 'children,' as used in the workmen's compensation act with respect to awarding compensation in their favor for death or injury to parent means 'legitimate children' and illegitimate children are not eneitled to benefits under the workmen's compensation law of Wyoming. ³ We must set aside Dragoni on that issue for the reason that its interpretation establishes a discriminatory classification which is justified by no legitimate state interest and violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the constitution of the United States. Weber, ⁴ in arriving at this conclusion, while dealing with Louisiana's workmen's compensation law and by which we are similarly bound, went on to say:

"* * * It would, indeed be farfetched to assume that women have illegitimate children so that they can be compensated in damages for their (fathers') death.' (Citing case.)

'Nor can it be thought here that persons will shun illicit relations because the offspring may not one day reap the benefits of workmen's compensation.' ⁵

Illegitimate and legitimate children are now entitled to the same treatment without regard to their legitimacy, under the workmen's compensation law.

Having decided that an illegitimate child of an employee is entitled to the same consideration as a legitimate child of an employee under the workmen's compensation laws of Wyoming, we move to a consideration of the second question raised in this appeal. Is the child of the deceased workman entitled to benefits even though she was never actually furnished any specific financial or other support by her father, as she admits?

While we are elevating the status of the illegitimate child to that of the legitimate child, we are not approving the life style of those responsible for bringing such children into the world. An abnormal and generally unsatisfactory family relationship is created, lacking stability and guidance for the youngster. Our sole interest is in protecting the child of the union in only this one particular before us.

The specific statutory provisions controlling the answer to the question are found in § 27-49(II), W.S.1957, C.1967:

'(d) 'Dependent families' means the spouse, or children under eighteen (18) years of age of the workmen who are wholly or in part actually dependent upon the workman for support at the time of the injury, * * *

'(e) 'Child or children' means the immediate offspring, stepchild or stepchildren or legally adopted child or children of the injured workman, under eighteen (18) years of age or under twenty-one (21) years of age (if physically or mentally incapacitated from earning) and shall also include legitimate children of the injured workman born after his death or injury. In other cases, questions of family dependency in whole or in part shall be determined in accordance with the fact, as the case may be, at the time of the injury, * * *' ⁶

Appellee-employer argues that the trial judge correctly decided that since no support had been actually received by Heather in the shape of money, payment of doctor or hospital bills at the time of birth, or contribution by food or otherwise, she failed the test of dependency set out in 2 Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, § 63.00, p. 11-58. ⁷ We disagree and hold that § 27-49(II)(e) grants a conclusive presumption of dependency to a child of the covered workman. This is a new guideline in Wyoming jurisprudence, though possibly practiced administratively, thereby not previously bringing the matter before the courts.

A careful, analytical and thoughtful study of the foregoing statutory definition of 'a child or children' in § 27-49(II)(e) calls to our attention that after the definition in the first sentence, the second sentence qualifies the first by saying, 'In other cases, questions of family dependency in whole or in part shall be determined in accordance with the fact, as the case may be, at the time of the injury; * * *' (Emphasis supplied.) To tell it differently but with and in the same sense, the subsection is saying, 'Except in the case of a child or children, questions of family dependency, in whole or in part, shall be determined in accordance with the fact, as the case may be, at the time of the injury.' The conclusive presumption of dependency is thereby fixed and it is unnecessary to explore any effect of § 27-49(II)(d).

This becomes more apparent when we look into the history of this phase of the workmen's compensation law. By chapter 79, Session Laws of Wyoming, 1913, the legislature passed, 'AN ACT to submit to the qualified voters of the State of Wyoming an amendment to the Constitution of the State of Wyoming adding to Section 4 of Article 10 of the Constitution a provision authorizing and requiring Workmen's Compensation Acts.' By vote of the people, the proposed amendment was ratified on November 3, 1914, and proclaimed in effect December 26, 1914. Records of the Secretary of State. The authority for our workmen's compensation law as a result of the amendment is now found in § 4 of Art. X of the Wyoming constitution, wherein the following pertinent provision appears:

'* * * As to all extra hazardous employments the legislature shall provide by law for the accumulation and maintenance of a fund or funds out of which shall be paid compensation as may be fixed by law according to proper classifications to each person injured in such employment or to the dependent families of such as die as the result of such injuries, except in case of injuries due solely to the culpable negligence of the injured employee. * * *'

By chapter 124, Session Laws of Wyoming, 1915, our workmen's compensation law came into being. Subsections 6(j) and (k) ⁸ contained essentially the same language as subsections 27-49(II)(d) and (e) now in effect.

But from what did Wyoming model its act? We find quite a number of other contemporary state workmen's compensation laws with respect to dependency that carry marks of being a source for the particular sections in which we are interested; it is impossible to determine its exact origin. Notice many of the same words and phrases and their arrangement, for example, out of Massachusetts, L.1911, C. 751:

"Part II, § 7. The following persons shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for support upon a deceased employe:

* * *

* * *

"(c) A child or children under the age of eighteen years (or over said age, but physically or mentally incapacitated from earning) * * *

"In all other cases questions of dependency, in whole or in part, shall be determined in accordance with the fact, as the fact may be at the time of the injury; * * *" ⁹

Wyoming could have used this as a sample and mutilated it but it is still capable of identification and failed to lose its vigor in spite of parts that were hacked out and rearranged.

Under quite a number of decisions in states having statutes practically like that of Wyoming or the law of origin, whatever it might have been, where children under a particular age are conclusively presumed dependents, there is no necessity to prove any actual dependency and the right to recover is fixed. ¹⁰ We hold that to be the rule in Wyoming.

Such a presumption is founded on reason, is the result of common observation and follows from experience. As said in Gulf States Steel Co. v. Griffin, supra: (P. 128 of 214 Ala., p. 900 of 106 So.)

'* * * children under the age of 16 are not acquainted with or capacitated to compete with the necessities of life or the customs and requirements of business and social conditions, and are not acquainted with the laws protecting their rights and governing the family relations. * * *'

It further makes good logic for the workmen's compensation law to ensure support to those normally entitled to parental maintenance because there is an obligation of support that rests upon a father of either illegitimate or legitimate children and the courts have not hesitated to make reference to that obligation in approving the award, without reference to what actual support was being given at the time of the injury. The legislature has manifested the public policy of this State. Wyoming has the Uniform Illegitimacy Act, § 14-59 et seq., W.S.1957, C.1965, by which the obligation of support may be enforced not only by the mother but by the child, through its guardian or next friend, or by public authorities. Failure to support an illegitimate child is a crime, punishable by fine and jail sentence. §§ 14-87, 88. Since the mother and child...