Heckman v. Heckman

• Decision Date: 07 May 1906
• Docket Number: 165
• Citation: 64 A. 425,215 Pa. 203
• Parties: Heckman v. Heckman, Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

64 A. 425

215 Pa. 203

Heckman v. Heckman, Appellant

No. 165

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

May 7, 1906

Argued March 5, 1906

Appeal, No. 165, Jan. T., 1905, by defendant, from decree of C.P. Northampton Co., Feb. T., 1905, No. 2, on bill in equity in case of Anna Louisa Heckman v. Jacob Heckman. Affirmed.

Bill in equity to cancel a deed and for a reconveyance. Before SCHUYLER, P.J.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Supreme Court.

Error assigned was the decree of the court.

The decree of the court below is affirmed.

Russell C. Stewart, for appellant. -- The court had no jurisdiction Gleghorne v. Gleghorne, 118 Pa. 383; Ritter v Ritter, 31 Pa. 396; Small v. Small, 129 Pa. 366; Kennedy v. Knight, 174 Pa. 408; Haun v. Trainer, 190 Pa. 1; Penna. R.R. Co. v. Bogert, 209 Pa. 589; Williams v. Fowler, 201 Pa. 336.

Business dealings between parents and children and other near relatives are not per se fraudulent; they must be treated just as are the transactions between ordinary debtors and creditors, and where the bona fides of their transactions is attacked, the fraud must be clearly proved: Coleman's Estate, 193 Pa. 605; Carney v. Carney, 196 Pa. 34.

Calvin F. Smith, for appellee. -- The court had jurisdiction of this case: Miller v. Miller, 44 Pa. 170; McKendry v. McKendry, 131 Pa. 24.

The court did not err in refusing to permit defendant to testify.

There was sufficient proof of undue influence: Dilworth v. Kennedy, 201 Pa. 388; Wolf v. Christman, 202 Pa. 475; Penna. Co. v. R.R. Co., 204 Pa. 356; Darlington's App., 86 Pa. 512; Stepp v. Frampton, 179 Pa. 284; Miskey's App., 107 Pa. 611; Shea's App., 121 Pa. 302; Kline v. Kline, 57 Pa. 120; Mauk's Est., 19 Pa.Super. 338; Odenwelder's Est., 1 Pa.Super. 345.

The resumption of marital relations between husband and wife was not a good and sufficient consideration for the deed: Kesler's Est., 143 Pa. 386.

Before MITCHELL, C.J., FELL, BROWN, MESTREZAT and ELKIN, JJ.

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE MESTREZAT:

We have no doubt as to the jurisdiction of the court below to entertain the bill and to give the plaintiff such relief as the facts may warrant. The plaintiff is the wife of the defendant and avers in her bill that by fraud, undue influence and coercion, and without any consideration, the defendant procured the execution and delivery to him of a deed conveying the undivided one-half of certain real estate, her separate property, to a third party, who, without consideration reconveyed it to the defendant. She prays a reconveyance of the property. An answer was filed admitting the real estate to have been the separate property of the plaintiff but denying the truth of the averments of fraud, undue influence, coercion and want of consideration.

It is unquestionably true that at common law a wife could not maintain an action against her husband to enforce a property right. The legal entity of the marriage relation prevented such an action. Such is still the law of this state except where a statute has provided otherwise. But since, if not prior to, the passage of the Married Woman's Act of April 11, 1848, P.L. 536, 2 Purd. 1298, equity has permitted a married woman in Pennsylvania to protect her separate estate and enforce her property rights in a suit against her husband. That act declares that every species and description of property owned by a single woman shall continue to be her property as fully after her marriage as before, and that such property as shall accrue to her during coverture shall be owned, used and enjoyed by her as her own separate property. That act contains no provision which enables a wife to protect or enforce her rights to her property against the claim or acts of her husband. Nor has subsequent legislation provided her with a remedy at law against her husband while living with his wife for an invasion of her property rights. But, as said by PAXSON, C.J., in McKendry v McKendry, 131 Pa. 24: "The act (of 1848) having given the right, there must be a remedy to enforce it; otherwise it would fail of its purpose, in part, at least." The entity of the marriage relation which denies the wife a remedy at law cannot be invoked to oust the jurisdiction of equity when appealed to by her for the protection of her separate estate against the fraud or other wrong of her husband. The purpose of equity is to correct that wherein the law is inadequate or deficient and as the law gives an injured wife no relief against her husband for an invasion of her rights of property or for an infringement of contracts relative thereto, equity will come to her aid and give such redress as the circumstances and facts of the case may require. Especially is this true in Pennsylvania where our statute of June 16, 1836, P.L. 789 confers upon the court of common pleas the jurisdiction and powers of a court of chancery so far as relates to "the prevention or restraint of the commission or continuance of acts contrary to law, and prejudicial to the rights of individuals." Indeed, the right of the wife to invoke the aid of a court of equity in such cases necessarily follows in every jurisdiction where the wife has the right to own and enjoy her separate property. Legislation like the act of 1848, which secures a wife's separate property as against her husband and his creditors, would avail her but little if there was no remedy for an infringement of her rights to the property. If he, by fraud or other unconscionable acts, can with impunity deprive her of the title or possession, the act of 1848 which was enacted as a shield and protection for her and which declares that she shall own, use and enjoy her separate property is vain legislation and the disabilities imposed upon her by the common law will, to a great extent, still remain. When, therefore, the act of 1848 declared that a married woman shall own and enjoy her separate property, it secured to her the title and right to the possession of the property which a court of equity will recognize and protect. The right of a wife to invoke the aid of a chancellor for the protection of her separate property against her husband is sustained by abundant authority in this and other jurisdictions. Before the passage of the act of 1848, it was said by ROGERS, J., in Hutton v. Duey, 3 Pa. 100, "that a wife can acquire a separate property which a court of equity will protect is ruled in many cases, and is recognized in McKennan v. Phillips, 6 Whart. 571." The same principle is recognized in Bergey's Appeal, 60 Pa. 408. In McKendry v. McKendry, 131 Pa. 24, it is said by this court (p. 35): "we think a bill in equity would lie against the husband at the suit of the wife to protect her in the enjoyment of her separate estate, independently of the act of 1856. As before observed, it is an act contrary to law, and prejudicial to the interests of the wife, for a husband to deprive her of the possession and enjoyment of her separate estate, and, as there is no remedy at law provided for such case, we have no doubt that the jurisdiction of equity would attach under the act of 1836, conferring equity powers upon the courts." In Fry v. Fry, 7 Paige, 461, a conveyance from the wife to the husband after marriage was set aside in equity on the ground that it was improperly obtained by him by taking advantage of her ignorance of her rights, and her confidence in him. And in Lombard v. Morse, 155 Mass. 136, it was held that a husband could maintain a bill in equity against his wife to recover property which she had obtained from him by fraud shortly before and in contemplation of marriage. In the recent ...