Heck v. Simplexgrinnell LP
| Decision Date | 23 February 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 14 C 5491,14 C 5491 |
| Parties | GARY HECK, Plaintiff, v. SIMPLEXGRINNELL LP Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Defendant SimplexGrinnell LP entered a contract to install fire protection equipment at a customer site, and subcontracted certain of the electrical work to Hartmann Electric Co. Plaintiff Gary Heck, a Hartmann electrician, sustained injuries when he fell over pipes while completing that work. He then brought this negligence action, alleging that Defendant is liable for the injuries.1 Plaintiff asserts myriad theories of negligence, each premised on alleged failures of Defendant: failure to inspect, failure to provide a safe place to work, failure to properly maintain the room where the accident occurred, failure to provide prior warning of dangerous conditions, failure to provide "adequate safeguards" that might have prevented the injury, and failure to supervise his work. (Doc. 1-1, at 3-4). Each theory necessitates that Plaintiff first demonstrate that Defendant owed him a duty of reasonable care. Defendant has moved for summary judgment, asserting that, as a general contractor, it owed no duty of care to Plaintiff unless it retained control over his work, which it did not. Plaintiff disagrees, contendingthat Defendant exercised sufficient control to create a duty. For reasons discussed below, the Court grants Defendant's motion for summary judgment.
Defendant is in the "fire protection business." (Doc. 46-1, at 9:11-13). In 2009, it entered a "Building Services Agreement" with customer Griffin Capital for service and ongoing inspection of its fire alarm system. (Doc. 46-5, at 37-49). Approximately two weeks before Plaintiff's accident in June 2012, Defendant entered into a "Services and Goods Order Agreement" (the "Services Agreement") with the customer for installation of a "low air trouble alarm" in the customer's "Fire Pump Room." (Doc. 46-6; Doc. 49 ¶ 8; Doc. 46-1, at 9:11-14). The project entailed coordination of three individuals: a sprinkler fitter, who would install a low-air pressure switch; an electrician, who would pull electric wire from the switch to a fire alarm panel; and finally, a fire alarm technician, who would connect and test the device. (Doc. 49 ¶¶ 20-22). Defendant employed sprinkler fitters and fire alarm technicians to complete those portions of the project itself, but it subcontracted the electrical work to Hartmann. (Id. ¶¶ 9, 19). No written agreement was executed by Defendant and Hartmann in relation to this work.
Plaintiff, who had completed similar projects on numerous occasions during his forty years as an electrician, spoke with Defendant's employee Nick Lieggi about the project. (Id. ¶ 5; Doc. 46-1, at 23:12-14, 36:18-24; Doc. 49 ¶¶ 5, 27). During a telephone call, Lieggi provided the address of the project to Plaintiff, and told him thatthe job consisted of pulling a pair of wires from the low-air pressure switch to the fire alarm control panel, and also what tools and materials he would need. (Doc. 49 ¶¶ 27, 28; Doc. 46-1, at 37:1-12, 37:22-23, 38:11-39:14). Lieggi also told Plaintiff that the fire alarm technician would make connections and test the device on June 15, so Plaintiff believed that he needed to finish the electrical work on June 14. (Doc. 49 ¶ 29; Doc. 46-1, at 107:16-108:6).
When Plaintiff arrived at the site on June 14, 2012, he saw Defendant's sprinkler fitter, Mike Styx, who had just finished installing the switch. (Doc. 49 ¶ 31; Doc. 46-1, at 42:17-43:6). Styx told him that it was "tight" in the Fire Pump Room. (Doc. 46-1, at 106:13-20). Aside from this interaction, no one else spoke with Plaintiff before or during the course of his work, and Defendant provided him with no safety training or other instructions before he began. (Doc. 45 ¶¶ 19, 21; Doc. 46-1, at 55:22-56:11). Plaintiff brought his own tools and equipment, and before beginning, he surveyed the room and concluded that running wire from the switch to the fire alarm panel would entail his stepping over a fixed set of pipes. (Doc. 45 ¶¶ 11, 14, 15, 16; Doc. 46-1, at 47:2-9). The pipes were on a "pad" and were approximately twelve to twenty-four inches off the ground. (Doc. 46-1, at 45:5-24). Plaintiff believed that he could have benefitted from assistance of another electrician to feed the wire and thereby avoid stepping over the pipes, but he did not call Hartmann or Defendant to ask for help. (Doc. 46-1, at 41:8-17, 51:16-52:12, 108:7-18).
As Plaintiff ran the wire from the switch to the panel, he stepped over the pipes "[h]alf a dozen" times. (Id. at 48:13-23). After working for about two hours, he climbed over the pipes to free up wires, lost his balance, and fell. While falling, he injured hisright knee and left shoulder: he grabbed a jockey pump feed line to stop the fall, at which time he heard his left shoulder "pop," and when he released the line, he landed on his knee. (Id. at 49:3-50:15, 54:22-24, 50:15-17; Doc. 45 ¶ 10; Doc. 49 ¶¶ 2-3).
Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). A "material fact" is a fact that would "affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A "genuine issue" of material fact exists when "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. However, if the evidence is merely colorable or there is not sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party, there is no issue for trial and summary judgment may be granted. Id. at 249-50. The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). At the summary judgment stage, a court's function is not to "weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. In making this determination, courts "draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party[.]" Continental Cas. Co. v. Nw. Nat. Ins. Co., 427 F.3d 1038, 1041 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Franklin v. City of Evanston, 384 F.3d 838, 843 (7th Cir. 2004)).
To state a claim for negligence, Plaintiff "must allege (and ultimately prove) that the defendant owed him a duty and breached that duty, and that [his] injury was proximately caused by the breach." Kotecki v. Walsh Constr. Co., 333 Ill. App. 3d 583, 776 N.E. 2d 774, 777 (1st Dist. 2002). Turning to the duty issue, the general rule in Illinois is that one who employs an independent contractor owes no duty of care to that contractor. Martens v. MCL Constr. Corp., 347 Ill. App. 3d 303, 807 N.E. 2d 480, 488 (1st Dist. 2004). The reason is that "a principal [such as a general contractor] generally does not supervise the details of an independent contractor's work and, thus, is not in a good position to prevent negligent performance, . . . ." Id. (citing Anderson v. Marathon Petroleum Co., 801 F.2d 936, 938 (7th Cir. 1986)). In contrast, an "employee submits to the employer's right to monitor and direct the details of the work in exchange for wages." Id.
Section 414 of the Restatement (Second) Torts "carves an exception to this general rule where the general contractor . . . entrusts work to a subcontractor, exercises the requisite level of control over the work, and fails to exercise that control with reasonable care." Henderson v. Bovis Lend Lease, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 2d 847, 850 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (citing Aguirre v. Turner Constr. Co., 582 F.3d 808, 810 (7th Cir. 2009)); see also Aguirre v. Turner Constr. Co., 501 F.3d 825, 829-30 (7th Cir. 2007) ("Aguirre I"). Section 414 states:
One who entrusts work to an independent contractor, but who retains the control of any part of the work, is subject to liability for physical harm to others for whose safety the employer owes a duty to exercise reasonablecare, which is caused by his failure to exercise his control with reasonable care.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414 (1965). The Supreme Court of Illinois recognizes Section 414 as a statement of Illinois law, and Illinois courts apply it regularly in negligence cases. Aguirre I, 501 F.3d at 828 (); Martens, 807 N.E.2d at 488-93 ().
Whether a duty of care exists based on retained control within the meaning of Section 414 is a question of law to be decided by the Court. Aguirre I, 501 F.3d at 829; Wilkerson v. Schwendener, 379 Ill. App. 3d 491, 884 N.E. 2d 208, 211 (1st Dist. 2008); Rangel v. Brookhaven Constructors, Inc., 307 Ill. App. 3d 835, 719 N.E. 2d 174, 176 (1st Dist. 1999). It is only when there are underlying factual disputes that bear on whether control was retained or the amount of control that was retained that a trial by jury is necessary so the Court can determine whether a duty existed. Bokodi v. Foster Wheeler Robbins, Inc., 312 Ill. App. 1051, 728 N.E. 2d 726, 732-33 (1st Dist. 2000) ).
Comment c to Section 414 elucidates that, for the retained control exception to apply, the general contractor:
must have retained at least some degree of control over the manner in which the work is done. It is not enough that [the general contractor] has merely a general right to order the work...
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