Hebert v. Ford Motor Co.

• Decision Date: 03 October 1938
• Docket Number: No. 47.,47.
• Citation: 285 Mich. 607,281 N.W. 374
• Parties: HEBERT v. FORD MOTOR CO.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

285 Mich. 607

281 N.W. 374

HEBERT

v.FORD MOTOR CO.

No. 47.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Oct. 3, 1938.

Appeal (in nature of Certiorari) from Department of Labor and Industry.

Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Roy Hebert, employee, opposed by the Ford Motor Company, employer. To review an award of the Department of Labor and Industry granting compensation, defendant appeals in nature of certiorari.

Award affirmed.

Argued before the Entire Bench.

E. C. Starkey, of Dearborn, and O. W. Johnson, of Iron Mountain, for appellant.

Ray Derham, of Iron Mountain, for appellee.

POTTER, Justice.

April 18, 1927, plaintiff while employed by defendant suffered an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. At that time he was employed as a resaw operator and it is conceded this was skilled labor. It was claimed he was permanently and totally disabled from continuing in the work in which he was employed. However, he returned to work for his employer in another employment; and after he returned to work he was again seriously injured July 1, 1930, and compensation was paid for this injury to August 2, 1930. January 8, 1933, plaintiff became totally disabled from performing any labor in any capacity and he filed two petitions with the department of labor and industry (1) for the adjustment of his claim for the injury received in 1927; and (2) for further compensation for the injury suffered in 1930. When the matter came on for hearing, plaintiff elected to proceed on the basis of recovery of compensation for the accident of 1927. The commission awarded compensation to plaintiff from January 8, 1933, the period from which it was contended he was totally disabled. No appeal was taken from that award. July 15, 1937, plaintiff applied for a review of payments for the accident suffered in 1930, and on the hearing of such application he was by the department awarded compensation as for total disability of $18 a week, and defendant appeals.

Defendant contends plaintiff has split his cause of action.

1. Obviously, plaintiff had no cause of action against his employer in the sense of the common law, or any amendment thereto, to split. Proceedings under the workmen's compensation act, Comp.Laws 1929, § 8407 et seq., have nothing to do with common-law actions for damages for negligence on the part of the employer. Its enactment marked the crystallization into a legislative enactment of the economic fact that the ultimate consumer pays for the compensation of injured employees in the increased cost of the product. It aims at compensation, not damage. It is wholly substitutional in character and displaces the common-law liability for negligence. It should be administered substantially as insurance of a social character. Claimant had no action in law or in equity against his employer. Proceedings under the workmen's compensation act are purely statutory,-administrative, not judicial,-inquisitorial, not contentious,-disposed of not by litigation and ultimate judgment, but summarily. Most of the difficulties now encountered in the administration of the workmen's compensation act arise from injudicious attempts, sometimes acquiesced in, to engraft upon the workmen's compensation act commonlaw theories at variance with its spirit and intent. Plaintiff did not institute an action at law. He presented claims for compensation. He had no action against his employer and, therefore, no action to split.

2. Plaintiff suffered an accident in 1927 and such accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of his employment in a skilled occupation under the law as it was then in force entitled him to be compensated for total disability if he was permanently and totally incapacitated from continuing in the performance of his occupation, regardless of whether he had earning capacity which could be utilized in the performance of other work. If plaintiff was totally and permanently disabled from performing labor of the kind and character in which he was employed, which it is conceded was skilled labor, then so long as this condition existed plaintiff was entitled to be compensated under the act as in force at the time the injury occurred and his right to compensation accured. This is not only apparent from the act itself, but has been repeatedly recognized by the decisions of this court. Section 10, part 2, of the act, Comp.Laws 1929, § 8426, provides for the payment of compensation; and section 11, part 2, of the original act, Pub.Acts 1912, Ex.Sess., No. 10, provided: ‘Weekly loss in wages referred to in this act shall consist of such percentage of the average weekly earnings of the injured employe, computed according to the provisions of this section, as shall fairly represent the proportionate extent of the impairment of his earning capacity in the employment in which he was working at the time of the accident, the same to be fixed as of the time of the accident,’ atc.

This section came before the court in Foley v. Detroit United Railway, 190 Mich. 507, 157 N.W. 45. It was said [page 48]: ‘The language of this last provision is plain, and has but one obvious meaning, designating as the test capacity to earn in the same employment in which the employe was injured. That under this rule instances may arise where it works inequitably does not authorize the court to read exceptions into it or modify its plain...