Hebron v. State

• Decision Date: 01 September 1992
• Docket Number: No. 98,98
• Parties: Wayne Sylvester HEBRON v. STATE of Maryland. ,
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 219

331 Md. 219

627 A.2d 1029

Wayne Sylvester HEBRON v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 98, Sept. Term, 1992.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

July 22, 1993.

Gina M. Serra, Asst. Public Defender, argued and on brief (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, on brief), Baltimore, for petitioner.

Tarra DeShields-Minnis, Asst. Atty. Gen., argued and on brief (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen. of Maryland, on brief), Baltimore, for respondent.

Argued before ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, McAULIFFE, CHASANOW, KARWACKI and ROBERT M. BELL, JJ., and CHARLES E. ORTH, Jr., Judge of the Court of Appeals (Retired, Specially Assigned).

ROBERT M. BELL, Judge.

At issue in this case is whether the proposition that a conviction based solely on circumstantial evidence cannot stand unless the circumstances are inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence is a proper subject of jury instruction or simply a matter of evidentiary sufficiency. The Court of Special Appeals held that it is the latter. Hebron v. State, 92 Md.App. 508, 608 A.2d 1291, cert. granted, 328 Md. 462, 615 A.2d 262 (1992). We agree.

I.

The petitioner, Wayne Hebron, appeals his convictions, entered in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, for breaking and entering a dwelling house, attempted breaking and entering, and destruction of property. At trial, two individuals who resided in the victim's development testified. Although neither witnessed the breaking of the victim's door frame, both identified the petitioner, in a line-up, as the driver of the car that was parked in the area just prior to the incident. One witness testified that she saw the petitioner park the car near the victim's home and, walking between two buildings, proceed in the direction of that home. She then heard a loud "bash bang" noise. About twenty seconds later, she saw the petitioner emerge from between the two buildings, get into his car, and drive away. The second witness could only testify to seeing the driver; she did not see him approach the building.

After the trial judge instructed the jury that,

There are two types of evidence; direct and circumstantial. The law makes no distinction between the weight to be given to either direct or circumstantial evidence. No greater degree of certainty is required of circumstantial evidence than of direct evidence. In reaching your verdict, you should weigh all the evidence presented, whether it be direct or circumstantial,

the petitioner requested that it also be instructed that "If you can draw more than one reasonable inference from the circumstantial evidence, then [the petitioner] must be found not guilty." The trial judge refused. The jury having returned guilty verdicts, the petitioner was sentenced to three years imprisonment for breaking and entering and a concurrent sixty day term of imprisonment for destruction of property. ¹ The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. This case is now before this Court pursuant to the writ of certiorari which we issued at the petitioner's request.

II.

Relying on the principle enunciated in West v. State, 312 Md. 197, 539 A.2d 231 (1988), the petitioner argues that, in a case in which the evidence consists only of circumstantial evidence, a jury instruction on reasonable hypothesis of innocence should be propounded. Specifically, he maintains that, because a different standard is employed when determining the appropriateness of a jury instruction than when weighing evidentiary sufficiency, the Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that the reasonable hypothesis of innocence principle is a matter of evidentiary sufficiency and not properly the subject of a jury instruction; determining whether a rational trier of fact could find proof beyond a reasonable doubt should not relieve the trial judge of the responsibility of properly instructing the jury. As the petitioner sees it, therefore, the question is whether Maryland Rule 4-325(c) ² requires that a reasonable hypothesis of innocence instruction be propounded, not whether the evidence to support the conviction is sufficient.

Rejecting the petitioner's arguments, the State contends that such an instruction is confusing and wholly unnecessary, when, as here, the jury is properly instructed on the reasonable doubt standard. Additionally, the State agrees with the intermediate appellate court that the circumstantial evidence principle is a rule of evidentiary sufficiency, a matter for determination by the judge, not the jury.

III.

A.

When it reviewed the case, on appeal, the Court of Special Appeals rejected the petitioner's jury instruction argument. After examining the way direct and circumstantial evidence are treated in this State and analyzing the Supreme Court's decision in Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 75 S.Ct. 127, 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954), the intermediate appellate court stated, Equally cogent in our view is the fact that, under the language used in Wilson [v. State, 319 Md. 530, 573 A.2d 831 (1990) ] and earlier cases, the issue raised by a case resting entirely on a single strand of circumstantial evidence is not one of reasonable doubt, which is for the jury to determine, but of evidentiary sufficiency, which is for the judge to determine. Wilson ... confirmed that a conviction based solely on a single strand of circumstantial evidence "is not to be sustained" unless the circumstances, taken together, are inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence.

This is, and always has been, a rule relating to evidentiary sufficiency.

92 Md.App. at 516-17, 608 A.2d at 1296. The court went on to hold:

[W]here the defendant posits that the State's evidence consists of a single strand of circumstantial evidence that is not inconsistent with a reasonable hypothesis of innocence, he is effectively charging that the evidence is legally insufficient. If that claim is made timely and properly, it is incumbent upon the judge to rule upon it as a matter of law, in the context of a motion for judgment of acquittal. If the motion is granted, of course, the count(s) to which it applies may not be submitted to the jury. If the motion is denied, the court must instruct on reasonable doubt, but should not supplement that instruction with any special focus on hypotheses arising from circumstantial evidence.

Id. at 519-20, 608 A.2d at 1297.

B.

It is well settled, in this State, that a conviction upon circumstantial evidence alone will not be sustained unless the circumstances, taken together, are inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Wilson v. State, 319 Md. 530, 537, 573 A.2d 831, 834 (1990); West v. State, 312 Md. 197, 211-12, 539 A.2d 231, 238 (1988); Brown v. State, 222 Md. 290, 296, 159 A.2d 844, 847 (1960); Vincent v. State, 220 Md. 232, 237, 151 A.2d 898, 901 (1959); Shelton v. State, 198 Md. 405, 411-412, 84 A.2d 76, 80 (1951). This principle has often been the subject of jury instructions.

The rationale underlying the giving of the circumstantial evidence jury instruction requested here is the notion that circumstantial evidence is inherently suspicious and less trustworthy than direct evidence. Holland, 348 U.S. at 139-40, 75 S.Ct. at 137, 99 L.Ed. at 166. That proposition is not universally accepted. The Supreme Court of Washington, in State v. Gosby, 85 Wash.2d 758, 765-67, 539 P.2d 680, 685 (1975), stated:

... whether direct evidence or circumstantial evidence is more trustworthy and probative depends upon the particular facts of the case and no generalizations realistically can be made that one class of evidence is per se more reliable than is the other class of evidence. Obviously, since circumstantial evidence is not per se less reliable than is direct evidence, there is no need to give the multiple-hypothesis instruction when circumstantial evidence is involved.

The Holland Court has also rejected it:

There is some support for this type of instruction in the lower court decisions, but the better rule is that where the jury is properly instructed on the standards for reasonable doubt, such an additional instruction on circumstantial evidence is confusing and incorrect.

Circumstantial evidence in this respect is intrinsically no different from testimonial evidence. Admittedly, circumstantial evidence may in some cases point to a wholly incorrect result. Yet this is equally true of testimonial evidence. In both instances, a jury is asked to weigh the chances that the evidence correctly points to guilt against the possibility of inaccuracy or ambiguous inference. In both, the jury must use its experience with people and events in weighing the probabilities. If the jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, we can require no more.

348 U.S. at 139-40, 75 S.Ct. at 137-38, 99 L.Ed. at 166-67 (citations omitted). The Holland rationale is now followed in the federal courts, see United States v. Fiore, 821 F.2d 127, 128 (2d Cir.1987); United States v. Rodriguez, 808 F.2d 886, 890 (1st Cir.1986); United States v. Stone, 748 F.2d 361, 362 (6th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 822, 111 S.Ct. 71, 112 L.Ed.2d 45 (1990); United States v. Bell, 678 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir.1982), and has been embraced by a number of states. See Henry v. State, 298 A.2d 327 (Del.1972); State v. O'Connell, 275 N.W.2d 197 (Iowa 1979); Commonwealth v. Kinney, 12 Mass.App. 915, 423 N.E.2d 1017 (1981); State v. Turnipseed, 297 N.W.2d 308 (Minn.1980); State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991); Johnson v. State, 632 P.2d 1231 (Okl.Crim.1981); State v. Roddy, 401 A.2d 23 (R.I.1979); State v. Stokes, 299 S.C. 483, 386 S.E.2d 241 (1989); State v. Eagle, 611 P.2d 1211 (Utah 1980); State v. Derouchie, 140 Vt. 437, 440 A.2d 146 (1981). But see Roy v. State, 375 So.2d 1289 (Ala.Cr.App.1979); Mercer v. State, 169 Ga.App. 723, 314 S.E.2d 729 (1984); State v. Holman, 109 Idaho 382, 707 P.2d 493 (App.1985); Adams v. State, 542 N.E.2d 1362 (Ind.App.1989); Stringfellow v. State, 595 So.2d 1320 (Miss.1992); People v. Ford, 66 N.Y.2d...