Hebbring v. Hebbring

• Decision Date: 14 February 1989
• Docket Number: No. A038187,A038187
• Citation: 207 Cal.App.3d 1260,255 Cal.Rptr. 488
• Parties: In re MARRIAGE OF Cindy Lee and Jess E. HEBBRING. Cindy Lee HEBBRING, Respondent, v. Jess E. HEBBRING, Appellant.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 488

255 Cal.Rptr. 488

207 Cal.App.3d 1260

In re MARRIAGE OF Cindy Lee and Jess E. HEBBRING.

Cindy Lee HEBBRING, Respondent, v. Jess E. HEBBRING, Appellant.

No. A038187.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 5, California.

Feb. 14, 1989.

Victor A. Fershko, Napa, for respondent.

William H. McPherson, McPherson, Barnett & Mattice, Fairfield, for appellant.

KING, Associate Justice.

In this case we hold that (1) retention of jurisdiction over spousal support after a marriage of short duration can be an abuse of discretion; (2) the limitations on reimbursement for separate property contributions to the acquisition of community property imposed by Civil Code section 4800.2 ¹ are inapplicable to and do not limit the trial court's discretion in ordering reimbursement for postseparation separate property payments on community obligations; (3) the failure to request a statement of decision is fatal to an appellate attack on the valuation of property determined by the trial court where the value could have been arrived at from the evidence presented at trial; and (4) the trial court possesses jurisdiction in a marital dissolution action to order reimbursement for separate property of one spouse which has been wilfully destroyed by the other from the community property share of the latter.

Jess Hebbring appeals from a judgment of dissolution of marriage challenging both the community property division and a spousal support award. We affirm the trial court's orders as to the value of the community property interest in a gun collection and for reimbursement for destroyed separate property, and reverse as to the retention of jurisdiction over spousal support and the failure to order Epstein ² reimbursements for postseparation separate property payments on community obligations.

Jess and Cindy Hebbring had been married for two years, two months, and had no children when they separated on January 2, 1984. ³ Cindy filed for dissolution on October 3, 1984. On July 2, 1985, the trial court awarded her $500 per month temporary spousal support from April 15, 1985, until further order of the court. According to income and expense declarations filed at the time of trial Jess, a merchant marine, had a gross annual income of $41,800 while Cindy earned over $20,000 a year as the office manager for a law firm, a job she had held for seven years. Cindy's fringe benefits included full health insurance coverage.

Jess contends the trial court erred in applying section 4800.2 to Epstein reimbursements, abused its discretion in reserving jurisdiction over spousal support, arbitrarily valued his gun collection, and exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering him to reimburse Cindy for property of hers that he destroyed.

I.

The trial court ordered that Cindy "is entitled to a continuation of spousal support in the sum of $500.00 per month through June 1, 1986. At that time, the court will reserve jurisdiction with respect to continued spousal support." Jess contends this permanent open-ended reservation of jurisdiction over spousal support is an abuse of discretion given a marriage of short duration. He relies on In re Marriage of Bukaty, supra, 180 Cal.App.3d 143, 225 Cal.Rptr. 492, where the court affirmed a termination of jurisdiction after three years of spousal support following a 19-month marriage. Bukaty did not hold, however, that nontermination of jurisdiction would be an abuse of discretion.

It is true, as we recently noted, that to date there has been " 'no case declaring it to be an abuse of discretion not to terminate jurisdiction.' " (In re Marriage of Prietsch & Calhoun (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 645, 664, 235 Cal.Rptr. 587, quoting In re Marriage of Wright (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 253, 257, 131 Cal.Rptr. 870.) There is now. Under the facts of this case we hold that retention of jurisdiction over spousal support was error as a matter of law.

At the time of trial Cindy's annual income exceeded $20,000, an increase of $2,000 over her income at the date of separation. She had worked in the same capacity for the same employer for seven years before trial. The Hebbrings' marriage was of short duration, only two years and two months, and there were no minor children of the marriage. Temporary spousal support of $500 a month had previously been ordered and the trial court ordered support in this same amount for six months after the judgment.

The issue of retention of jurisdiction over spousal support has been confused ever since our Supreme Court held that termination of jurisdiction was erroneous after a lengthy marriage unless the record demonstrated the supported spouse would be able to adequately meet his or her needs. (In re Marriage of Morrison (1978) 20 Cal.3d 437, 453, 143 Cal.Rptr. 139, 573 P.2d 41.) "However, we reject the notion this proscription is applicable to all marriages, regardless of length. [p ] True, a trial judge need not, on the basis of duration alone, automatically terminate jurisdiction after a relatively short marriage. [Citations.] But there is no authority for wife's proposition the court must retain jurisdiction, even in a short marriage, in the absence of evidence the supported spouse will be self-supporting on the date selected for termination." (In re Marriage of Bukaty, supra, 180 Cal.App.3d at p. 148, 225 Cal.Rptr. 492, emphasis in original.)

The factors listed in section 4801 to be considered by the trial court in determining spousal support issues "should be considered in light of legislative intent expressed in the Assembly Judiciary Committee report in approving the Family Law Act. 'This report indicates that in those cases in which the supported spouse is working, the amount and duration of support, if any, should reflect this fact. The report also sets forth the Legislature's intent that courts should encourage supported spouses to seek employment. However, the report does not in any way suggest that when the supported spouse is unemployed or is earning only a small salary, a court should set a jurisdictional termination date based on the mere hope that this will induce that spouse to become self-supporting.' [Citation.] Indeed, our Supreme Court in Morrison recognized that '[l]imiting the duration of support so that both parties can develop their own lives, free from obligations to each other, is a commendable goal.' [Citation.]...." (In re Marriage of Prietsch & Calhoun, supra, 190 Cal.App.3d at pp. 662-663, 235 Cal.Rptr. 587.)

"In some instances the record will indicate that both spouses are employed, an increasingly prevalent situation today, or that there are sufficient assets available to enable each to provide for his or her needs. In that event, no support or support for only a limited time, without a retention of jurisdiction, would be appropriate. (Civ.Code, §§ 4801, subd. (a), 4806.)" (In re Marriage of Morrison, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 453, 143 Cal.Rptr. 139, 573 P.2d 41.)

As we recently noted, "In short-term marriages the duration of the marriage, considered alone, will usually militate against any but short-term spousal support with a fixed termination date...." (In re Marriage of Prietsch & Calhoun, supra, 190 Cal.App.3d at p. 663, 235 Cal.Rptr. 587.) "True, the length of the marriage is only one factor to be considered in making a support award. [Citation.] But it is a substantial one. It is indicative of the very essence of the union." (In re Marriage of Bukaty, supra, 180 Cal.App.3d at p. 149, 225 Cal.Rptr. 492.)

We hold that under the facts of this case--a marriage of short duration where the spouse seeking retention of jurisdiction is in good health and enjoys permanent employment providing income adequate for self-support--it is reversible error to retain open-ended jurisdiction over spousal support. This holding meets the objective of the legislative policy behind the Family Law Act that, where appropriate, the obligations of former spouses are ended so that they can proceed to develop their future lives.

Before leaving the subject of spousal support, we note that Jess has wisely not challenged the trial court's order requiring six months of postjudgment spousal support to Cindy. "After a short-term marriage, where no order for long term or 'permanent' support would be appropriate, such an order might be an appropriate vehicle for assisting an economically disadvantaged spouse to make an orderly and less traumatic transition to self-supporting status." (In re Marriage of Prietsch &amp Calhoun, supra, 190 Cal.App.3d at p. 656, fn. 3, 235 Cal.Rptr. 587.) Under the circumstances of this case, six months of spousal support was appropriate. It provided financial assistance to Cindy in making the transition to single status when she must again provide for her own support. During this transition period her housing situation may change and the results of the division of community assets and obligations may require a period of financial adjustment. Thus the circumstances, although not justifying the open-ended retention of jurisdiction over spousal support, did justify a short period of spousal support to allow Cindy a more orderly transition to self-sufficiency.

II.

The trial court found Cindy and Jess had each used postseparation separate property earnings to pay preexisting community obligations, expenditures which our Supreme Court has determined are ordinarily reimbursable upon dissolution. (In re Marriage of Epstein, supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 84, 154 Cal.Rptr. 413, 592 P.2d 1165.) The trial court also found the payments were made under circumstances in which it would have been reasonable to expect reimbursement, and did not constitute a discharge of the duty to support. (Id. at pp. 84-85, 154 Cal.Rptr. 413, 592 P.2d 1165.) However, because the payments were on debts incurred for the acquisition of property, the trial court felt bound by section 4800.2 ⁴ and thus ruled reimbursement was limited to amounts by which the payments reduced the outstanding principal...